When the bomb exploded at the Batasan last week, it was only natural that people asked if this is the second of a series of destabilization bombings preparatory to a “palace coup”. Whether a “solution” has been found, or it was a pre-arranged “solution”, it is hard to tell. We cannot say for sure if this bombing is or is not preparation for a palace coup. Bombings and coup plots are secret. All we can do is sort out the rumors, the open moves of key protagonists, the political terrain and come up with a likely scenario and where our own plans fit in.
What are the rumors? There are two versions of the “palace coup” rumor. One where GMA becomes a figurehead but remains president to gain some kind of legitimacy for coup plotters; another where she is completely edged out. This kind of palace coup would be undertaken by palace insiders who are worried that when GMA is gone, - even earlier, when she’s a lame duck, their political, economic and even physical survival would not be assured. I find this possibility unlikely mainly because the military is so divided none of the palace insiders could pull it off.
In this rumor, the movers would be the police generals in the cabinet (Mendoza and Ebdane), the Chief of Staff, Esperon, and Bert Gonzales. Mendoza and Ebdane’s control over the PNP is doubtful, especially with “FVR boy” Sonny Razon the new national police chief. The only PNP unit that would be useful in a coup is the SAF but reports indicate SAF junior officers are still sympathetic to the military rebels in Tanay. Bert Gonzales does not have troops, only ambitions. That leaves Esperon.
If you look at Esperon’s career, the most consistent thread is that he always follows the line of command. During EDSA 1 he stayed with Ver. Even the illegal things GMA asked him to do in the 2004 elections he did. He has loyalists from his PMA class 1974 such as Dolorfino and Ibrado, but none of them have the trust of junior officers. Class 1976 officers such as Yano and Maclang occupy key positions and are poised to take over after Esperon retires in February.
The other frequent rumor is an FVR-led coup with the backing of the US. I find this just as unlikely. I think FVR’s influence in the military at this time, ten years after he left the presidency is overrated. I also find the possibility of direct US military intervention unlikely. Bush cannot even get support for military action against Iran, a favorite target of his. The US would come in only if the situation has gone out of control as in 1989, and if limited intervention without the use of troops has great chance of success.
What we have to carefully watch is the situation with the military rebels. While their tactical situation is much weaker than in February 2006, they retain a lot of influence among junior officers in key combat ready units such as the marines, the Scout Rangers and SAF. They continue to raise the ante in their fight against Esperon, provoking him with insulting statements and walking out of the military trial. A combination of new corruption scandals and another bombing could provoke them into action.
In a regime as corrupt as the GMA regime, the possibility of yet another corruption expose is always there. Chinese money has raised the stakes. Sec. Neri’s invocation of “executive privilege” is as good as an admission that he has something to hide. But if GMA and JdV have not exactly “kissed and made up”, they apparently know that taking their conflict further would damage both of them. The sham impeachment means JdV can stay as speaker even if everyone knows his power is now severely circumscribed. He would have been more discreet in distributing largesse; he certainly would not have used paper bags.
If the GMA-JdV/Lakas-Kampi truce holds for another few months, it will get overtaken by presidential election dynamics. The 2010 election is two and a half years away. In a ‘normal’ presidential election, it should not be until early 2009 that presidential dynamics begin to determine political developments. In a week, the LP will hold a national congress where Mar Roxas will become party president. Even if he does not formally announce his candidacy, the buzz is on. Villar will do his NP extravaganza in December. The presidential derby has started earlier this time because people want to get rid of GMA as soon as possible. Those who see an advantage in a snap election, or a TRG situation prefer things to come to a head soon. Those who want GMA out but worry about instability in an extra-constitutional transition are crossing their fingers.
The problem, of course, is that the anti-GMA opposition is a diverse mix ranging from the Maoists to the Erap loyalists each of whom is suspicious of the other. What is new is Erap’s pardon and apparent plan to run Jinggoy as a vice presidential candidate of Villar. In his new situation Erap is less likely to support destabilization efforts including coup plotting. For the Left this will also mean less money for street mobilizations. Business may understand that current high growth rates is not trickling down to the really poor, but if they’re doing reasonably well, no matter how anti-GMA they are, they would prefer to wait and get a constitutional transition in 2010.
We do not have business’ preference for an orderly transition. More significant changes are possible in disorderly transitions, in extra constitutional situations. Apart from the fact that conditions do not apparently allow such a transition at this time, we prefer to have reasonably good chances (not necessarily guarantees) that some good will come out of disorder. Without such chances, we stay with our already agreed plan for 2010: implement consolidation under the new organizational frame, and defend, expand the space available to us in early preparations for the 2010 presidential election.