

Beyond Boycott: The Philippine Left and Electoral Politics After 1986

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Beginning with the 1987 congressional and senatorial elections, the post-EDSA resurrection of formally democratic institutions and processes paved the way for what commentators have referred to as the “return of the oligarchs” [1] to political predominance in the Philippines. Subsequent elections appear to have further clinched the “continuing domination of political clans” [2] and thus strengthened the revival of the pre-Marcos “ancien regime.” [3] Meanwhile, however, the Philippine Left—broadly defined—has begun to trespass upon the elite-controlled domain of electoral politics. In comparison with previous efforts to participate in elections by similarly oriented groups and organizations before the declaration of martial law in 1972, [4] moreover, these recent electoral interventions by the Philippine Left have tended to encompass a wider geographic scope and to draw on more diversified sectoral support.

This essay focuses attention on problems of Left participation in Philippine electoral politics under the transitional regime of Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992). While affected by the overall decline of and dissension within the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), and the National Democratic (ND) movement at large during Aquino’s presidential tenure, [5] the broad Philippine Left has not experienced a commensurate downward trend in the field of electoral politics in the same time period. While neither the organizational unity and strength of the dominant Left during the 1987 elections nor the more variegated approaches of the highly fragmented Left-of-Center forces in the 1992 elections have succeeded in dramatically altering the composition of elected representatives to date, they have nevertheless contributed to broaden significantly the spectrum of electoral politics in the post-EDSA Philippines. Thus, when viewed within the context of the dominant Left’s widespread demobilization and deep division, examined elsewhere in this volume, the sustained efforts at electoral intervention by individuals, organizations, and coalitions identified with Left-of-Center politics present a compelling puzzle for investigation.

This essay examines the conditions—both external and internal—that combined to shape the Philippine Left’s intervention in the 1987 congressional elections and the 1992 simultaneous local and national elections. It argues that the varying extent of anti-communist mobilization and degree of electoral entrenchment influenced both these efforts, as did the Philippine Left’s own ideological orientation vis-à-vis, and actual experience of, elections. Based on this analytical framework, the essay also sketches some discernible trends for future Left electoral participation.

SITUATING THE QUESTION OF PHILIPPINE LEFT ELECTORAL INTERVENTION

Reflective of its American colonial legacy, Philippine electoralism in the pre-Marcos era discouraged the emergence both of third parties [6] and of issue-based or ideological party politics. Historically, there was no precedent of a Left party organized nationwide for purposes of fielding and/or supporting candidates before the declaration of martial law in the Philippines. [7] Moreover, with

few significant exceptions, the Philippine Left largely refrained from organized electoral intervention before the 1987 national elections. Heavy-handed government intervention against the candidacies and support of the organized Left in the elections to the 1946 Congress [8] and, more importantly, to the 1978 National Assembly [9] only served to validate the boycott position within the Philippine Left in the years between the official lifting of martial law in 1981 and the fall of Marcos in 1986. Thus, the boycott line essentially prevailed during the 1986 snap presidential election. [10]

However, in the immediate aftermath of EDSA, the Communist Party of the Philippines officially declared the decision to boycott the 1986 snap presidential elections a “tactical mistake.” [11] The 1987 national elections then saw the emergence of the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) with its senatorial slate of former-CPP/ex-detainee candidates and its platform of “new politics.” The ensuing electoral contests of 1988 and 1992, moreover, have witnessed an expansion of the electoral political spectrum to include both Left and Left-of-Center alliances and coalitions, some of which have linked up with more traditional political parties.

While noteworthy in and of itself, the Philippine Left’s recent efforts at playing electoral politics have so far fallen short of both the rosy predictions of hopeful “Progressives” [12] and the doomsday prophesies of fearful “*trapos*.” Aside from a small (and far from monolithic) minority in Congress, electoral intervention at the national level has barely made a dent in the elite and clan-dominated Congress, for example. [13] With the exception of the Senate’s rejection of the US-Bases Treaty in 1991, the broad Philippine Left has been unable to exert decisive influence on legislative issues of critical importance to its constituency, such as human rights, land-reform, and foreign debt. [14]

Rather than focusing on these obvious limitations, this essay instead proceeds with an examination of four factors that shaped in decisive ways the Philippine Left’s efforts at playing electoral politics in the post-Marcos period. While for purposes of analytical clarity a distinction is made here between external versus internal conditions, such categorization clearly simplifies a more complicated and interactive political process. That is, developments in both government counter-insurgency measures and overall political stability have clearly had far-reaching consequences for the evolving debates over strategy and tactics within the Philippine Left. Similarly, the declining fortunes of the armed revolutionary movement have seen corresponding shifts both in government anti-communist policy and practice and in regime political polarization.

In any event, the following external and internal factors can be identified as decisive influences upon the nature and direction of the Philippine Left’s intervention in the local and national elections since 1986. On the one hand, the degree of anti-communist mobilization and the entrenchment of Philippine electoralism comprise two factors external to the Philippine Left that have clearly contributed to shaping its involvement in electoral politics. On the other hand, the Philippine Left’s ideological orientation toward and actual experience from elections constitute two important internal factors that have decisively conditioned its electoral performance.

ANTI-COMMUNIST MOBILIZATION

Despite the organized Left’s political marginalization among the so-called “middle forces” in the aftermath of the 1986 boycott, the NPA’s military strength remained essentially intact and caused influential elements both within the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) [15] and the Reagan administration [16] to call for stepped up counterinsurgency measures within months of the Aquino administration’s assumption of power. In the first year after EDSA, however, the civilian government avoided publicly committing itself to further militarizing [17] the conflict and instead lent support to political initiatives for national reconciliation [18]— the sixty-day national ceasefire in December 1986 and the February 1987 constitutional mandate to eliminate anti-communist vigilante groups.

However, after the NDF (National Democratic Front) left the peace talks in protest against the massacre of thirteen peasant demonstrators by Manila security forces in January 1987, the civilian government began to embrace publicly the military's preferred solution to the so-called "insurgency" problem. The activation of the National Capital Region District Command for purposes of establishing "an effective territorial defense" [19] in Metro Manila in January 1987 and the following month's declaration of the "Total War" policy against the insurgents reflected this shift. In her commencement speech at the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in March 1987, for example, President Aquino declared that

[t]he answer to the terrorism of the left and the right is not social and economic reform but *police and military action*. [20]

In addition to "police and military action," moreover, the Philippine government now also publicly signaled its approval of military-backed anti-communist civilian groups known as "vigilantes," beginning with President Aquino's visit to one such group in Davao del Sur in late March. [21] In fact, the Department of Local Government "required all OIC [Officer-in-Charge] Governors in Mindanao to create similar community-based counter-guerrilla organizations by May 31, 1987, lest the OIC Governors lose their position." [22] Encouraged by this shift in the administration's position on right-wing civilian militias, such groups proliferated in subsequent months, and by the end of 1987, their number had grown to over two hundred. [23]

The May 1987 elections were thus held within the context of a mounting counterinsurgency drive by the Aquino administration and against the backdrop of a proliferation of so-called "vigilante groups" or anti-communist civilian militias. Employed by both police and military forces, vigilantes regularly performed "police and military activities such as armed patrols, manning of checkpoints, and search and seizure operations" throughout the Philippines. [24] In the course of 1987, and while enjoying wide support from the national top brass and operating with local military assistance,

some of [these vigilante groups] tortured, maimed, mutilated, beheaded, shot and hacked to death people who they claimed support or sympathize with the NPA. Their victims included young children, infants, and the elderly. [25]

In this context of mounting anti-communist mobilization, the new legal left party in 1987—Partido ng Bayan (PnB)—and its Alliance for New Politics (ANP) were subjected to rampant red-baiting in the mainstream media and widespread harassment by armed groups. Thus, "[a]lmost all traditional parties and many key personalities of the right went public in voicing their apprehension and fear of the PnB." [26] Moreover, military and paramilitary armed groups reportedly harassed and even killed numerous PnB and ANP supporters—officials, candidates, campaign organizers and volunteers—during the 1987 election campaign. [27] Similarly, the PnB also saw its headquarters raided, supporters arrested and rallies disrupted by government officials. [28] In addition, the initial denial of accreditation as a legal party to the PnB [29] and the eventual removal of many candidates' ANP affiliation from official COMELEC (Commission on Elections) lists of registered candidates, for example, have been cited as further evidence of possible anti-Left intervention by COMELEC officials at both the national and local levels in the 1987 elections. [30]

The following statement by the PnB Secretary-General on the 1988 local elections summarizes the argument advanced here that, against the backdrop of Aquino's Total War policy, Left-leaning electoral efforts were bound to run up against not merely the usual election-related violence for which Philippine polls have gained such notoriety but also against more selective repression as a result of widespread anti-communist mobilization:

Efforts by the Left and other progressive forces to contest the local elections not only

would involve them in the fierce and bloody fighting among traditional political rivals for their power bases, but also pit them in direct and more intense confrontation ... with the Aquino regime... [31]

By comparison, the May 1992 elections were held without the widespread anti communist hysteria and repression that marked the 1987 electoral exercise. By 199 most vigilante groups had been demobilized or disbanded altogether and the majority of paramilitary forces known as CAFGUs (Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units) operated as private armies at the behest of individual local politicians rather than in the service of a national government crusade against communism, thus making above-ground Left affiliates less privileged targets of repression. That is, Left candidates faced much the same pressures due to electionrelated violence and harassment—which remained salient features of the electoral process in many parts of the Philippines—as did other contestants in 1992. In short the relative decline of government-backed anti-communist mobilization allowed for greater visibility and activism on the part of above-ground progressive forces, thus favoring electoral intervention by individuals and organizations identified with the Philippine Left. [32]

