Thoughts on Stathis Kouvelakis’s text “From Greece, taking the risks into account: Some thoughts on the situation in Portugal“
“The risks are however immense and seem to me to outweigh by far the expected gains,” says Stathis Kouvelakis. What are what he calls “the three ways of summing up” this opinion? (His text below.)
First thought?
The question of the debt is dodged – whereas the PS repeats that it wants to remain within the framework of the European commitments. (“it is just impossible to see how even a “relaxation” of austerity can take place without dealing head-on with the issue of the debt and the straitjacket of the eurozone, and it is just crazy to imagine for a second that the PSP is willing/prepared to do that - actually even the BE and the PCP are relatively cautious on these two issues”.)
This is true. And it will be a major question. But:
a) the ratio of debt to GDP in Portugal is weaker than in Italy, close to that of Belgium and does not imply a current subordination the European mechanism of stability (EMS): there are more margins than for Greece; and it is necessary to see more closely what are the agreements and means of financing recommended to implement them: Stathis seems to affirm an “assessment of costs/benefit”, without concrete evaluation of the gains for the population and the room to manœuvre …
b) Why not propose to all the European and Portuguese left to put back on the table the question raised by Tsipras, of a European conference about the debt, to thus loosen the grip of the bilateral relations with the Eurogroup: it is a major “lock” for the dominant policies and a subject which requires acceptable and coherent “rules” for a Union, therefore the respect of principles. Let us discuss democratically, and on pluralist bases: in short let us seek a European politicization of the challenges of the debt, making possible a democratic challenge to the legitimacy of the pressures from the Eurogroup, shedding light on the mechanisms and criteria of tax and budgetary effectiveness, and what are the European common popular interests against the dominant “arguments” on the national debt;
c) This could also be prepared by a procedure of audit started in Portugal independently of the governmental agreements – launched by groups from the civil society.
Last remark on this same subject: neither the leadership of Syriza, nor its left (for opposite reasons that do not finish the debate) supported the work of the Committee for the Truth on the Greek Debt, and thus truly did not campaign around these challenges. A European campaign does not interest those who consider that there are no specifically European strategic and internationalist stakes.
This is in fact linked to the second point:
Second “thought”?
“The Greek experience has also shown that between full scale confrontation and capitulation there is no intermediate way”.
Was that “shown”? And is it thus general? In other words does one need a European campaign for all countries to leave the EMU and the EU? There is no place for struggles for rights against or within the EU and the EMU?
And has that “been shown” simply by the Greek case alone? In other words, there weren’t any other possible policies than that of Tsipras – or leaving, despite all the debates on this subject?
In addition, would there be no more room for struggle in countries in a better relative situation than Greece? Was the Greek experiment the only and last – or the first attempt to carry out a national fight against austerity, in the name of the interests of the people in all the Union, in particular?
Third thought The difficulty of the “red lines” - and logic “would you dare to reverse the left government”? - in Greece, or in Portugal? (“It is conceivable to withdraw support if the government crosses some “red lines” - but experience shows that defining those “red lines” is far from being simple.”)
This is an essential question. But in what has the example of Syriza, on this point too, exhausted the subject and “demonstrated” the absence of possible criteria and safeguards?
In the contribution that I attach, written for next issue of the review Les Possibles of the Scientific Council of Attac, I comment on this argument in particular – which is in my opinion essential for any political struggle apart from in a clearly revolutionary situation: what are the acceptable compromises? Who judges? On which criteria?
All betrayals are made (sincerely or not) in the name of the “lesser evil”. One cannot face these difficult dilemmas by pre-existing recipes, outside a concrete examination of what the suggested compromises would bring, in their context and dynamics: do they improve the concrete situation of the population and give – or not – confidence in an alternative policy? The procedure to judge this is more important for transforming a failure into support for the future, than the choice itself. Let us hope that this will be the fundamental lesson learnt by the Portuguese comrades for deciding at each stage.
This itself implies that a judgment from outside – although not without interest – should at the very least be relativized.
The 3rd Memorandum accepted by Tsipras continues the austerity policy and breaks a great hope of resistance to austerity. This is the opposite situation to that opened by the 70 points of the agreement negotiated in Portugal: they are commitments to real breaks with the policies in operation in Portugal, opening new possibilities. The path will be strewn with obstacles, faced with difficult confrontations and choices which will arise rapidly. Nothing is guaranteed. But each battle can and must shake the legitimacy of the Eurogroup and the operation of the EMU if it is carried out in defence of fundamental human, social, political rights: this is the guiding principle to which all currencies and finance must be subordinated.
Thank you to the Portuguese comrades, for widening the new possibilities, from which we must still learn.
Catherine Samary