The decision of the Grand Alliance to boycott and resist the holding
of the January 22 elections to the Jatyo Sangshad has put the two
alliances directly on the path of confrontation. This denouement
conjures up images of two scorpions who when they fight precede their
battle by a ritual dance before they sting each other to death. Are
we witnessing such a dance of death where the ultimate casualty will
be the democratic process? Let us briefly review the role of the
players in this macabre dance to which the nation bears mute witness.
The ostensible lead player in the dance appears to be the chief
adviser of the caretaker government, President Iajuddin Ahmed. He has
been from the moment he assumed office through what is perceived as a
constitutional coup, the target of the 14 Party Alliance. The ongoing
demand of the Grand Alliance that the president step down from his
role as chief advisor, or at least conduct himself in a non-partisan
manner, appears to mistake the dancer for the choreographer. This
means that all attempts by the Grand Alliance and our development
partners to periodically pressure the chief adviser to change his
steps, were, from the outset, exercises in futility.
The key party to the performance of the chief adviser and hence the
CTG was and remains the leadership of the 4 Party Alliance. The
underlying motivations of this alliance remain unclear. In their
public postures they project a firm confidence that they can win an
election. They attribute the demands of their opponents for changes
in the conduct of the CTG as motivated by a need to avoid elections.
If they were so confident that they could win a free and fair
election, they should have gone out of their way to ensure that the
Grand Alliance participated by accommodating their demands for a
non-partisan chief adviser and chief election commissioner.
Once Justice Hasan stepped down, the 4 Party Alliance could have
agreed to have the surviving chief justice preceding Hasan, Justice
Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury, as chief adviser. They could have further
advised the president to induct a generally respected and acceptable
person such as the former cabinet secretary under the 4 Party
Alliance government, Sadat Hossain, as chief election commissioner.
Faced with such a positive political response from the 4 Party
Alliance, the 14 Party Alliance would have had no option but to go to
the polls and to stand by the results, even if this meant a victory
for the 4 Party Alliance.
Rather than accommodate its opponents, the 4 Party Alliance appears
to have gone out of its way to provoke the Grand Alliance. The latest
provocation of instigating the revival of the corruption case against
HM Ershad, just when the leaders of the Grand Alliance had decided to
go for elections on January 22, in spite of the unevenness of the
playing field, appears mind boggling for its pointlessness. From the
moment the 14 Party Alliance accepted the president as chief adviser,
and then went on to accept the watered down “package” agreement
negotiated by the 4 Advisers it was apparent that the alliance, or at
least its leadership, were keen to contest elections even on an
unlevel playing field. It was also evident that this leadership was
under great pressure from many of their associates to boycott the
elections. Under the circumstances, everything should have been done
by the 4 Party Alliance to strengthen the hands of the leadership of
the 14 Party Alliance to stand by their original decision to contest
the elections.
From their responses the 4 Party Alliance appear to suggest that they
remain indifferent as to whether the Grand Alliance participates in
the election. In the light of recent developments, the 4 Party
Alliance appear to believe that they can compel the CTG to hold an
election even without the Grand Alliance. They presume that the CTG
will be able to withstand resistance to the polls from the supporters
of the Grand Alliance, through the use of the law enforcement
machinery and the army, backed by local protection of the polling
centres of their own party cadres. The 4 Party Alliance may possibly
believe that however limited be the voter turn-out or strong the
degree of resistance, once such a poll is held and votes them back to
power, they would be able to deal with any further challenges on the
ground.
Whether this scenario follows as planned so that the CTG does carry
through an election and the elected government can then suppress all
challenges to its authority, remains to be seen. However, what is
more relevant is the credibility of an election held with a massive
deployment of armed might of the law enforcement agencies, involving
resistance and loss of life, and the subsequent legitimacy of a
regime which would hold office as a result of an election boycotted
by some of the major political parties.
The notion that a regime with such a questionable mandate could then
resort to the level of wholesale repression needed to stay in power
would be even more challengeable. Such a regime would need to keep in
mind that apart from the internal challenge to such a regime, the
international community would have severe reservations in not just
recognizing the outcome of a flawed election but would hardly remain
silent through the acts of repression which would follow.
Of course, flawed elections and/or repression have been tolerated in
the past, as in Myanmar or Zimbabwe, though both regimes have
acquired “outcast” status in the international community and remain
cut off from most sources of development assistance. It is quite
possible that the international community may bow to ground realities
in Bangladesh and after administering a few ritual slaps on the wrist
of such a regime, however distasteful its origins, would resume
business as usual. I cannot speak here for the international
community but perhaps some of our resident envoys may speak up on the
reaction of their respective governments to such a one-sided election
and its possible repressive aftermath.