ENTRENCHMENT OF ELECTORALISM

Despite the authoritarian legacies of Marcos's martial law years and the "revolutionary" origins of the Aquino regime, the swift political comeback of old elites and the resounding popular endorsement of the new constitution seemed to pave the way for the successful entrenchment of electoralism in the post-EDSA Philippines. As in the pre-martial law period, formally democratic institutions and procedures once again presented obvious opportunities for a national agro-industrial oligarchy [33] and local political bosses [34] to rejuvenate and legitimize stable elite rule through regular and popular elections. The massive turnout and endorsement—in sharp contrast to the dominant Left's official boycott and "no" positions—in the 1986 snap presidential elections and the 1987 constitutional plebiscite, respectively, also appeared to confirm the safe return of electoral politics in the post-Marcos Philippines. [35]

However, extra-electoral forms of political mobilization nurtured by conditions under martial law continued to pose a challenge for the consolidation of Philippine electoralism even as the 1987 senatorial and congressional election campaigns gained momentum. In fact, these elections were held within a context characterized by widespread political uncertainty as to the sturdiness of the "rule of law" especially in the face of persistent military adventurism and revolutionary mobilization. Thus, the ravages of civil war and the continued presence of both a vastly expanded armed forces and Asia's largest contemporary communist movement contributed to a highly polarized political environment during the time of the 1987 elections. [36]

The most serious challenges to the entrenchment of electoralism in the early post-Marcos years stemmed from extra-electoral mobilization from both the Right and the Left. During its first eighteen months in power, for example, the Aquino administration faced down six separate coup attempts by so-called "rebel" soldiers or Marcos "loyalist" troops. [37] Meanwhile, the New People's Army remained essentially intact and retained significant control over some 20 percent of all barangays in the Philippines. [38] In addition, while essentially pursuing parliamentary politics by other means, striking workers [39] and demonstrating peasants [40] (especially those identified with the organized Left) nevertheless presented a challenge for the Philippines' resurrected elite democracy by publicly exposing its narrowly conservative political parameters. Despite widespread popular support for the widow-housewife president, the constitutional foundations of the Aquino regime came under increasing public attack in 1987. For example, the Aquino administration's efforts to promote a new draft constitution ran up against strong protests from "representative[s] of the radical Left, nationalist, cause-oriented groups, and the extreme Right, particularly the

military.” [41] Significantly, the Communist Party of the Philippines called for a “No” vote in the plebiscite on the ratification of the new Constitution, which was also reportedly voted down in several military camps in the country. [42]

In the weeks before the February 1987 constitutional plebiscite, moreover, Manila witnessed the Channel 7 military coup attempt, the Mendiola Massacre of peasant protesters, and a series of popular demonstrations, all of which underlined the political precariousness of the regime at the time. Although the constitution won roughly 75 percent popular approval, the political mobilization of what have been referred to elsewhere as elements of the “disloyal opposition” [43] continued to undermine the consolidation of Philippine electoralism throughout the 1987 congressional campaign and inauguration.

On the one hand, renegade military troops continued to plot and to launch coup attempts during this period, as evidenced by the following three incidents recorded between April and August 1987: the April 18 Black Saturday occupation of Fort Bonifacio; the July 2 failed Manila International Airport takeover; and the August 28 coordinated attacks on the Malacanang presidential palace, the Camp Aguinaldo AFP headquarters, the Villamor Air Force base and the Quezon City government TV station. [44] On the other hand, as the ceasefire between government and underground troops broke down in January 1987, the Politburo of the CPP resolved to “regularize” and intensify the armed struggle in a “strategic counter-offensive” [45] and the Party’s public voice, *Ang Bayan*, began to call for opposition to “the US-Aquino scheme to stabilize the reactionary ruling order.” [46] In addition, NPA “tactical offensives were escalated throughout the archipelago.” [47] According to *Ang Bayan*, for example,

the NPA took for its main targets the CHDF [the Civilian Home Defense Forces, the government militia], paramilitary right-wing groups, warlord armies, death squads, and armed fanatical sects, as well as units of reactionary armed forces associated with the deposed dictator. [48]

This early escalation of NPA tactical offensives, moreover, was reportedly followed by a coordinated anti-LIC (low intensity conflict) campaign in July-September 1987 [with] more than 600 small and big guerrilla operations . . . launched by the NPA throughout the country. [49]

In the aftermath of the May elections, non-violent collective mobilization from both the Right and the Left also added to the challenge against Philippine electoralism. Leaders of the rightist Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD), for example, including former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, held a mass protest outside the AFP and PC (Philippine Constabulary) camps on EDSA soon after the May 11 elections and distributed leaflets urging soldiers to take action against alleged electoral fraud perpetrated by the Aquino administration. Two months later, moreover, a radical “parliament of the streets” confronted the official inauguration of the newly elected elite- and clan-dominated Congress with its own mass ceremony:

At noon, various people’s organizations started to congregate. . . including militants from BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan], KMU [Kilusang Mayo Uno], KMP [Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas], KAIBA. . . . The rallyists peaked at more than 3,000 but they were prevented from approaching Congress by anti-riot police who encircled them. . . . The demonstrators version of Congress—a Congress of the streets—was highlighted by their own State of the Nation address which was delivered by BAYAN secretary-general Lean Alejandro... [50]

Escalating political violence in Metro Manila itself also attested to the instability and vulnerability of the Aquino regime in the months surrounding the May 1987 elections. Contributing to the

heightened levels of armed confrontation in Metro Manila—the center of economic and political power in the Philippines—the AFP activated the National Capital Region District Command “to conduct security operations, . . . establish an effective territorial defense, [and] maintain peace and order.” [51] Responding in part to increased counterinsurgency operations by government forces, the NPA’s urban “sparrow units” stepped up their own tactical offensives in the National Capital Region. [52] As a result, according to one source, in 1987,

the most devastating effects of NPA violence—traditionally largely confined to the provinces—came to Manila. As many as one hundred people were executed by NPA urban ‘sparrow units’—assassination squads; almost all of the victims were police or military personnel. [53]

Overall, the mounting extra-electoral mobilization and deepening political polarization that surrounded the May 1987 elections contributed to delimit the nature and scope of the Philippine Left’s participation in these polls. The escalation of both government and underground military (and paramilitary) campaigns in the aftermath of the failed peace negotiations, and the concomitant centrifugal trajectory of the rebel Right and the revolutionary Left away from “critical collaboration” within Centrist parameters, militated against electoral intervention by the Philippine Left. In fact, given the continued obstacles to the entrenchment of electoralism discussed above, the 1987 elections constituted only one among several arenas of contestation for the Philippine Left. As the CPP’s renewed emphasis on military efforts hampered planning and coordination concerning all other areas of work, it has been suggested, “[t]hese organizational problems fed into a long series of propaganda disasters [including] the defeat of Partido ng Bayan candidates in the 1987 congressional elections.” [54] With the consolidation of Philippine electoralism still uncertain, the Left’s 1987 electoral strategists and activists thus never resolved “whether the [Pnb/ANP] campaign should primarily be aimed at winning seats, at using the elections to ‘educate the masses’ or both.” [55]

In 1992, by contrast, elections were firmly established as *the* route to power and influence in the Philippines. Threats of coups no longer posed a credible challenge to the regime, especially in light of the demilitarization of the Philippine Constabulary and the creation of a Philippine National Police (PNP) removed from control and supervision of the AFP and the Department of National Defense (DND). [56] As a further deterrent to military adventurism,

the government after December 1989 [also] built up its defenses, including forming an anti-coup force and an extensive counterintelligence unit especially to thwart rebel attempts. [57]

Moreover, due to government counterinsurgency efforts as well as internal conflicts, the severely decimated underground Left, and its much-depleted “united front” affiliates, no longer posed an acute challenge for the consolidation of Philippine resurrected electoralism. According to its own estimates, for example, between 1987 and 1990,

Party membership decreased by 15 percent, the total number of barrios under its coverage by 16 percent, the total number of members of the people’s army by 28 percent, and the total membership in the rural mass organizations by 60 percent [and] big number of cadres at the provincial, front and district levels were lost due to arrests, death, or demoralization. [58]

However, this period also allowed for the simultaneous growth and proliferation of smaller above-ground Left-of-Center groups and organizations for which progressive electoral struggle constituted a *sine qua non*: “Opening ‘yan na dapat ine-exploit.” [59] While clearly less enthused by the

prospect, the largest legal left mass organization also recognized the imperative of electoral participation in 1992: “We will have to participate.” [60] The entrenchment of electoralism thus contributed to create a new set of incentives for participation in elections by the Philippine Left. Against this backdrop, the following section will briefly outline the Philippine Left’s evolving ideological orientation on the question of electoral struggle.

IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

In terms of the ideological orientation and cohesion of the Philippine Left, the 1987 and 1992 elections offer a study in contrasts. Ideology has obviously been an important “internal” factor conditioning the Philippine Left’s electoral involvement in the post-EDSA period. Whereas some developments leading up to the 1987 national elections suggested the increasing significance of legal and electoral forms of struggle, the dominant organized Left continued to emphasize both the primacy of armed struggle and the ‘vanguard’ role of the Party leadership in relation to its above-ground affiliates, with direct consequences for the “new politics” election campaigns. By 1992, however, the deepening ideological differences within the Party itself, as well as the emergence of a plethora of so-called “cause-oriented” groups with links to Left-of-Center organizations, allowed for a more variegated electoral intervention. [61]

Historically, the Maoist orientation of the CPP has been a decisive factor shaping its involvement—or lack thereof—in electoral politics. [62] The following excerpt from founding chairman Sison’s “revolutionary bible” illustrates this strong influence of Mao Zedong Thought on the CPP:

The main force of the Philippine revolution is the peasantry. It is the largest mass force in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Without its powerful support, the people’s democratic revolution can never succeed. . . . There is no solution to the peasant problem but to wage armed struggle, conduct agrarian revolution and build revolutionary base areas. [63]

Thus, from its inception as a breakaway Maoist faction from the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), the CPP’s “rejection of the cities in favor of the countryside led it, on a theoretical plane, to equate urban struggle with parliamentary or legal struggle, and hence with revisionism.” [64]

In addition, it has been argued, the “revisionist” PKP’s old cadres served as influential “teachers by negative example” [65] for the new generation of middle-class intellectual recruits who formed the core of the CPP. This is reflected in another key document titled “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party,” [66] which is as much a critique of “PKP leaderships for their alleged ignorance or non-application of Mao Zedong Thought [and] of the previous PKP leaderships, from Crisanto Evangelista down to Jesus Lava, as it is an enunciation of the CPP-ML’s (Communist Party of the Philippines—Marxist-Leninist) theses for revolution.” [67]

Leninist principles of “democratic centralism” scholars have suggested, discouraged debate over—or deviation from—the Maoist party line. [68] In fact, despite the much celebrated policy of “centralized leadership, decentralized operations,” successful local adaptations by regional and sectoral cadres, it has been argued, “rarely worked their way ‘upwards’ as ideas that prompted a re-thinking of the central tenets of Party thought” [69] The binding nature of sanctions by higher Party organs upon subordinate cadres—reflected in practices of suppression and selfpolicing—thus insulated Maoist doctrine from internal “revisionist” challenges.

