Nuclear Safety Commission struggled to summon experts after disaster, chairman admits
The Cabinet Office’s Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) was able to summon only a handful of its 40 emergency advisers immediately after the Fukushima nuclear accident that was triggered by the March 11 quake and tsunami, its chief has admitted.
In an exclusive interview with the Mainichi, NSC Chairman Haruki Madarame, 63, explained that the body was unable to send emails to many advisers in the aftermath of the disaster, while other members were unable to come to the NSC headquarters because transportation systems in the Tokyo metropolitan area were paralyzed.
As a result, the NSC panel of 40 experts hardly fulfilled its role of giving expert advice to the government at the time of a major disaster. The finding highlights problems with NSC’s crisis management system.
Excerpts of the Mainichi’s interview with Madarame follow:
Question: The ongoing Fukushima nuclear crisis is often described as a human-made disaster. What is you view on this?
Answer: In a way, we can’t help but admit that it’s a human-generated disaster in that we weren’t well prepared for such an accident.
Q: What do you mean by “weren’t well prepared?”
A: On the whole, nuclear power circles lacked determination to make a constant effort to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants. It’s wrong to think it’s acceptable to meet the minimum standards set by relevant guidelines. Nuclear plant operators must break away from such a passive attitude and step up their efforts to boost safety.
Q: Has the NSC been able to fulfill its role?
A: Disaster prevention guidelines and other regulations hadn’t envisaged such a crisis. As a result, we’ve been forced to give advice on how to respond to an accident that has already occurred. Our preparedness was insufficient.
Q: Would you please elaborate further?
A: For example, the disaster prevention guidelines stipulate that we must seek advice from doctors on whether to take iodine medicine. However, I wonder whether doctors were actually able to examine individuals in the midst of such an emergency. Furthermore, we had appointed 40 experts as emergency response advisers and asked them to gather immediately in the event of a serious disaster. We also conducted drills. But only four or five of them were able to show up at the NSC headquarters on the day of the quake. Mobile phone emails didn’t get through, and we were initially unable to contact any of the advisers.
Q: You told Prime Minister Naoto Kan that a hydrogen explosion wouldn’t occur when you flew with him to the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant by helicopter on the day after the accident, didn’t you?
A: There is no oxygen is in the containment vessel, so if plant workers had been successful in venting the reactor building, there wouldn’t have been a hydrogen explosion. I accordingly continued to tell workers to vent the structure.
Q: Didn’t you think hydrogen was leaking into the reactor building?
A: At the time, I didn’t think so.
Q: Do you feel a sense of responsibility for being unable to prevent the explosion?
A: I can’t say for sure. But I think we should’ve taken measures with that possibility in mind.
Q: Electric power companies have worked out accident-management measures to prevent nuclear power plant problems from developing into serious accidents. But such measures didn’t function at the Fukushima plant, did they?
A: All power suppliers have worked out uniform accident-management measures. It’s no exaggeration to say they are colluding behind closed doors in a way. A system in which power suppliers have worked out unique and effective safety measures will be appreciated and should be created.
Q: After the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) conducts “stress tests” on Japan’s nuclear reactors, the NSC is supposed to conduct further checks on them. What do you think about this?
A: NISA discussed the matter with power suppliers behind closed doors and suddenly publicly reported their decision to the NSC. They shouldn’t have done such a stupid thing. It is NISA’s function as a regulatory body to directly give instructions to and supervise power companies. NISA should hold open debates with power suppliers on the matter.
Q: Do you think a new regulatory body that the national government will set up can secure its own independence?
A: It’s unacceptable that officials who once occupied high-ranking positions in NISA now work in the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. (Both NISA and the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy are under the umbrella of the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry.) The organization should be restructured into one that’ll be acceptable to the public.
Q: Do you think you’ll stay in your post or not?
A: I still have 1 1/2 years before my current tenure expires, but I’ll be relieved from my post if a new regulatory body is launched before then. However, it’s not true that I can assume responsibility simply by quitting NSC. Rather, I should assume responsibility for the problem by reviewing various nuclear power safety guidelines.
