In the four and a half years that have elapsed since Myanmar’s armed forces, or Tatmadaw, took back direct political power, scholars, journalists, activists and sundry other pundits have made a wide range of predictions about the eventual outcome of the current civil war.

At first, most forecasts were quite pessimistic, as the country’s powerful security apparatus was deployed to put down the burgeoning opposition movement .

Despite the widespread support, both in Myanmar and outside it, for recognition of the 2020 national election results (which saw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy returned with a massive majority), and the immediate return to a more democratic system of government, there was an expectation among many expert observers that, as had happened so often before, the nationwide rising against the junta would be ruthlessly crushed.

The anti-junta forces soon turned to violent resistance, and sought the help of several ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) based around the country’s periphery. As these groups responded, and the strength and cohesion of the opposition movement gradually grew, analysts began to hedge their bets. They still warned against excessive optimism, but allowed for a much more effective resistance than in the past.

By late 2023, after a string of remarkable military victories by a coalition of EAOs and local militias, some figures confidently forecast the imminent downfall of the military regime. Several foreign observers agreed that it was in a “death spiral decline” and “on the brink of collapse”.

In January 2025, the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) claimed that the junta controlled only 32% of the country’s 330 townships. A study conducted by the BBC went as far as stating that the regime only controlled 21% of the country. However, these claims need to be treated carefully. The BBC study, for example, failed to mention that most of the territory reportedly “lost” to opposition elements included many remote and thinly populated areas characterised by rugged mountains and thick jungle.

Throughout this period, the activist community and other supporters of the opposition movement publicly maintained a level of optimism in the outcome of the civil war that was hard to justify by any objective analysis of developments. In what appears to have been a combination of inaccurate data, disinformation and wishful thinking, they made numerous prognostications regarding the pro-democracy struggle that could not be justified. The Economist felt that the opposition risked believing their own propaganda.

As history has clearly shown, predictions of the regime’s imminent demise were rather premature. Indeed, over the past nine months the Tatmadaw has restored its depleted numbers (mainly through conscription), rearmed and modified its tactics, recovering some of the territory it had earlier lost. Some northern EAOs are under increased pressure, including from China, which has threatened to cut their lines of communications and supply.

These days, serious Myanmar-watchers tend to adopt much more measured tones, with most recommending caution when contemplating future developments. The security situation is very fluid and there are still many gaps in our knowledge, but terms such as “strategic stalemate” are now becoming more common. Few analysts predict the junta’s ultimate victory, but many now allow for its continued survival, in one form or another.

They note, for example, that changing geopolitical conditions are giving the generals more room to manœuvre on the world stage. There is a growing sense that the junta, once condemned by almost the entire international community, is starting to enjoy a degree of tolerance, if not acceptance. Myanmar is being invited to more international meetings. Senior military officials are making more visits overseas, and not just to its allies Russia and China.

The elections due to be held in December 2025 will be a complete farce in terms of popular representation, but they will result in a new government. There are signs that it will be accorded a degree of recognition by several countries, including all of Myanmar’s immediate neighbours. There is already an inclination on the part of these states to accept that the Tatmadaw will effectively remain in control of critical official functions for the foreseeable future, requiring some kind of modus vivendi.

Notable in this regard is China which, after a period of apparent indecision, is coming down increasingly firmly on the side of the generals. Beijing seems to have decided that its vital interests lie in propping up the junta and backing its sham elections. This includes protecting Chinese assets in Myanmar with “private” security forces and putting greater pressure on the EAOs based along Myanmar’s northern frontier.

As noted by the independent Myanmar-watcher David Mathieson, among others, the NUG currently suffers from a range of ills. It is divided, both politically and militarily, and lacks a common strategy to take control of the country. It has made some ambitious claims that simply do not stand up to scrutiny. Its window of opportunity seems to be closing and, without greater support, there is the danger that it will wither on the vine. This too makes it difficult for analysts to look ahead.

As always, what is needed to understand developments in Myanmar is objective and evidence-based analyses of the facts—as far as they can be determined in such a volatile and emotive environment—in order to reach realistic assessments. Such an exercise does not encourage hopes that the civil war in Myanmar will end decisively, or that the pro-democracy forces will take full control of the country, any time soon.

Myanmar has always had the ability to surprise analysts but, tragically, the portents at the moment are for history to repeat itself, the junta to survive, the opposition to fracture and fade, and the suffering of the Myanmar people to continue.

Andrew Selth