Finally, the relative isolation from international communist movements, it has been noted, further shielded the CPP from any serious critical challenges to its position that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Thus, as a Maoist splinter party, “Philippine communists have had relatively

little access to on-going debates within other, broader Marxist circles in the world.” [70] In fact, several critics have linked the relative isolation of the CPP to its “purist” orientation in favor of a protracted people’s war in the countryside (and at the expense of legal or parliamentary urban struggles). [71]

While internally debated and opposed, [72] the Party leadership’s ideological orientation in 1987 essentially reflected a back-to-basics approach—“building on the movement’s strength in rural armed struggle and union organizing, then waiting for the [urban] ‘middle forces’ to return” [73]—which downplayed the significance of electoral struggle. At the same time, however, the Party reportedly authorized the foundation of the Partido ng Bayan (PnB) as a new progressive legal party, which was subsequently “organized by prominent former party leaders, including founding Chairman Sison and the first NPA Chief Bernabe Buscayno.” [74]

Thus identified with—though not identical to—the underground Left, the PnB’s electoral agenda was allegedly still considered “secondary” to armed struggle. [75] For example, a key PnB figure and ANP senatorial candidate claimed that the “primary campaign goal was to educate the electorate and to broaden the policy debate.” [76] Another prominent PnB personality also admitted “very strong reservations about participating in the 1987 elections.” [77] Many PnB insiders, moreover, “noted that their strategists and activists were less than united on the objectives of their participation.” [78]

Organizationally, PnB also had a difficult time instituting and enforcing the national council’s decisions, particularly among the base organizations that openly supported the party. Many of the party directives, for instance, were not awarded enough attention by local chapters and constituent organizations, which were understandably engaged in other campaigns and commitments. This could be seen as a reflection of how elections are accorded strategic significance in the rank and file of ND organizations. [79]

Compared to the PnB’s “propaganda campaign” in 1987, its new motto, “field to win,” seemed to point in a new direction for the Left in the 1988 local elections. However, reflective in part of the heavy toll suffered by its supporters in 1987—both in terms of electoral defeat and personal injury—the PnB also declared that in the 1988 elections “only chapters that are able to ensure the safety of their candidates are campaigning actively, resulting in few reported PnB casualties this year compared to last year. . .” [80] The party thus reportedly fielded fewer than a hundred PnB candidates for the positions of municipal mayor and councilor, while expressing support for some 3,000 candidates of different party-affiliations and reputed opposition to the government’s counter-insurgency policies. In addition to official guidelines limiting the PnB’s electoral participation to areas where supporters could receive adequate protection, media reports that “Communist guerrillas have confirmed for the first time that they are receiving money from candidates . . . for safe-conduct passes in guerrilla-controlled areas” [81] also underlined the continued significance of armed struggle for the Philippine Left during the 1988 elections.

In short, the dominant Left’s orientation towards elections in the aftermath of the “tactical mistakes” of the 1986 boycott and 1987 “no” campaigns continues to reflect the secondary importance accorded to legal progressive efforts in the electoral arena as opposed to the primacy of armed revolutionary struggle. The following statement in *Ang Bayan* captures the extent to which considerations of an essentially tactical nature guided the Party’s move toward a “beyond boycott” position on the question of electoral participation in the 1987 and 1988 elections:

The Party should never allow itself to be preoccupied with and divided over any debate on the question of boycott or participation in any voting exercise . . . [but] counter . . . by using revolutionary dual tactics and encouraging the legal progressive parties to expose

the limits of the voting exercise and, at the same time, use it to gain advantages for the people. [82]

By 1992, by contrast, the internal debates within the Party and the growth of the extra-Party left reflected far-reaching reassessments and critiques of the Left's revolutionary program. The 1992 elections saw, for example, "the disjointed . . . ND forces, with PnB calling for 'active participation,' BAYAN-MMR [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan—Metro Manila-Rizal] calling for 'Rebolusyon, hindi eleksyon' and BAYAN-National asserting 'walang ilusyon sa eleksyon.'" [83] Thus, contrasting the revived PnB of 1992 with its predecessor in 1987, the new chair emphasized a shift toward "a more long-term view of our role in parliamentary work." [84] The following statement further underlines the PnB's changing electoral agenda for the 1992 elections:

The 1987 PnB had Alliance for New Politics, at the national level, but this was actually made up of kindred spirits. Now we are trying to broaden the coalitions. We have talks with traditional parties. We have coalitions with progressive candidates at the local level... [85]

The growth and proliferation of progressive forces more or less autonomous of the dominant underground Left have also contributed to a wide array of Left-of-Center initiatives aimed at intensifying and expanding electoral struggle since 1987. For example, while the 1987 electoral coalition of broad progressive forces (led by popular democrats [86]), the Movement for New Politics, was superseded by the more orthodox Alliance for New Politics (led by national democrats [87]), the 1992 elections saw the participation of a broad spectrum of Left-of-Center groups and coalitions in both the local and national elections. Thus, despite the staying power of the "guns, goons and gold" of traditional party politics and the absence of a unified electoral coalition/strategy of the broad Left, many among the latter took the position that "the parliamentary arena must be maximized to bring progressive issues, if not leadership, closer to the people." [88] In the 1992 elections, for example, the Koalisyong Pambansa (National Coalition)—which included the Liberal Party (LP), the Pilipino Democratic Party Lakas ng Bansa (PDPLABAN), and the Kaakbay ng Sambayanan (AKBAYAN) [89]—constituted the most ambitious effort to bring established political parties together with cause-oriented and non-governmental organizations around a national platform of progressive politics.

ELECTORAL EXPERIENCE

Finally, in terms of electoral experience, the Philippine Left had little to no actual experience of involvement in electoral politics in 1987. In the words of the PnB's chairman: "Hindi pa talaga kami sanay." [90] Again, with few exceptions, electionboycott campaigns constituted the Left's most organized efforts at electoral intervention since Independence and mass suffrage. In addition to lacking much useful experience for purposes of fielding and/or supporting candidates, moreover, the Philippine Left's collective memory of one or two previous attempts at playing electoral politics further shaped its involvement in the 1987 elections. [91]

In 1992, by contrast, the Philippine Left could draw on its own record of electoral experiences which included both participation in the 1987 national and 1988 local elections, as well as the subsequent incumbency of a few municipal and congressional "Progressives." The so-called "Progressive Bloc" in Congress after 1987, for example, influenced not merely legislation but also government appointments, pork-barrel, and national debates which added to the Left's experience of Philippine electoralism. [92] the "participation as propaganda" line characteristic of much of the Left's electoral efforts in 1987 backfired with the dismal performance of PnB and ANP candidates. In addition, the lessons of the 1987 electoral campaign underscored the significance of i) linking up local constituents to the national leadership through an organizational "machine" [93]; ii) translating

sectoral support into territorially mobilized votes [94]; iii) and mobilizing resources to last the entire campaign—from candidate posters before to ballot-watch vigils after election day. [95] Finally, the Philippine Left's experience in the elections before 1992 underlined the importance of electoral reforms to progressive politics.

Mindful of the PnB/ANP's weak and uncoordinated electoral machinery in 1987, and its consequent failure to translate local support into national votes, the Philippine Left adopted two approaches aimed at overcoming or circumventing this problem in the 1992 elections. First of all, the Left-of-Center Koalisyon Pambansa and the PnB-BAYAN TAP AT network presented two separate efforts at linking local constituencies to national platforms by means of a political machine. The former linked local cause-oriented and non-governmental organizations, united under a socialist-oriented umbrella group, to the political machineries of two national parties. [96] The latter mobilized the mass base of BAYAN and other ND formations in support of a nationwide campaign—"Tañada Para sa Tao" (TAPAT)—to elect Bobby Tanada to the Senate. [97] Second, the broad Philippine Left placed much greater emphasis upon local than national level electoral efforts in 1992.

The PnB/ANP campaigns also highlighted another salient issue for the Philippine Left's electoral intervention in 1992—the problem of translating sectoral support into actual votes within given territorial boundaries (municipalities, congressional districts etc.). In view of the PnB/ANP's failure to mobilize a labor, peasant, or urban poor vote in 1987, for example, Philippine progressive electoral initiatives in 1992 included organized efforts at building electoral coalitions out of existing non-governmental and people's organizations. One example was the formation in Bataan province of the local electoral coalition (Kabalikatan) from an already established developmental NGO (Balikatan) linked to the Movement of Popular Democracy. [98] Another example was the launching in Davao City of KAPATIRAN (Kilusan ng Alternatibong Pulitika para sa Inang Bayan) as an effort to channel broad-based national democratic forces into an electoral coalition "for campaigning for progressive candidates." [99]

The Philippine Left's electoral intervention prior to 1992 also underlined the importance of mobilizing salient resources for each stage of the election campaign. By combining their own volunteer recruitment and training efforts with the resources available to local candidates of established political parties, for example, progressive electoral coalitions proved more successful at fielding and keeping poll watchers throughout the vote count and canvassing procedures in certain parts of the country in 1992. [100] In addition, Philippine progressive forces showed greater appreciation for the political significance of registering voters, checking the official voters' lists, and providing sample ballots, for example, in the 1992 elections.

