The “blue summer” promised by Feijóo has not arrived, but, beyond the relief produced by the defeat of the right’s expectations, neither does it seem that a hopeful future awaits us under a new progressive government which, in the midst of a growing polycrisis and with the threat of a new phase of austerity looming on the horizon, limits itself to being a mere manager of what already exists.

With a turnout of 70.4% (4.2% higher than at the previous elections in 2019) and against a backdrop of strengthening bipartisanship (from 48% in 2019 [1] to 64.8% [2]), the increased mobilization of left-wing citizens succeeded in preventing the rise of the right-wing bloc, announced as inevitable by the polls, from translating into a majority sufficient to constitute a governmental alternative. Indeed, with 33.1% of the vote and 136 seats (47 more than in 2019) for the PP and 12.4% and 31 seats (19 less) for Vox, the two forces failed to reach a total of 176 seats required [for an absolute majority] and it will be impossible for them to add votes beyond Coalición Canarias (1 [3]) and UPN (1 [4]).

Vox’s decline is undoubtedly good news, but it should not blind us to the fact that it has been influenced by the PP leadership’s increasing takeover of the discursive framework that this party has imposed of late, which could even be reinforced under pressure from Isabel Díaz-Ayuso [PP leader and president of the Madrid regional government]], who will soon be presenting herself as an alternative to Feijóo, as we already saw on election night.

Pedro Sánchez’s PSOE (with 31.7% of the vote and 122 seats) was the main beneficiary of the useful vote against this threat - perceived as very real after the PP’s municipal and regional pacts with Vox, even in autonomous communities such as Catalonia and the Basque Country. Forces such as Euskal Herria Bildu (Reuniting the Basque Country) with 6 elected members, PNV-Partido Nacionalista Vasco with 5 elected members, ERC-Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (7), Junts per Catalunya (7) and BNG-Bloque Nacionalista Galego (1) will be decisive in repeating the experience of a progressive coalition government. For its part, Sumar obtained 12.31% of the vote and 31 seats (3,014,006 votes), below the number obtained by Unidas Podemos in 2019, although it managed to halt the decline suffered by this party in the last municipal and regional elections on May 28. As for the other forces to its left, the CUP (Candidatura de Unidad Popular) failed to confirm the two seats it won in the last general election (dropping from 6.37% to 2.81%), while Adelante Andalucía, which ran only in Cadiz, fell short of its one-seat target, obtaining 1.42% of the vote.

These were the main results of an election that marked the end of an intense campaign that began immediately after the regional elections of 28M [May 28], characterized by a constant change of scenario under the impact of the pacts that the PP and Vox negotiated in many town halls and autonomous communities, and during which a large part of the electorate became aware of the threat to fundamental rights and freedoms that the formation of a government by these two parties would represent. This is why the vote of the social left was essentially defensive, “responsible” as some have described it, in order to preserve gains in the face of what could become a truly historic regression.

However, despite the strengthening of the two-party system, the key to the possibility of forming a new progressive government will continue to lie with the peripheral political formations and, in particular, with EH Bildu, ERC and, above all, Junts. We will see once again that, without the democratic resolution of the national-territorial divide that the State is going through, there will never be stability or governability. All the more reason to fight for an end to repressive policies and to continue demanding recognition of the plurinational reality and the right of our peoples to decide their own future, including their independence.

However, there is no reason to believe that if the risk of deadlock [in the formation of a so-called progressive government] is overcome, there will be a change of course from that maintained to date by the main formations of a progressive bloc. Within it, moreover, the PSOE emerges strengthened, while Sumar, which has shown its willingness to take further steps forward in programmatic moderation [5] and its subordination to Pedro Sánchez’s leadership, appears to be in a weaker position than in the past. If this potential government pursues the policies - which are also the dominant policies in the European Union - under which the right and far right have developed, it is to be feared that the previous dynamic will continue to be fed, with the aggravating factor that these forces (PP and Vox) have more institutional levers (including now a Senate with an absolute PP majority [6]) than before.

For this reason, it will be necessary to put the focus back on reactivating popular mobilization, beyond the vote, around objectives and demands able of overflowing the dominant progressive framework, in order to push the right-wing bloc back into its positions. The latter, as we are already seeing, will not give up and will not hesitate to mobilize in the streets and from their spaces of power, preparing themselves for the eventuality of a new election.

Beyond the electoral analyses of 28M and 23J [July 23], we need to open up a process of collective reflection within the Left on the fundamental trends developing at national and European level, in order to open up a new phase of recomposition that goes beyond the politics of the lesser evil and the culture of government.

Finally, we need to work towards a broad ecosocialist project that does more than simply administer what already exists, and seeks to widen the field of possibilities. A project that allows us to visualize that what is not possible today, nor even seems possible today, could begin to be possible, collectively, tomorrow“ [7].

Jaime Pastor