India seems to have become the Flavour of the Month for many major powers. The spate of visits by heads of governments and other dignitaries over the past six weeks, including Presidents George W. Bush and Jacques Chirac and the Prime Ministers of Russia, Australia, Finland and China’s Vice-Foreign Minister, certainly suggests that. As do the number of “positive” articles in the Western media about a country that used to be written about largely in jaded stereotypes: elephants, snake-charmers, gurus and Information Technology.
It’s incontestable that India’s global profile has risen dramatically in recent months mainly because of a change in the Western perception of the country, which now variously describes it as an “emerging” economic giant, the “Next China”, and more hyperbolically, the “Back-Office of the World”. These new stereotypes greatly exaggerate selective aspects of India’s reality-just as the old ones did. They also indicate that India’s political weight and global influence is now perceived to be substantially greater than a decade ago.
This perception contains a grain of truth, but is in large measure based on questionable assumptions. A major constraint on India, ironically, is none other than its close political and strategic relationship with the United States. This narrows its options for independent manœuvre.
For this and other reasons, India is not much better placed today to influence global events and trends than a decade ago. Nor is it willing to bring about major changes in the world order or global distribution of power-as distinct from incremental, narrowly focussed, parochially motivated alterations, for instance, in the world nuclear regime.
The surest refutation of the “growing-clout-of-India” proposition is found in its own neighbourhood. Nor only does India show no real leadership in South Asia. Her relations with her neighbours (not just Pakistan) continue to be a source of tension and worry. India cannot assert herself and shape political processes to its liking in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Nepal.
In Nepal, tumultuous changes are under way. The absolute monarchy faces serious opposition in the form of a mass agitation beginning early next month to be organised jointly by an alliance of seven political parties and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).
India would like to support the agitation. It facilitated talks which led to the agreement between the seven-party alliance and the Maoists to launch it. But it’s unclear if India can do so: the Americans have a different line on Nepal. Until recently, India used to reiterate the well-known “twin-pillar” formula: Nepal needs “Constitutional monarchy” and “multi-party democracy.”
India was hostile to the Maoists. Like the US, India appealed to the King to start a dialogue with mainstream political parties and restore the suspended legislature. The King refused.
India’s policy has since evolved in a different direction. Logically, either India and the US should part ways on Nepal, or India should persuade Washington to its point of view. Consider this:
The seven-party-Maoists understanding on launching a joint agitation was reached just last week near Delhi. It spells a big showdown with King Gyanendra, starting with a general strike on April 6. The understanding builds upon their 12-point agreement last November under which the Maoists would disarm under international supervision. The deal was reached in India and facilitated by Indian parties including the Congress and Communists. It was also endorsed by the government.
The November agreement became possible because the Maoists radically rethought their strategy. They concluded that their main enemy is the King and the best way of removing him lies in peaceful methods, not armed insurrection.
The latest understanding was reached after days of tough negotiations. America’s shadow hung heavy over the deliberations. On February 15, Washington’s ambassador to Nepal James Moriarty launched a scathing attack on the November agreement. Washington is annoyed that the Maoists “have gained a greater degree of legitimacy” through the agreement.
Although India endorses the agreement, it made no attempt to dissuade Washington from adopting a hard line against it. Thanks to US pressure, former Prime Ministers Girija Prasad Koirala and Sher Bahadur Deuba were reluctant to issue a joint statement with the Maoists. They came around to the “compromise formula” of separate statements largely because of pressure from their cadres.
The Nepali public is fed up with the monarchy. Under Gyanendra’s rule, the economic situation has worsened, development activity has come to standstill, and corruption has flourished. Democratic freedoms stand suspended. As much as one-third of that poor country’s budget goes to the military. Textbooks have been taxed-to buy guns.
The coming agitation could be the final anti-monarchy struggle. The history of Nepal’s democracy movement of 1989-90 shows that once the people are fired by the ideas of freedom, self-empowerment and democracy, force becomes counter-productive. King Gyanendra risks an ignominious collapse of the monarchy if he ignores this. His best-probably, only-bet lies in a Constitutional, largely ceremonial, monarchy.
However, the path to democratisation won’t be smooth. The seven parties don’t fully trust the Maoists although CPN(M) leaders have repeatedly declared that their armed squads will be demobilised. In interviews to the BBC and The Hindu, leader Prachanda said that although he prefers a Republic, he’d abide by the verdict of a Constitutional Assembly in case that favours a nominal monarchy.
The coalition partners differ on tactics. The Maoists advocate immediate elections to a Constitutional Assembly. But the seven-party alliance would like the National Assembly restored first. There’s a real danger that this will lead to jockeying for power and rifts. The King might also launch attacks on the Maoists, hoping that retaliation would wreck the two-bloc coalition.
New Delhi has to walk the tight-rope. It must make a clean, decisive break with its past approach, which consisted in clinging to the King as the best guarantor of Nepal’s unity and stability-which he’s patently not-, banking on discredited politicians, while spurning the Maoists.
India’s opposition to the Maoists was unduly influenced by its security forces and unreasonable fears about a Maoist-Naxalite link possibly leading to a “Red Corridor” across the border. There’s at best a weak link between the two.
The Maoists represent a force for positive change and reform from below, although their reliance on violence is totally unacceptable. India should acknowledge the positive aspects of the Maoist movement. The present moment offers the best chance to bring it fully into democratic politics.
India faces yet another task. It must persuade the US to take the Maoists out of the “terrorist” watchlist. It can convincingly cite the 12-point agreement to this end. India must counter Washington’s attempt to stitch together a bogus, unviable settlement in Nepal, through the appointment of a nominally “civilian” and “democratic” government. That can only prolong the cycle of state violence, insurgency and counter-insurgency.
India has a legitimate stake in democracy and stability in Nepal, with which she has a 1,400 km long open border. The Nepali people welcomed India when she threw her weight behind their pro-democracy demand. India can’t play a helpful role in Nepal if the King prolongs his stay in power. The solution lies in the 12-point agreement. But will India stand by it in the face of Washington’s opposition?