While publicly proclaiming its emphasis on voter education and political propaganda in 1987, the PnB/ANP campaign actually devoted scanty attention and resources to developing or disseminating a progressive agenda for electoral reform in this election. By contrast, the 1992 elections saw the broad Left-of-Center undertake a plethora of initiatives—ranging from immediate measures such as candidate/platform evaluation seminars to long-term demands for proportional representation—aimed at reforming the legal provisions, administrative procedures and political culture underpinning Philippine electoral democracy. For example, several more or less successful progressive efforts at promoting organized voters education and ballot watching accompanied the 1992 elections: the PnB and BAYAN supported Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms (IPER) [101] and KAPATIRAN [102] Projects 1992 and 2001, [103] and COMPEL (Citizens for Meaningful and Peaceful Elections). [104] In addition, an International Observer Mission was invited to watch and report on the 1992 electoral exercise. [105] Another area of electoral reform which saw the intervention of progressive forces concerned the COMELEC's exemption of the paramilitary CAFGUs from the gun ban. After petitions from the PnB and public pressures from other progressive elements, the COMELEC eventually reversed its decision less than a week before election day.

These efforts constituted novel additions to the more traditional clean-election campaigns that have emerged at critical junctures in the past (NAMFREL in 1953, CNEA in 1969, and NAMFREL in 1986) with the backing of opposition supporters, business elites, and church organizations, and that appear to have become a permanent fixture in Philippine electoral contests after the highly publicized Bantay ng Bayan crusade in 1986 (NAMFREL in 1987 and 1988, PPCRV-MCQC in 1992). [106] As a result, the 1992 election campaign might very well have been the most issue-oriented to date with progressive forces contributing to focus public debate on questions of substantive electoral reform and programmatic party politics. However, reflective of the disunity among individuals, groups, and organizations identified with Left-of-Center politics, the proliferation of such efforts also reveal a lack of coordination that hampered progressive intervention in the 1992 elections.

THE 1987 NATIONAL ELECTIONS

In terms of the four factors discussed above, the elections for congressional representatives in 1987 and for municipal and gubernatorial positions in 1988 proceeded under circumstances highly unfavorable to successful participation by the then relatively strong and united Philippine Left. First of all, in the context of mounting anti-communist mobilization, supporters of the legal left party were targets of right-wing propaganda and military-backed repression. Second, against the backdrop of persistent challenges to the new constitutional regime from both the military Right and the armed Left, the 1987 and 1988 parliamentary exercises presented themselves less as critical mechanisms for wielding power than as opportunities for political education and organizational consolidation of the mass base for the dominant Philippine Left. Third, in light of the Communist Party's strong influence upon the nature and direction of the PnB and ANP's electoral intervention, and the Party's ideological stance on the primacy of armed struggle, the Left, on the whole, made little organized effort to translate its mass base and resources into a serious political machine. Fourth, and finally, after a succession of election-boycott campaigns, the Left's extremely limited electoral experience served as poor preparation for participation in polls enveloped in the politics of "guns, goons, and gold."

Thus, relative to the Philippine Left's overall armed strength and mass support at the time, very few PnB/ANP candidates won election in 1987 and 1988. In 1987, for example, none of the "Magnificent Seven" candidates running under the ANP's banner succeeded in capturing a senate seat. [107] Moreover, despite reports of preelection surveys that estimated at fifty the number of districts with ANP or ANP-supported candidates in the lead, or "in a good second place, with a chance to win," and with sixteen identified as "almost sure" winners, fewer than "twenty congressional winners [were] supported by the ANP." [108] Of thirty-six fielded, only two PnB congressional candidates—whose districts fell within NPA strongholds—won election in 1987. Finally, only eighteen out of 144 PnB candidates were elected to municipal governments in 1988. [109]

Suggestive of the significance of armed Left support for progressive electoral intervention in 1987, PnB candidates Garduce and Andolana captured Western Samar's sole and North Cotabato's first congressional districts, respectively. However, despite public pledges that "NPA guerrillas 'will adopt measures to protect voters and civilians' from being harassed and intimidated" in so-called "red zones" elsewhere in the country, no other electoral gains for the Left occurred in such areas. [110] In this regard, Andolana's victory in North Cotabato contrasts with PnB candidate Ireneo Escandor's failed bid to represent the second congressional district of Sorsogon (another province considered an NPA stronghold at the time) and, according to one study, highlights the role of pre-existing grassroots networks in mobilizing and protecting progressive votes in the 1987 elections. [111]

THE 1992 SYNCHRONIZED LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS

In contrast with the early post-Marcos electoral exercises, the 1992 synchronized local and national elections saw different external and internal conditions influencing the electoral interventions by a more fragmented and diminished Philippine Left. First of all, with anti-communist mobilization on the wane, supporters of the broad legal Left rarely faced the systematic and discriminatory treatment accorded the PnB in 1987. Second, given the entrenchment of Philippine electoralism and the elimination of serious armed threats to the stability of the regime, elections now unquestionably constituted the key mechanism for exerting influence and power, a reality even the harshest critics of “bourgeois democracy” could not afford to ignore entirely without risking virtual political marginalization. Third, reflective of the growing ideological dissension within the Party as well as the emergence of alternative Left and Left-of-Center groups and coalitions, the 1992 elections saw a variety of more or less effective efforts at electoral participation, ranging from ideological education to pragmatic politicking. Fourth, and finally, with the lessons of 1987 and the example of the Progressive Bloc in Congress, the Philippine Left’s expanded electoral experience provided relatively greater insights into both the costs and rewards involved in “working the system.”

The left, in effect, worked the clientelist system. National leaders, as well as leaders of provincial affiliates such as labor unions, made short-term alliances with candidates at national and local levels and so operated like vote brokers. [112]

Thus, compared to the dominant Left’s overall decline and dissension at the time, the intervention of broader Left-of-Center forces in the 1992 elections indicated the continued significance of progressive politics in the electoral arena. A reactivated PnB, for example, fielded or supported candidates in seven major cities and twentythree provinces in eleven out of the thirteen regions. While only two out of eleven senatorial and four out of twenty-nine congressional candidates endorsed by the PnB at the national level won election, individual PnB chapters who entered into local electoral alliances with other political parties reportedly supported twenty-eight winning bets to the House, eleven of whom “are considered ND/ND allies and the rest are open and can be approached on an issue-to-issue basis.” [113] Counting not merely congressional candidacies, but also other PnB fielded and/or supported winning bets at the local level (reportedly including, among others, “forty-four councilors in five provinces and four cities,” “seventeen vice-mayors in seven provinces and two cities,” “forty-one mayors in ten provinces,” “forty board members in fifteen provinces,” as well as a few vice-governors and governors [114]), the PnB’s own assessment of the 1992 elections identified 622 successful candidacies, or “3.6 percent of the total number of candidates who won,” [115] as having received the party’s active support. While perhaps overly generous and certainly difficult to evaluate without further research into specific local election campaigns, this internal report nevertheless underscores the extent to which the Philippine Left’s post-EDSA trajectory points toward expanding rather than contracting electoral intervention.

Indicative of the increasing significance of so-called “development NGOs” to Left-of-Center political forces and agendas in the Philippines, some notably successful efforts at progressive intervention in the 1992 elections focused on building electoral coalitions around pre-existing local community groups and associations with ties to regional or national development-oriented nongovernmental organizations. For example, political candidates identified with NGOlinked groups reportedly performed “credibly” in Angeles City, Cebu City, Pasig, Quezon City (districts two and four) and Davao City, and won seats in “two municipalities in Bataan, San Luis, Aurora; Roxas, Oriental Mindoro; Irosin, Sorsogon; and North Cotabato.” [116] While manifesting salient variations from case to case, these progressive electoral advances typically resulted from a combination of, on the one hand, sustained efforts to promote economic development (by NGOs) and political organizing (by so-called “people’s organizations” [POs] or more mainstream “cause-oriented groups” [COGs]) among local communities and, on the other hand, pre-election initiatives to form strategic alliances

with individuals and groups identified with mainstream municipal/ provincial politics.

The local elections in Bataan province, for example, highlighted the significance and role of NGOs and POs for progressive electoral intervention. [117] Prior to the 1992 election campaign, for instance, the PO-NGO community in the Bataan municipality of Orani—which elected a mayor, a vice-mayor and four councilors identified with a local progressive electoral coalition—allegedly counted 12 percent of the total voting population among its members. [118] Targeted as a priority area by both the PRRM, a major NGO committed to sustainable development, and the IPD, a Manila-based organization engaged in electoral research and training, Bataan province (particularly the first congressional district) thus saw the emergence of Kabalikatan, a local coalition which fielded its own progressive, and supported other allied, political candidates in the 1992 elections. As a result, three municipalities in the first congressional district of Bataan province elected a combined total of three mayors, two vice-mayors and nine councilors identified with Kabalikatan. [119]

The relative success of Jovito Salonga’s presidential bid in the province of Camarines Sur (where he, in sharp contrast to placing fifth in the national tally, captured the lead) has also been linked to the intervention by progressive electoral coalitions of NGO-PO-COGs and established political parties in the 1992 elections. [120] That is, the so-called “NagaPopDems,” a few Liberal Party stalwarts, and the PnB contributed to Salonga’s campaign by, for example, organizing voters education seminars, brokering the province’s Salonga-Pimentel Movement, supplying sample ballots, and training poll watchers. While electoral coalitions forged around local communities already organized into sectoral, political, and/or cause-oriented groups have contributed to some progressive gains in the 1992 elections, many such efforts also floundered. For example, former PnB chair Romeo Capulong failed in his bid for the first congressional district of Nueva Ecija, despite support from both local NGOs and the province-wide coalition BALANE, which in turn linked up to the national party of Danding Cojuangco. [121] In part, such failures resulted from the difficulties involved in transforming sectoral and issue-based organizations into electoral machines. As noted on the Nueva Ecija elections:

NGOs and people’s organizations campaigned in the early part of the electoral period towards information dissemination among voters including grassroots voters’ education activities. Unfortunately, as election day neared, active individuals in the same NGOs and POs . . . ceased these activities to campaign for their own candidates in various posts.” [122]

The outcome of the 1992 elections, while hardly a decisive victory for the broad Left, nevertheless signaled a deepening of its 1987 electoral involvement, especially in light of its widespread decline and disarray. As noted above, one candidate strongly identified with the Left, Bobby Tanada, won reelection to the Senate; a number of Left-of-Center candidates won election as congressmen, governors, mayors, and councilors. Moreover, in contrast with the 1987 election, the Left showed greater flexibility and pragmatism in its electoral tactics and strategies, endorsing candidates running under established national political parties and entering into various alliances with local politicians and party formations, as well as building a national progressive coalition with LP-PDP-LABAN.