Q: Do you intend to step down when an interim report on the review of various nuclear safety guidelines is issued at the end of this fiscal year and the new regulatory body is launched?
A: Yes, I do.
Mainichi Shimbun , August 19, 2011
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/08/19/20110819p2a00m0na012000c.html
Probe finds TEPCO failed to predict hydrogen explosion at Fukushima nuclear plant
The operator of the tsunami-hit Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant failed to predict the hydrogen explosion that occurred on March 12 following the disaster, sources involved in the investigation into the crisis said.
“Nobody was able to predict the explosion,” an employee at Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) was quoted as telling members of the government’s fact-finding panel on the Fukushima nuclear crisis.
“We made a serious mistake as we failed to grasp important information on the power station,” plant manager Masao Yoshida was quoted as telling the panel.
The investigation has also revealed that TEPCO did not prepare an instruction manual on procedures for venting to protect reactors’ containment vessels when external power sources are lost.
As part of its investigation into the crisis, the fact-finding panel has questioned Yoshida and other TEPCO employees as well as officials with government regulators. It will closely examine the answers as well as data on the accident in order to get to the bottom of the crisis.
The hydrogen explosion occurred at the plant’s No. 1 reactor at 3:36 p.m. on March 12, the day after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami hit the plant. The blast blew off the upper part of the building housing the reactor.
Experts suspect that the hydrogen was generated after zirconium contained in fuel rods was heated and reacted with water.
TEPCO officials told the fact-finding panel that workers had never imagined that hydrogen would fill the reactor building and eventually explode because they were preoccupied with checking the conditions of the reactor and its containment vessel.
Because the plant had no instruction manual on venting, workers were forced to consider a procedure for venting by closely examining the blueprint of the reactor.
Since all the external power sources had been lost, workers at the plant procured batteries and other equipment to secure power sources. However, due to insufficient communications between workers on the types of devices that were needed, various machines were brought into the plant, forcing workers to take time to select usable devices from among them.
Moreover, some of the devices were mistakenly delivered to the Fukushima No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant — situated about 10 kilometers south of the crippled No. 1 plant — and the J-Village soccer training ground, about 20 kilometers south of the No. 1 plant, where plant workers were staying, forcing workers to visit these facilities to pick up the devices.
“The TEPCO headquarters didn’t extend sufficient support to us,” one of the employees was quoted as lamenting during the questioning.
Furthermore, the panel has discovered that Yoshida and other top officials with the plant failed to notice the isolation condenser (IC), necessary to cool down the core of the No. 1 reactor in case of emergency, had stopped working, and considered countermeasures on the assumption that the IC was functioning properly.
Mainichi Shjimbun , August 17, 2011
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/08/17/20110817p2a00m0na016000c.html
Agency didn’t think to tell neighboring countries radioactive water was released into sea
Nobody in the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) thought of notifying the governments of neighboring countries before water containing low levels of radiation at the tsunami-hit nuclear power plant was released into the sea, it has been learned.
The Foreign Ministry also learned of the measure only after being alerted by an official assigned to the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) accident task force, who happened to see a TEPCO document.
The revelations illustrate NISA’s lack of a sense of crisis and problems involving the communication system between nuclear power plant operators and government regulators on crucial information.
The government’s panel investigating the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant found out about the lack of communication after questioning officials with NISA, the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) and others involved.
According to sources familiar with the investigation, TEPCO noticed in late March this year that water contaminated with high levels of radiation had accumulated in the basements of buildings that house turbines for the No. 1 to 3 reactors at the crippled power plant.
On April 1, a task force comprised of officials with TEPCO and other entities considered a plan to release water containing low levels of radiation from the plant’s intensive waste disposal facility into the sea to make room for water contaminated with high levels of radiation at the turbine buildings.
The task force initially abandoned the plan after some of its members voiced stiff opposition to it.
However, after low-level radioactive water was transferred to the No. 4 reactor’s turbine building, workers noticed on the morning of April 4 that the water level in the No. 3 turbine building had also risen. Workers stopped sending water to the No. 4 turbine building after suspecting that the two turbine buildings were connected underground.
The finding prompted TEPCO, NISA and the NSC secretariat to prepare to release the low-level radioactive water into the sea.