Now that Bangladesh is a less aid-dependent economy, the sanctions at
the disposal of our development partners remain weak. The one weapon
that the international community does have at its disposal is their
control over the levers of UN peace-keeping operations. Our armed
forces are today one of the world’s largest contributors to such
operations and have justifiably earned an excellent international
reputation for their performance in the field. The armed forces and
the whole nation attach great value to this role, which is not
without considerable material benefit to the national economy as well
as to the peace-keepers. If our armed forces, who have already been
deployed in the field, are put into the unenviable position of
repressing their own citizens, first in response to resistance to the
election, and then to cope with challenges on the ground to the
“elected” regime, this would be potentially detrimental to their
image in the eyes of the international community.
The response of the CTG and BNP and its allies to the course of
future events hangs, in no small measure, on the intentions and
capability of the Grand Alliance. From the outset the 14 Party
Alliance has continued to give confused signals of its intentions,
culminating in its bizarre and unprincipled compact which challenged
its historic commitment to secular politics.
The 14 Party Alliance’s initial outright rejection of Justice Hasan
as the chief adviser, in the light of their experience with the
current chief adviser, may be viewed by their own ranks as a
strategic error. After all, would he have been quite as partisan as
the incumbent chief adviser? Once the president carried through his
constitutional coup, the 14 Party Alliance continued to vacillate on
whether to challenge the legitimacy of the chief adviser or to go
along with various negotiated “package” deals offering piecemeal
concessions. The latest offer of the leave of Zakaria but the
retention of Mudabbir was part of the dance of the seven veils
enacted by the chief adviser to tantalize the Grand Alliance into the
elections. The dance may have indeed served its purpose had the
gratuitous provocation of seeking to bar HM Ershad from contesting
the elections not served the role of one provocation too many to be
tolerated by the Grand Alliance.
Now that the Grand Alliance has decided to boycott the January 22
polls they have to reckon whether they can generate enough strength
at the local level in every constituency to frustrate the holding of
the poll or at least make voter participation very difficult.
Mobilization at the constituency level would be very crucial to their
strategy of challenging the polls. All the prospective candidates of
the Grand Alliance, who have now withdrawn their nominations, will
have a vested interest in ensuring that no election takes place in
their constituency. All such candidates would feel compelled to
challenge any sort of legitimacy being vested on the 4 Party Alliance
candidates through the January 22 polls which would establish their
power and control over patronage in the constituency over the next
five years.
The Grand Alliance would further expect that large numbers of voters,
not just their party supporters, would be hesitant to vote in a one
sided election, as was the case in February 1996 when most people
simply kept away from the polls. However, the BNP and its allies
would certainly aim to vote and would defend their right to vote. In
challenging the poll, the Grand Alliance would have to reckon on the
degree of repression they would have to face from the law enforcement
agencies and possibly the army who would be mandated by the president
to ensure that the polls were carried through. Finally, as and when
the polls are completed and the 4 Party Alliance take over power, the
Grand Alliance would have to realistically evaluate their capacity to
withstand massive repression whilst mobilizing a much broader
constituency of citizens to join them in challenging the legitimacy
of a flawed poll.
In responding to the prospect of a one-sided election all citizens
and civil society itself will have to decide what role they will
play. Will they accept an election result which does not involve all
the principal parties? Will they be silent spectators to the
resultant confrontation between the principal alliances or will they
come forward to assert their democratic rights?
In asserting their position civil society will no doubt be keeping an
eye on what will be done by the other players in the drama such as
the armed forces and the international community. The citizens of
Bangladesh will eventually have to decide whether democracy in
Bangladesh is a spectator sport or it is sufficiently important for
them to come forward to ensure that they are served by a government
which truly reflects their freely given vote.
In the final analysis, a major conflict, with prospects of violent
confrontations, will damage both the alliances since neither of the
protagonists can be sure where this dance will end and what
consequences it will have for either of them or for our democratic
process. Can the two principal alliances step out of the circle where
they are engaged in their fatal dance of destruction and seek the
path of statesmanship?
There is a universal demand across the country for a free, fair and
peaceful election held under a non-partisan CTG. Neither
constitutional niceties nor partisan politics should be allowed to
frustrate this deeply felt demand. Can civil society play any role in
this process of sustaining our democratic institutions or will they
remain silent witnesses as the lights across the land go out one by
one?