LOOKING AHEAD TO FUTURE ELECTIONS

Looking ahead to upcoming elections, the following developments can be discerned in terms of the four factors that have so far decisively shaped the Philippine Left’s electoral participation in the post-EDSA period. First of all, the legalization of the Communist Party and the renewal of the AFP-NPA peace process under the new Ramos administration signal a more hospitable political environment for so-called “progressive” forces in elections to come. [123] Second, the successful

neutralization of threats of coups and revolution as well as the peaceful transition of power from Aquino to her anointed general underscore the extent to which elections define future arenas of struggle for the Philippine Left. Third, the casualties of the Party's internal debates and the government's counterinsurgency efforts, in combination with the "NGO-ization" of the Philippine Left, have set the stage for more pragmatic and flexible electoral intervention by a wide array of forces ranging from the Left to the so-called "progressive mainstream." Fourth, and finally, in addition to first-hand experiences at the polls since 1986, recent developments within the Philippine Left and progressive mainstream—ranging from voters' education seminars, ballot-watch manuals, election studies, coalition-building efforts, and lobbying activities—underline a stronger appreciation for—as well as commitment to—the requisites of competitive electoral politics.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, whereas the "reaffirmationist" faction of the Communist Party might succeed in closing down the internal debate and ousting its "heretics," and thus possibly consigning itself to indefinite political marginalization, the broader Philippine Left is now increasingly recognizing the primacy of legal and parliamentary struggle. [124] While noteworthy in and of itself, however, the Left's emergence on the electoral scene hardly resolves the political dilemma of cooptation versus contestation. The following quote from a recent so-called "popular democratic" publication captures this dilemma:

[T]he broad Left must position itself firmly within the national current—the better to expose the limits of elite democracy, if not to gain entry into mainstream political life. [125]

In other words, rather than posing a counterhegemonic challenge to Philippine elite democracy, the Left's participation in elections may end up simply conferring legitimacy upon the existing political order. Moreover, rather than redefining the parameters of Philippine electoralism, the Left itself may end up (re)defined by the limitations of procedural democracy.

In general, the logic of electoralism, it has been noted, is inherently demobilizing, based as it is on a periodic one-person, one-vote symbolic enactment of political citizenship. Procedural democracy thus privileges elections as the most legitimate form of political participation, while delegitimizing—or coopting—extra-electoral forms of popular collective action. In the Philippine case, moreover, the American colonial legacy of machine politics and the absence of proportional representation decisively structure both the means and ends of electoral participation by the Left.

In terms of the means, several reports of local election initiatives by the broad Left in 1992, for example, cited the key role of so-called "electoral technology"—or, in the words of one community organizer, the "dirty-tricks department"—for a successful campaign. [126] In terms of the ends, moreover, another organizer working on an election-campaign for progressive politics in Bataan noted that while before 1992 he thought

that winning an election or 'seizing the state' was the most difficult effort of any organizing effort. . .[n]ow he argues that this is chicken feed compared to the task of governing. . . because they are commitment-bound to govern in a new way [which] involves new roles for government officials, PO leaders, and NGO development workers. [127]

Similarly, progressives who won election to municipal office or to Congress, for example, have since encountered difficulties in realizing their "progressive" constituencies' goals without running up against the interests of the local landowners who provided critical backing for their election bids.

On this note, and by way of concluding, the following quote culled from a post-1992 election document by the PNB-affiliated Institute for Political and Electoral Reform aptly captures, on the one hand, the Philippine Left's interest in acquiring relevant skills and accessing legal institutions, and, on the other hand, its wariness of submitting to the shortcomings and the dangers of Philippine electoralism.

Lobby work is something we have to live with or work on. If we want to know the system, then let us plunge into this system of governance and make it as a field of action or an arena of struggle. But let us not also forget how to swim or else we will get drowned. [128]

The author gratefully acknowledges her debts to several people who generously extended themselves and interrupted their busy schedules to share their insights into and experiences of progressive electoral intervention in recent Philippine elections. While the errors and opinions expressed below belong to the author, she would thus like to thank the following people for their best efforts: Francisco Cinco, Lisa Dacanay, Eric Gutierrez, Liddy Nakpil-Alejandro, Toinette Raquiza, and Clark Soriano. In addition, she would like to thank two anonymous readers as well as Jojo Abinales, Doming Caouette, John Sidel, and Kathleen Weekley for helpful comments on previous drafts of this essay.

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When a Revolution Devours its Children Before Victory: Operasyon Kampanyang Apos and the

Footnotes

[1] Institute for Popular Democracy, *Political Clans & Electoral Politics: A Preliminary Research* (Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy, 1987), p. 95. EDSA [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] is commonly used as a shorthand term to refer to the "People Power" revolt that took place in February 1986; protesters gathered on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Manila.

[2] Edicio de la Torre, "Structural Obstacles to Democratization in the Philippines," *Conjuncture* (July 1988).

[3] Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," *New Left Review* 169 (May-June 1988): 28.

[4] See, for example, Masataka Kimura, "Philippine Peasant and Labor Organizations in Electoral Politics: Players of Transitional Politics," *Pilipinas: A Journal of Philippine Politics* 14 (Spring 1990): 29-78.

[5] For more on this see the other essays in this volume, as well as, for example, Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1994).

[6] The most significant third parties to emerge in the pre-martial law period were the Democratic Alliance [DA] and the Philippine Progressive Party [PPP]. Whereas the former included both Huk guerrillas and members of the old communist party [Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas], the latter constituted a break-away faction from the Nacionalista Party during the presidency of Carlos P. Garcia by former affiliates of the Magsaysay for President Movement [MPM]. See Thomas Marion Pinckney, Jr., "Third Parties and the Philippine Party System" (PhD dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1971). For a brief summary, see also David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 100-103.

[7] While enjoying some support in the capital region and elsewhere in the country, too, the Democratic Alliance scored its greatest success in Central Luzon in the 1946 elections. See Benedict Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 140-150. For a detailed discussion of the Democratic Alliance in the pre-election period, see also Ronald King Edgerton, "The Politics of Reconstruction in the Philippines: 1945-1948" (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1975), pp. 276-292.

[8] First, during the 1946 electoral campaign, supporters and candidates of the Democratic Alliance [DA] suffered harassment by armed men. Thereafter, the six elected DA congressmen in Central Luzon were prevented from taking their seats because of alleged electoral fraud. See Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*

[9] See, for example, Emmanuel de Dios, "The Erosion of the Dictatorship," in Emmanuel de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., *Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power* (Metro Manila: Conspectus, 1988), pp. 70-71; and Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

[10] For a brief discussion of the internal deliberations behind the Executive Committee's 1986 boycott decision, see Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution*, pp. 156-158.

[11] *Ang Bayan*, May 1986, reprinted as "Sum Up, Learn from Boycott Error," *Ang Katipunan* (San Francisco) (July 1986): 7. For further early Party assessments of the boycott error, see also the June 1986 issue of *Ang Bayan*.

[12] Before the 1987 national elections, for example, the newly created Institute for Popular Democracy [IPD] estimated that Partido ng Bayan would capture some 20 percent of the total votes for both Congress and Senate. See Institute for Popular Democracy, "Fearless Forecast," *Political Clans & Electoral Politics: A Preliminary Research* (Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy, 1987), p. 84.

[13] For a well-documented study of the post-1986 entrenchment of elite families, see Eric Gutierrez, Torrente, and Narca, eds., *All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power Relations in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992). For an informative overview of the family and business ties of the present Congress, see also Eric Gutierrez, *The Ties that Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1994)

[14] Clearly, the rejection of the US-Bases Treaty owed a great deal to Philippine senators' opposition to the unfavorable terms proposed by a recession-hit US government faced with mounting domestic pressures for post-Cold War peace dividends. At the same time, as a study of Filipino opposition to the US military bases argues, "it cannot be denied that the Left performed the crucial role of providing the consistent, organized mass of opposition." Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, "Anti-Bases Coalition," in "Coalition Experiences" (unpublished mss., 1993), p. 22.

[15] For example, the AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] strongly endorsed relying on so-called "vigilantes," or paramilitary anti-communist civilian groups, as one means of intensifying the counterinsurgency. Thus, even at a time when "the Philippine armed forces were deeply divided, they were largely united in their support for vigilantes." Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Vigilantes in the Philippines: A Threat to Democratic Rule* (New York: The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1988), p. xv.

[16] For a general discussion of US support of counterinsurgency in the Philippines, see Walden Bello, *Creating the Third Force: US-Sponsored Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippines* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1987) and Gareth Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency in the Philippines: Military and Political Options* (University of Hawaii: Philippine Studies Occasional Paper, no. 9, 1987). See also, Armitage, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 3, 1986, p. 10, cited in Bello, *US-Sponsored Low-Intensity Conflict*, pp. 72-3; "US Wants Aquino to Toughen Stand on Insurgents," *New York Times*, September 1, 1986; Armitage, Statement before House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 17, 1987. See also Committee on Foreign Affairs, *US Assistance to the Philippines*, statement of John C. Monjo, deputy assistant secretary of state, before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the House hearings, May 15, 1986, insisting that Aquino must "go strong on counterinsurgency".

