THE war in Pakistan’s tribal areas is being
fought by Pakistan’s army under America’s gun and
on its orders. Many innocents have tragically
died from bombardment from the skies. Therefore,
not surprisingly, Pakistanis are angry and most
feel it is not their war.
But Pakistan, for its own sake, urgently needs to
battle the flames of religious fanaticism lest
they consume the rest of the country. This must,
however, be done in a manner that is intelligent
and principled.
Few Pakistanis have spoken out against the rising
tide of fanatical militancy. Even the horrific
mass murder of joyous citizens by two suicide
bombers during Benazir Bhutto’s triumphal return
has not led to a full-throated condemnation of
extremism.
Normally vocal, urban, educated Pakistanis -
whose values and lifestyles make them eligible
for slaughter by Taliban standards - are
remarkably silent. Do we believe it cannot really
happen to us? Are we unwilling to speak because
the threat has cloaked itself in the name of
religion? Or, are we blinded to the danger by the
conviction that the war against the jihadis is
America’s war?
No one can doubt that there is a creeping
Talibanisation of Pakistan’s society and economy.
The signs are everywhere. The Taliban have taken
control in many tribal areas, forcing local
government officials to flee. As happened in
Afghanistan, the Taliban are now the law. A
widely available Taliban-made video shows the
bodies of common criminals and bandits dangling
from electricity poles in the town of Miramshah,
the administrative headquarters of North
Waziristan. Girls’ schools have been closed.
Barbers have been told: shave and die.
Traditional folk musicians have fled. Polio
vaccinations have been declared haram.
Unvaccinated children are under threat from polio
and other diseases because doctors and health
workers are being killed.
Taliban vice-and-virtue squads enforce the
Sharia, checking, among other things, the length
of beards, whether shalwars are worn at an
appropriate height above the ankles, and the
attendance of individuals in the mosques. Even
our history is being attacked, as fanatics trying
to emulate their Afghan Taliban brothers
attempted to destroy the 2,000-year-old statue of
the Buddha in Swat, surely one of the greatest
historical monuments in our country. Not
surprisingly, tourism in Swat and the Northern
Areas has come to a dead halt.
Much of the responsibility lies with the
government, which is seen as insincere. Everyone
knows that military generals, politicians and
incendiary mullahs have been symbiotically linked
to Pakistan’s politics for decades. Jihadist
groups, aimed against India, have long operated
with the state’s knowledge and support. These
alliances have helped various power groups attain
their respective goals.
Nations win wars only when there is a clear
rallying cause. While the army high command has
committed men to battle, and lost well over a
thousand of them, they have not told the nation
what these men are fighting for. Nor has the
enemy yet been given a name - they are merely
termed ’miscreants’. There is also well-founded
suspicion of government motives. Since the
Taliban were Pakistan’s creation, and firmly
supported by its intelligence agencies,
Pakistanis know that the U-turn would not have
happened but for America.
The state is also seen as inept. As in the Lal
Masjid episode, the government initially refused
to identify the enemy. It finally had to do so
when the militants went on the rampage. But,
instead of acting decisively, the government
sought appeasement - a move that made it look
weak. When appeasement failed - as it certainly
had to - there was a massive use of force leaving
large numbers of innocents dead. A situation that
could have been dealt with by using minimal force
was allowed to fester until it eventually
exploded.
The Taliban have won victory after victory
because the army leadership has not reacted as it
should have. In another country, the beheadings
and mutilation of soldiers’ bodies would have led
to an uproar which that government could have
used to drum up support for its subsequent
actions. Recall that in 2006, the capture of just
two Israeli soldiers by the Hezbollah had been
the casus belli for the invasion of Lebanon.
But the capture of nearly 300 Pakistani soldiers
led only to public scorn, not sympathy.
Initially, an attempt was made to deny that any
soldiers had been kidnapped or had surrendered.
This soon had to be abandoned. Then, several
weeks later, after the BBC interviewed the
military officers in the Taliban’s captivity,
General Musharraf criticised the officers for
having surrendered and said that they had behaved
unprofessionally.The Taliban have executed three
of the soldiers, released a few, and kept most of
the rest. The captors say that the army is not
interested in having the remaining men back
because they are poor people, not from the
officer class. This propaganda resonates
powerfully with the ordinary soldier.
The demoralisation in the ranks can only be
imagined. A once-proud army stands isolated in
the war. It is rightly blamed for the collateral
deaths of non-combatants, but it is receiving
none of the support it deserves from the public
for stemming the tide of primitive religious
extremism.
The government is not to be blamed alone. The
private media, including the so-called ’free’
private television channels known for their
so-called openness, studiously avoid meaningful
discussions on religious extremism. Although
there are endless discussions on the wheeling and
dealing of succession politics, the enormous
damage to the country’s social and economic
fabric receives scant attention.
This does not mean that the Pakistani public has
succumbed to extremism. An overwhelming majority
of Pakistan’s citizens do not want harsh
strictures imposed on their personal liberties.
They do not want enslavement of their women,
their forced confinement in the burqa, or for
them to be denied the right to education.
Instead, they want a decent life for themselves
and their children. They disapprove of Islam
being used as a cover for tribal primitivism. But
there is little protest.
We must understand this. Why is there no mass
movement to confront the extremist Taliban of
Miramhah and Waziristan, or the
violence-preaching extremist mullah in Mingora,
Lahore or Islamabad? This is because ordinary
people lack the means and institutions to
understand, organise, and express their values
and aspirations. We do not yet have the
democratic institutions that can give politics
meaning for ordinary people. Depoliticising the
country over the decades has led to paying this
heavy price.
To fight and win the war against the Taliban,
Pakistan will need to mobilise both its people
and the state. The notion of a power-sharing
agreement is a non-starter; the spectacular
failures of earlier agreements should be a
lesson. Instead, the government should help
create public consensus through open forum
discussions, proceed faster on infrastructure
development in the tribal areas, and make
judicious use of military force. This is every
Pakistani’s war, not just the army’s, and it will
have to be fought even if America packs up and
goes away.
It may yet be possible to roll back the Islamist
laws and institutions that have corroded our
society for over 30 years and to defeat our
self-proclaimed holy warriors. But this can only
happen if our leaders win the trust of the
citizens. To do this, political parties,
government officials, and yes, even the generals,
will have to embrace democracy, in word and deed.
This will ultimately determine whether we become
a respectable member of the comity of states, or
a pariah extremist state that breeds
export-quality terrorism.