After gaining approval from Prime Minister Naoto Kan and advice from NSC, NISA notified TEPCO later in the day that it was unavoidable to release radioactive water into the sea.
The chief Cabinet secretary announced the decision at a news conference at 4 p.m. on that day. TEPCO began releasing contaminated water shortly after 7 p.m.
However, none of the officials with NISA, who were involved in the procedure for releasing radioactive water into the sea, thought to notify the governments of neighboring countries in advance, even though the agency is supposed to notify the governments of foreign countries of any nuclear accident in Japan, the sources said.
An official with NISA’s international affairs division, who happened to see the chief Cabinet secretary’s news conference on TV, notified the International Atomic Energy Agency by e-mail only one hour before the water was released.
The Foreign Ministry also learned that TEPCO was releasing radioactive water into the sea after being alerted by a junior official assigned to TEPCO’s accident task force, who happened to see a draft of the utility’s public relations document on the measure.
The contaminated water was released between April 4 and 10, sparking criticism from neighboring countries as well as local governments near the plant that they had not been notified in advance.
Mainichi Shimbun , August 18, 2011
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/news/20110818p2a00m0na014000c.html
Nuclear safety agency advised Niigata gov’t not to hold joint quake, nuke disaster drill
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) discouraged the Niigata Prefectural Government from holding a disaster drill envisaging the simultaneous occurrence of an earthquake and nuclear disaster, it has been learned.
A study by a government panel investigating the causes of the nuclear accident at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant found that NISA had advised the Niigata Prefectural Government not to hold the twin-disaster drill in 2010, saying it could cause fear and invite misunderstanding among residents.
As a result, the Niigata Prefectural Government dropped the initial plan and instead conducted a drill envisaging a snow and nuclear disaster.
The revelation indicates that NISA forced on the prefectural government the myth that nuclear power plants were safe, and the government panel is poised to investigate if NISA’s stance could have added to damage in the Fukushima accident.
According to internal documents obtained by the Mainichi Shimbun, the panel’s damage limitation measures verification team started interviewing concerned parties on July 14 over the Fukushima nuclear crisis. As of Aug. 9, the panel had questioned some 60 officials from NISA, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan. The panel is further to question a total of around 200 officials.
In the wake of an accident at Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Niigata Prefecture in 2007, which was triggered by the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake, the Niigata Prefectural Government started considering in May 2010 a disaster drill assuming the simultaneous occurrence of a quake and nuclear disaster.
NISA, however, told the prefectural government, “Conducting a multiple disaster drill presupposing an earthquake measuring lower 5 on the Japanese seismic scale of 7 and a nuclear disaster could cause fear and invite misunderstanding among residents.”
In response, the prefectural government conducted a drill for a simultaneous snow and nuclear disaster in November 2010.
Furthermore, NISA underestimated the risk of a major natural disaster and a nuclear disaster occurring simultaneously or almost simultaneously in a report submitted to a subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, a panel to the economy, trade and industry minister, in April 2009.
In the draft report filed by NISA on points to consider in preparing manuals for nuclear disaster prevention, the agency stated that “sufficient measures have been taken (at nuclear power plants) to ensure safety even in case of the most severe earthquake possible.” The report also asserted that “the probability of a nuclear disaster actually occurring as a result of a major natural disaster is extremely low.”
The revelation about the Niigata drill case surfaced while the fact-finding panel was investigating emergency drills that had taken place in Fukushima Prefecture before the nuclear accident. The panel is continuing to probe the case to see if NISA’s disregard of a possible quake-nuclear disaster could have led to questionable advice to the Niigata Prefectural Government.
Mainichi Shimbun , August 18, 2011
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/news/20110818p2a00m0na007000c.html
New N-safety agency faces difficulties
Although the government has decided to establish a new external nuclear safety organization following the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, the new watchdog is sure to face difficulties in maintaining its independence from other government bodies as well as in improving crisis management and response.
The Cabinet approved a basic plan for drastic reform of the government’s nuclear safety regulatory organs Monday.
The new organization will be established in April 2012, integrating the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry, the Cabinet Office’s Nuclear Safety Commission and other nuclear regulatory organizations.