[17] However, Aquino's New Armed Forces of the Philippines [NAFP] were not issued any "defensive posture" orders during this period. Rather, Porter argues, "the NAFP's counterinsurgency plan, code-named 'Oplan Mamamayan' which emerged full-blown from the office of the Chief of Staff only a few weeks after the ouster of Marcos, owes nothing to the

influence of the democratic regime of Corazon Aquino . . . Originally drawn up in 1985 . . . [its] security portion . . . [is] basically the same as the one in its predecessor 'Oplan Katatagan.'" Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency*, p. 86.

[18] The military's counterinsurgency strategy specified "a three-pronged approach which included not only security and development but national reconciliation as well." Hilario G. Davide et al., *The Final Report* (Manila: The Fact-Finding Commission, 1990), p. 59.

[19] AFP General Headquarters, Letter of Instruction 02787, January 20, 1987, cited in Lorenzo B. Ziga, "Military Checkpoints and the Rule of Law: An Unsettled Peace for Whom?" *Philippine Law Journal* 64, 3rd-4th quarter (September-December 1989): 242.

[20] President Aquino's commencement speech at the PMA, March 23, 1987, cited in Bello, *US-Sponsored Low-Intensity Conflict*, p. 74, emphasis added

[21] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights [LCHR], *Vigilantes in the Philippines*, p. v

[22] Free Legal Assistance Group, "Open Letter to Her Excellency Corazon C. Aquino," reprinted in *Malaya*, April 11, 1987, p. 16. The term OIC, or Officer in Charge, refers to the Aquino-appointed replacements for old Marcos loyalists in the interim period between the former dictator's ouster and the holding of local elections in January 1988.

[23] See, for example, the following *Malaya* articles: "Vigilantes to boost Cebu anti-Red drive," April 1, 1987, p. 1; "Counter death squads formed in S. Negros," April 4, 1987, p. 7; "Resist formation of vigilante units, Samarenos urged," April 9, 1987, p. 13; "Caution urged in arming vigilantes," April 10, 1987, pp. 1, 6; "PC, landowners form new vigilante group in Negros," April 22, 1987, p. 12. See also the "Open Letter to Her Excellency Corazon C. Aquino" from the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] expressing the "deepest concern over the rise of armed paramilitary groups, counter-guerrilla groups, [and] vigilantes," reprinted in *Malaya*, April 4, 1987, p. 16, shortly after the news of a NAKASAKA-affiliate religious cult, Tadtad, chopping "to death a wounded rebel. . . drank his blood 'to ward off his ghost,' pierced his cheeks with rattan and carried his head to display in the . . . town square." "Vigilante group beheads, drinks blood of rebel," *Hong Kong AFP*, April 1, 1987, reprinted in Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Vigilantes in the Philippines*, p. 144

[24] Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, *Report on Vigilante Groups* (Quezon City: Philippine Congress, April 1988), cited in Ziga, "Military Checkpoints and the Rule of Law" p. 242. This report unequivocally calls for the dismantling of vigilante groups in the Philippines.

[25] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Vigilantes in the Philippines*, p. xi.

[26] Eric Gutierrez, "Electoral Coalitions for the 1992 Elections," "Coalition Experiences" (unpublished mss, 1993), p. 96. According to then-chair of PnB, Fidel Agcaoilil, the anti-PnB and ANP [Alliance for New Politics] propaganda in the 1987 election campaign even included a "comic booklet [in which] the ANP people were portrayed as satanists," cited in Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., "What's Left of New Politics?" *Midweek*, September 23, 1987, p. 7.

[27] See, for example, the following *Malaya* articles: "PnB man killed in Aklan, another nabbed in Navotas," April 1, 1987; "More ANP bets cry harassment," April 9, 1987, pp. 1, 6; "Two campaign workers of ANP believed killed," April 10, 1987, pp. 1, 6; "Stop harassment of ANP, government urged," April 11, 1987, pp. 1, 7; "4PnB campaigners are missing," April 14, 1987, pp. 1, 6; "ANP

worker attacked by armed group," April 25, 1987; and "Increase in military harassment cases noted," May 1, 1987. A paid advertisement by PAHRA [Institute for Political and Electoral Reform], POTENT, KMU, KMP, LFS, KPML, and KAP claims that 24 "officials, campaigners and supporters of the Alliance for New Politics have been killed while 54 others have been arrested, abducted and mauled . . .," "Another Rape of Democracy?," *Malaya*, May 11, 1987, p. 7.

[28] See, for example, the *Malaya* articles cited above.

[29] See, for example, Jun F. Sibal, "Newcomer in the Arena," *Midweek*, March 18, 1987, pp. 3-7

[30] For example, there were reports of "Comelec lists in polling booths [that] failed to identify PnB, Bayan and Volunteers for Popular Democracy candidates as ANP coalition candidates." *Malaya*, May 12, 1987, p. 3.

[31] Alan Jazmines, "Areas of Contention: Aquino's Total War and the Local Elections," *National Midweek*, January 20, 1988, p. 33.

[32] However, the PnB's internal election report cited "heavy military operations throughout the electoral period" as the main reason why the party refrained from reactivating its Partido Kordilyera and PnB-Metro Baguio chapters in Regions One and Two. See Partido ng Bayan, *Grassroots Electoral Politics: An Evaluation of the Electoral Performance of PnB and Allied Organizations in the 1987 and 1992 Elections* (Quezon City: Partido ng Bayan, April 1993), p. 39. See also, for example, "Lull before the long war," *Manila Chronicle*, December 28, 1991-January 2, 1992, p. 10. Significantly, William Claver, a congressional representative identified with progressive politics, failed to gain reelection in his district in Kalinga-Apayao.

[33] See, for example, Temario Campos Rivera, "Class, The State and Foreign Capital: The Politics of Philippine Industrialization, 1950-1986" (PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1991).

[34] See, for example, John T. Sidel, "Coercion, Capital and the Post-Colonial State: Bossism in the Postwar Philippines" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1995).

[35] While Marcos, too, held "elections" and "plebiscites" under martial law, these served essentially as auxiliary public relations measures (designed as much for target audiences in US foreign policy circles and international lending institutions as for local consumption) under his reign of "constitutional authoritarianism." See, for example, Raul P. de Guzman, "Citizen Participation and Decision-Making under the Martial Law Administration: A Search for a Viable Political System," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 21,1 (January 1977).

[36] For a brief account that vividly captures the "vigil" of the early Aquino regime, see, for example, Marites Danguilan-Vitug, "An endless vigil: Philippine democracy under siege," in *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990), pp. 153-160. Another recent PCIJ publication provides an introductory anthology of sorts to various manifestations of what one contributor refers to as the apocalypse-now mentality characteristic of these "siege" years. For more on this, see PCIJ, *Coups, Cults & Cannibals* (Manila: PCIJ, 1993).

[37] The government-appointed investigation released a lengthy report which lists these attempts: "The first coup attempt against the Aquino administration was staged by civilians and military elements loyal to the deposed President Marcos by taking over the Manila Hotel in July

1986. Subsequent attempts were the November 1986 'God Save The Queen' plot, the January 1987 GMA-7 attempt, the April 1987 Black Saturday incident, the July 1987 takeover plot at the Manila International Airport [and] the August 1987 [attempt]." Davide, *The Final Report*, p. 21, fn. 1. See also Fransisco Nemenzo, "A Season of Coups: Reflections on the Military in Politics," *Kasarinlan* 2,4, (1987): 9-14.

[38] At the time, the AFP reportedly estimated "NPA strength to 24,000-25,000 regulars, half of whom are thought to be armed. The insurgents are thought to be operating in at least sixtyeight out of the nation's seventy-two provinces, and to exert significant influence over 20 percent of the nation's 40,000 villages." Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Vigilantes in the Philippines*, p. 3.

[39] According to one estimate, "strikes increased in 1986 to 581, 248 (43 percent) of which were reportedly led by KMU-affiliated unions," Bureau of International Affairs, Department of Labor, *Foreign Labor Trends: Philippines 1986* (Washington DC.: Department of Labor, 1987), p. 10. KMU, which is short for the Kilusang Mayo Uno, is the most radical national federation of Philippine workers. The 1986 strikes, moreover, reportedly involved 169,379 workers, a dramatic increase compared to the calculated 20,902 workers who participated in the sixty-two strikes recorded for the year 1980. "Most of the 1986 strikes were called by the KMU." Fransisco Nemenzo, "The Philippine Labour Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Democracy," paper presented at the Conference on Labour Movements in Transition to Democracy, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, April 1988, p. 41.

[40] The founding in 1986 of the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas [KMP] as a peasant counterpart to the KMU—both of which are affiliates of the above-ground umbrella organization for the national democratic left, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN]— signaled a new development as "the KMP launched nationwide 'organized land occupations' on 26 September 1986. Other peasant organizations also decided to occupy idle and abandoned land in an attempt to force the government to make good its promises for reform," James Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1992), p. 219.

[41] Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Roger L. Mendoza, "Elections and the Crisis of Legitimacy in the Philippines: A Comparative View of the Marcos and Aquino Regimes," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* 32, 3-4 (July-October 1988): 291.

[42] "After the plebiscite, . . . considerable concern was expressed over the conviction and persuasion of the military which supported the Constitution by a mere 60 percent to 40 percent margin. The 40 percent was viewed as a significant number. The 'no' vote was in fact larger in certain military camps." Tancangco and Mendoza, "Elections and the Crisis of Legitimacy in the Philippines", p. 292.

