Photo credit: DRC Kashaka and Shabindu displaced persons camp - Wikimedia Commons

From the outset, observers were circumspect about the end of the conflict, due to the establishment of two parallel and intimately linked peace processes.

Two peace agreements

The first, sponsored by the USA, is an agreement between states, the DRC and Rwanda. It was signed on 27^th June. According to the actors themselves, it is running behind schedule, particularly on the question of the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from Congolese territory. It is conditional upon the DRC armed forces (FARDC) neutralising the FDLR [1], a militia composed of former génocidaires [2] whose danger Rwanda overestimates, considering that it represents an existential threat.

The second agreement, still under discussion, is that of Doha [3], this time between the DRC and the M23/AFC militia, massively supported by Rwanda. It has conquered a large part of the territory of the east of the country by occupying the main cities of Goma and Bukavu [4]. The talks are stalling. The Congolese authorities demand to recover their authority over the entire territory, whilst M23/AFC speaks of co-management of the region. If M23, at the beginning, was a strictly military rebellion, it has transformed into a political force with the addition of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), led by Corneille Nangaa [5].

Parallel regime and rise of militias

This militia has rapidly installed a new administration to manage the conquered territories. Governors have been appointed, courts established and, recently, a police force has been created with the recruitment of new civil servants. Traditional chiefs opposed to this new power have been sidelined and sometimes physically eliminated. The other thorny problem is that of demobilising M23 forces. These combatants demand to be integrated into the army. Tshisekedi [6], the DRC president, categorically refuses, considering that such integration would be a sword of Damocles for his regime.

To wage war against M23/AFC, the Congolese government has largely called upon numerous militias that operate in the region. They act under the generic name of Wazalendo (the patriots, in Kiswahili [7]). Officially, their members have the status of “armed defence reserve”. In practice, the Wazalendo enjoy great independence and consider that they are not bound by the commitments made in Doha, as they were absent from the discussions. Indeed, the latter had requested to participate in the meetings, but the refusal of both the Congolese government and M23/AFC resulted in ignoring the demands of these armed groups. Already the first skirmishes between Wazalendo militias and FARDC are appearing. The latest took place in Uvira [8], causing the death of about ten people.

Contrary to what Trump declares, when he claims to have ended a thirty-year war [9], the conflict continues, pushing civilian populations, victims of abuses perpetrated on all sides, to take the path of exile.

Paul Martial