The new agency will be take on full control over nuclear safety, by integrating the organizations and nuclear regulatory functions of government offices.
“We’ll clarify where responsibility lies and ensure a culture of safety,” Goshi Hosono, minister in charge of the nuclear crisis, said Monday at a press conference after the day’s Cabinet meeting.
The new watchdog will operate under the Environment Ministry. Hosono said, “The Environment Ministry is the most desirable organization to implement strict control [over nuclear safety].”
Environment Minister Satsuki Eda said, “We’ll do our best to restore confidence in the nuclear safety agency.”
The latest organizational reform will resolve the conflict of interest problem arising from the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s falling under the economy ministry. Presently, the agency in charge of overseeing the country’s nuclear facilities is a part of the same ministry that promotes nuclear policy.
However, based on the basic reform plan, it is unclear whether the new agency would completely separate itself from the ministry’s influence and ensure its independence.
The Environment Ministry has a history of promoting nuclear power plants from the viewpoint of combating global warming.
The Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan, which obliges the government to reduce greenhouse gases by the end of 2012, says nuclear power plants have an extremely important role to play in combatting global warming. Furthermore, the government plans to utilize such energy.
“Although the reform is dubbed a separation of the promotion of nuclear power generation from control, the Environment Ministry is not necessarily in an impartial position,” a senior ministry official said.
Concerning the establishment of the new agency, interests related to the ministries are complexly entangled.
The Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry currently has a budget of about 240 billion yen for nuclear-related policy. The ministry is expected to transfer the commanding role in the observations of radioactive materials to the new agency, although the it will still be in charge of inspecting nuclear facilities and monitoring nuclear substances to prevent misuse for nuclear weapons.
However, education minister Yoshiaki Takaki did not clarify the details Monday.
“I think some of our staffers will be transferred to the new agency, but it’s still under consideration. We don’t know how many people will be moved there,” he said.
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Independence problems
One problem that emerges with the new safety agency is how it will ensure its independence, as an external agency, from the Environment Ministry.
After the new agency kicks off, the environment minister will have the authority to approve or disapprove nuclear power policy.
However, the new agency might violate the international standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear safety rules, as such an agency should be completely independent from any sectors of the government.
In addition, the new watchdog will probably face problems with the actual implementation of regulatory practices and with responding to crisis situations.
The current Environment Ministry was launched as the Environment Agency in 1971 to address environmental pollution problems. Since then, the ministry has been responsible for controlling pollution.
However, radioactive substances are not within the ministry’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the ministry will have to start from scratch on nuclear regulatory policies.
Some observers believe the new agency will be forced to rely on staff members with previous technical knowledge about nuclear power plants and administration at the beginning, such as those transferred from the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).
The number of staffers to be transferred from NISA and other organizations is likely to be about 500. This will be about one-third of the total number of staffers at the ministry, which currently stands at about 1,250.
Some young officials at the Environment Ministry were surprised by the move. “I never expected I would be involved in the nuclear regulatory administration,” one official said.
The new agency will be responsible for responding to severe accidents, but there are concerns as to whether the Environment Ministry can handle such accidents without knowledge and previous experience.
Several senior officials said they are capable and up to the task. However, one official was quoted as saying, “We don’t have any details [on the new agency] yet.”
The initial responses by the Prime Minister’s Office in cooperation with METI following the outbreak of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant were criticized as inappropriate, although the two organizations were forced to serve as command and control centers.
Some experts point out cooperation with the Self-Defense Forces is likely to become more important in the future to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents. The SDF played an important role in addressing the Fukushima nuclear crisis.
In addition to setting up a new position called “emergency situation handling official,” the government plans to establish a system in which the Environment Ministry will serve as the commanding office to oversee coordination and cooperation with other government ministries.
However, grounds for the organizational reforms—such as how the government will utilize lessons learned from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant crisis—remain unclear, with the government’s nuclear accident investigation and verification committee still analyzing the accident.
Yoshihiro Kiyonaga, Atsuki Kira and Satoshi Yamada / Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writers, August 18, 2011
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110817007326.htm