[43] While loaded, the term "disloyal opposition" nevertheless captures the idea of more or less organized resistance to and/or assault upon not merely a particular politician, party, or administration, but an entire regime or, put differently, the "rules of the game" See, Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

[44] Over 2,000 troops reportedly took part in the August 28 coup attempt (and many more allegedly hedged their bets until the end), making it the most serious military threat during Aquino's first eighteen months in power. Beyond Metro Manila, "[r]enegade troops also took over

the military commands in at least six provinces and mobilized their supporters among the cadets of the Philippine Military Academy." Sheila S. Coronel, "A Coup Before Dawn," *Manila Chronicle*, December 31, 1987, reprinted in Sheila S. Coronel, *Coups, Cults & Cannibals: Chronicles of a Troubled Decade* (Manila: Anvil Publishing House, 1993), p. 71. For more on these coup attempts, see also the government-appointed Da vido Commission's report: Da vido et al., Final Report. See also the PCIJ-collection, *Kudeta*, and Criselda Yabes, *The Boys from the Barracks: The Philippine Military after EDSA* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 1991).

[45] Paco Arguelles, "Pagbabalik-aral: A-priorism Reaffirmed" *Debate* 7 (August 1993): 69.

[46] "Oppose the US-Aquino Scheme to Stabilize the Reactionary Ruling Order," *Ang Bayan*, January 1987, pp. 1-3.

[47] Arguelles, "Pagbabalik-aral."

[48] "People's War Advances, Confronts Total War" *Ang Bayan*, March 1987, pp. 2-3.

[49] Arguelles, "Pagbabalik-aral."

[50] Melanie Manlogon, "The Day Congress Came Back" *Midweek*, August 19, 1987, p.46.

[51] AFP General Headquarters, Letter of Instruction 02787, January 20, 1987, cited in Ziga, "Military Checkpoints and the Rule of Law," p. 242.

[52] Porter, *The Politics of Counter insurgency*, p. 8.

[53] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, *Vigilantes in the Philippines*, pp. 9-10.

[54] Rocamora, *Breaking Through*, p. 93.

[55] *Conjuncture*, February-March 1988:17

[56] See, for example, Rod B. Gutang, *Pulisya: The Inside Story of Law Enforcement in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Daraga Press, 1991). Congressman and former PC Brigadier General Gutang drafted the bill to demilitarize the police force which went into effect as R.A. 6975 on January 1, 1991.

[57] Roberto D. Tiglao, "Rebellion from the Barracks: The Military as Political Force," in *Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990), p. 21.

[58] Arguelles, "Pagbabalik-aral," p. 78.

[59] Interview with Ronald Llamas of Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa [BISIG] by Ces Ochoa, "New politics: Is it worth another try?" *Midweek*, May 16, 1990, p. 23. This statement is echoed by many other individuals and groups identified with the aboveground progressive Left.

[60] Interview with Bayan chair Nelia Sancho by Rodney Tasker, "Grassroot support: Left to help some candidates in local polls," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 12, 1992, p. 20.

[61] For more detailed and nuanced accounts of the nature and direction of the Philippine Left in this period, see Arguelles, "Pagbabalik-Aral."

[62] See, for example, Armando Malay, IF., "The Legal vs. the Illegal in CPP-ML Strategy and Tactics," *Asian Studies* 20 (1982): 122-142.

[63] Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society And Revolution* (Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao, 1971), p. 280.

[64] Armando Malay, IF., "The Influence of Mao Zedong Thought on the Communist Party of the Philippines Marxist Leninist," in Theresa C. Carino, ed., *China and Southeast Asia: Contemporary Politics and Economics* (Manila: La Salle University Press, 1984), p. 48.

[65] Ibid., p. 42.

[66] This document was adopted at the CPP "Congress of Reestablishment" in December of 1968. See, for example, Fransisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Lim Joo Jock and S. Vani, eds., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia* (Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984), pp. 75-79.

[67] Malay, "The Influence of Mao Zedong Thought," pp. 47-48.

[68] Gareth Porter, "Strategic Debates and Dilemmas in the Philippine Communist Movement," *Pilipinas* 13 (Fall 1989): 19-40.

[69] Kathleen Weekley, "A Tale of Two Boycott Debates: Some Notes on the Roots of the Crisis of the Communist Party of the Philippines," in this volume. The CPP's official publication, moreover, has argued that on "occasions, at various levels, when we were not able to correctly enforce democratic centralism ... our unity was unstable and our advance obstructed." "Party Members Urged to Review Basics of Democratic Centralism," *Ang Bayan* (English ed.)17, 4 (June 1986): 8.

[70] Weekley, "A Tale of Two Boycott Debates," p. 3

[71] See, for example, Rene Ciria Cruz, "Why the Philippine Left Must Take the Parliamentary Road," *Debate* 2 (March 1992): 9, and Marty Villalobos (pseudonym), former high-ranking Party member, "For a Politico-Military Framework," unpublished paper, February 23, 1987.

[72] See, for example, Marty Villalobos, "For a Politico-Military Framework."

[73] Rocamora, *Breaking Through*, p. 84.

[74] Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency*, p. 44. Jose Maria Sison chaired PnB's Preparatory Committee, while several other former CPP cadres and ex-detainees became prominent PnB personalities, including, for example, Secretary-General Romeo Candazo and senatorial candidates Bernabe "Dante" Buscayno, Horacio "Boy" Morales, and Nelia Sancho.

[75] See, for example, Jose Maria Sison, "Political Report," presented to PnB's founding convention on August 30, 1986, cited in Porter, *The Politics of Counterinsurgency*, p. 53, m. 47.

[76] Francisco Lara, Jr. and Horacio R. Morales, Jr., "The Peasant Movement and the Challenge of Rural Democratisation in the Philippines," *Journal of Development Studies* 26, 4 (July 1990): 149. Morales was one of ANP's seven senatorial candidates in the 1987 election.

[77] Interview with Etta Rosales by Ces Ochoa, "New politics: Is it worth another try?" *Midweek*, May 16, 1990, p. 8.

[78] *Conjuncture*, February-March 1988, p. 17

[79] Eric Gutierrez, "Electoral Coalitions for the 1992 Elections," unpubl. mss., author's file, p. 96.

[80] Interview with Lui Gamit, PnB deputy secretary-general for operations, by Yasmin Arquiza, "PnB adopts new poll motto: field to win," *Malaya*, January 15, 1988, p. 6.

[81] "Rebs admit bets gave them money," *Malaya*, January 15, 1988, p. 1. Other contemporary reports claimed that "several municipal and provincial candidates in Quezon province yesterday said the NPA was collecting 'tong' from the candidates to raise funds . . . The candidates, who requested anonymity, said the rebels were asking P5,000 from councilors, P10,000-P30,000 from mayors and P100,000 from gubernatorial bets. Several candidates have already been forced to pay up because the rebels were prohibiting them from campaigning . . ." *Manila Chronicle*, January 5, 1988, p. 6. See also, for example, "A must for candidates: NPA pass," *Malaya*, January 13, 1988; and the front-page picture and caption of "a New People's Army safe conduct pass," *Manila Chronicle*, January 15, 1988.

[82] *Ang Bayan*, December 1988, p. 16

[83] Partido ng Bayan, *Grassroots Electoral Politics: An Evaluation of the Electoral Performance of PnB and Allied Organizations in the 1987 and 1992 Elections*, (Quezon City: Partido ng Bayan, April 1993), p. 54.

[84] "PnB with a Difference," *Conjuncture* 5,2 (February 1992): 5.

[85] Interview with PnB chair Loretta Ann "Etta" Rosales, in "PnB with a difference," *Conjuncture* 5, 2 (February 1992): 5.

[86] Popular democrats, or "popdems": Volunteers for Popular Democracy [VPD] and Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa [BISIG].

[87] See Rocamora, "Breaking Through", pp. 139-169, on "natdems."

[88] Toinette Raquiza, "Is a democratic transition possible?" *Conjuncture* 5, 2 (February 1992): 11.

[89] AKBAYAN [Kaakbay ng Sambayanan] drew on three socialist-oriented groups for its leadership (BISIG, Pandayan, and MPD [Movement for Popular Democracy]) and on NGOs, labor, peasant, and urban poor groups.

[90] Interview with PnB chair Fidel Agcaoili by Benjamin Pimentel Jr., "What's left of New Politics?" *Midweek*, September 23, 1987, p. 41.

[91] While the old communist party—the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas [PKP]—emphasized "legal and parliamentary struggle" in the early post-war period, there appears to be little residue of this experience in contemporary debates on progressive electoral intervention. For a brief discussion of the "rebelliousness" of the Manila-Rizal Committee in regards to the 1978 elections,

however, see Armando Malay, Jr., "The Dialectics of Kaluwagan: Echoes of a 1978 Debate," Third World Studies Center, *Marxism in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1988), pp. 1-21. See also, Benjamin Pimentel, *Rebolusyon! A Generation of Struggle in the Philippines* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991), pp. 218-231.

[92] For more on the "progressive bloc" in Congress, see, for example, "The Progressives," *Midweek*, June 14, 1989, pp. 3-6. This article identifies Representatives Bonifacio Gillego, Oscar Rodriguez, Florencio Abad, Gregorio Andolana, Nikki Coseteng and Edcel Lagman as the core of this bloc and goes on to list Oscar Santos, Milagros Laurel-Trinidad, Enrico Dayang-hirang, Eduardo Josen, William Claver, and Ciriaco Alfelor as other progressives.

[93] The following excerpt from an internal PnB report dated April 5-15, 1987, assessed the party's operation in the provinces of Agusan Norte, Agusan Sur, Surigao Norte, Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon, Misamis Occidental, and Zamboanga del Sur: "Organizationally, the PnB also had a difficult time instituting and reinforcing the national council's decisions, particularly among the base organizations that openly supported the party. Many of the party directives, for instance, were not awarded enough attention by local chapters and constituent organizations, which were understandably engaged in other campaigns and commitments. This could be seen as a reflection of how elections are accorded strategic significance in the rank and file of ND organizations." Cited in Gutierrez, "Electoral Coalitions," p. 96.

[94] See, for example, Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., "Interview: Fidel Agcaoili," *Midweek*, September 23, 1987, pp. 6, 7, 41.

[95] "Capulong admitted that the lack of campaign funds had been the major problem of the party . . . [For example,] the Pnb could only afford a minimal printing of one group campaign poster." Cited in *Midweek*, June 14, 1989, p. 13.

[96] See, for example, Cristina Jayme Montiel, "Organizational Dynamics in a Left-of-Center National Coalition: The Salonga-Pimentel Campaign," paper presented to the Fourth International Philippine Studies Conference at the Australian National University, July 1, 1992

[97] See, for example, PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 40.

[98] In 1992, the MPD included, among other "popdem" NGOs, the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement [PRRM] and the Institute for Popular Democracy [IPD]. While not a direct participant in the 1992 elections, PRRM, which has its largest branch in Bataan province, lent several of its people to work on Kabalikatan's campaign. For a case study of PRRM in Bataan, see Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, *Bataan: A Case on Ecosystem Approach to Sustainable Development in the Philippines* (Quezon City: PRRM, 1991).

[99] PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 53. Among the supporting organizations for the Kilusan ng Alternatibong Pulitika para sa Inang Bayan [KAPATIRAN] were: the Alliance for Concerned Teachers [ACT], Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], Kilsang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas [KMP], League of Filipino Students [LFS] and PRRM, according to a KAPATIRAN flyer on "What to ask the candidates."

[100] See, for example, Fransisco Cinco, *Experiences during the Local Elections in Bataan*, (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1993).

[101] See, for example, IPER's "Pagsasanay pang-instruktor para sa batayang edukasyong

pambotante," author's file.

[102] See, for example, KAPATIRAN organizational material, author's file

[103] The three socialist-oriented groups BISIG, Pandayan, and MPD formed the core of Project 1992. Project 2001 brought together the Caucus for Development NGOs [CODE-NGO], allegedly the largest NGO federation in the Philippines, and "virtually formalize[d] NGO involvement in electoral politics." Gutierrez, "Electoral Coalitions," p. 101. The MPD-supported Institute for Popular Democracy, together with the PRRM, also developed and organized voters education seminars. See, for example, PRRM and IPD's *Voters Education Training Module*, author's file. BISIG's Institute for Electoral Education also prepared "educational modules," for example.

[104] From its origins as the "Covenant for Orderly, Meaningful and Peaceful Elections" and to its eventual "Citizens for Meaningful and Peaceful Elections," COMPEL drew on the support from the Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs [ACSPPA], the much criticized NAMFREL and the government appointed COMELEC, among others. It focused on broader electoral reforms, as well as on voters education and poll-watch volunteer training. See, for example, "Electoral Reforms," *People's Agenda for Development and Democracy* (Quezon City: ACSPPA, 1992), pp. 59-61.

[105] See, for example, Tezza O. Parel, "Memo from election monitors," *Midweek*, June 10, 1992, pp. 6-8; "Foreign observers to monitor polls," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 11, 1992, pp. 1, 13; "Int'l group to monitor elections," *Daily Globe*, May 11, 1992, p. 3. Officially invited by the Council for People's Development, the Ecumenical Bishops Forum, the Philippine Independent Church, and the local chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the IMO [International Mission of Observers] thirteen-person delegation of "church workers, academics, journalists, and officials from government and non-government organizations" contributed perhaps a more critical international perspective than that offered by the mostly American foreign observer teams that have descended on precincts all over the archipelago in previous elections. IMO, "Preliminary Report," author's file.

[106] NAMFREL in the early 1950s refers to the National Movement for Free Elections; in the 1980s, it refers to the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections. CNEA refers to Citizen National Electoral Assembly. PPCRV-MCQC refers to Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting-Media Citizens Quick Count.

[107] The top ANP senatorial candidate polled only about 1.7 million votes nationwide.

[108] IPD, *Political Clans*, pp. 84, 87.

[109] This figure does not include candidates who enjoyed the endorsement or support of PnB but who ran under other political parties.

[110] See, for example, "NDF pledges to protect voters in coming polls," *Malaya*, April 13, 1987, p. 4.

[111] See Jenny Franco, "Philippine Electoral Politics and the Peasant-Based Civic Movement in the 1980s," draft mss., 1993.

[112] Rosanne Rutten, "Courting the Worker's Vote: Rhetoric and Response in a Philippine Hacienda Region" (Center for Studies of Social Change, New School for Social Research: Working

Paper no. 176, 1993), p. 4. Rutten's analysis of the worker's vote in the 1992 elections focuses on the province of Negros Occidental.

[113] PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 38. While the successful senatorial candidacies of Bobby Tanada and Nikki Coseteng enjoyed the PnB's endorsement, their incumbent status (as Senator and Congressional Representative of Quezon City's district 3, respectively) as well as other resources (the Tanada family name and Danding Cojuangco's Nationalist People's Coalition political machinery, respectively) significantly advanced these reelectionist bids. In terms of the four winning PnB-endorsed congressional bets, moreover, three of them— Bonifacio Gillego, Edcel Lagman, and Gregorio Andolana—ran as reelectionist candidates in their respective districts, while the fourth, Juan Ponce Enrile, was a former Senator. 114 PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 38.

[114] PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 38.

[115] Ibid., p.43. In addition to leaving unexamined both the question of what, if anything, the PnB contributed to these 622 winning candidacies and the issue of the 260 odd seats out of those 622 for which no internal assessments had been completed, this report also falls short of identifying by name and party affiliation these alleged ND or issue-based allies. Such shortcomings make it difficult to evaluate claims that "[o]ut of the 364 winning candidates accounted for, 1/3 or 118 are ND/ND allies while 2/3 or 246 are issue-based allies." PnB, *Grassroots Electoral Politics*, p. 49.

[116] Julio P. Macuja, "The Mass Movement and the Elections," *Philippine Political Update*, April-July, 1992, p. 5. However, Macuja also notes that the two candidates with the strongest ties to development NGOs, former Acting Secretary of Agrarian Reform Florencio "Butch" Abad and Polytechnic University of the Philippines President Nemesio "Doc" Prudente, failed in their respective senatorial bids. Other progressive incumbents, moreover, lost in Davao Oriental, Pampanga, South Cotabato, and General Santos City. Interestingly, losing incumbent candidates Governor Mike Sueno of South Cotabato and Mayor Lita Nunez of General Santos City allegedly "lost their highly dedicated mass base and the informal but influential support of the local Catholic Church" after switching party affiliation from the AKBAYAN-supported PDP-LABAN [Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan] to Danding Cojuangco's NPC [Nationalist People's Coalition]. See Montiel, "Organizational Dynamics in a Left-of-Center National Coalition," p. 6.

[117] For an insightful inside analysis of progressive electoral intervention in Bataan's first congressional district in the 1992 elections, see Fransisco Cinco, *Experiences during the Local Elections in Bataan* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1993). See also, by the same author, the brief post-election summary "Kilusang Electoral sa Bataan: NGOs-POs Tumaya sa Halalang Panlokal," *Conjuncture* 5, 6-7 (June-July 1992): 7-8. For some background on Balikatan, see also PRRM, *Bataan: A Case*, especially pp. 46-47, 76-83.

[118] J. Clark Soriano, *Selected Case Studies: NGO-PO-GO Interfaces in Local Governance* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1993), p. 28. In absolute terms, according to Soriano, the NGO-PO community in Orani counted some 3,000 members in a voting population of approximately 24,000 people.

[119] Of the three elected mayors, Dr. Mario Zuniga was fielded as a Kabalikatan candidate in Orani while the two successful contenders for the highest municipal office in Abucay and Morong both received direct backing from the same progressive electoral coalition. Kabalikatan also supported the successful candidates for Orani and Morong's vice-mayorship positions and several

elected councilors in Abucay (five) and Orani (four).

[120] Soliman M. Santos Jr., "The local face of the national campaign," *Conjuncture* 5, 6-7 (June/July 1992): 9.

[121] Laura L. Gonzaga, "Interview: Romeo Capulong," *Midweek*, May 13, 1992, pp. 3-5.

[122] Excerpt from a report on the 1992 elections in Cabanatuan City, and the towns of Zaragoza, Talavera and Quezon, Nueva Ecija, prepared by the International Observer Mission's Nueva Ecija team, headed by Ruth Cadwallader, p. 8. See also, for example, "Memo from election monitors," *Midweek*, June 10, 1992, pp. 6-8.

[123] Executive Order no. 125 issued on September 15, 1993, outlines the Ramos administration's vision of "comprehensive peace efforts."

[124] A recent paper discussing the "unfolding drama of the Philippine Left" argued that a "highly predictable outcome of the debate, such as it is, between radicals and moderates is this: nothing will be settled [and] both will remain entrenched in their 'non-negotiable' positions..." Armando Malay, Jr., "Old Reflexes, New Slogans: The Mid-Life Crisis of the Philippine Left," paper presented at the Second Philippine Studies Conference, University of London, April 1994. For a statement broadly representative of the "moderate" left's position on elections, see, for example, R. Ciria Cruz, "Why the Philippine Left Must Take the Parliamentary Road," *Kasarinlan* 7,4 (1992): 51-61.

[125] Editorial, "Uniting the broad left around electoral reforms," *Conjuncture* 4, 4 (April 1991): 1.

[126] See, for example, Francisco Cinco, "NGOs-POs Tumaya sa Halalang Panlokal," *Conjuncture* 5, 6-7 (June-July 1992): 7-8.

[127] J. Clark Soriano, "Selected Case Studies: NGO-PO Interfaces in Local Governance," unpublished manuscript, Institute for Popular Democracy, June 1993, p. 32.

[128] Antonio R. Villazor, Policy Officer, PAHRA, "Lobby Work: The Pahra Experience," *Consultations on Parliamentary and Electoral Work*, unpublished document, Institute for Political and Electoral Reform, 1993.