Friday 13 June. Barely arrived in Mali [1], mercenaries from the new Russian military structure Africa Corps replacing Wagner, the deceased Evgeny Prigozhin’s militia, fell into an ambush between Anefis and Aguelhoc in the Kidal region [2]. The toll is heavy. Several dozen deaths are reported. The operation is claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) [3] mainly composed of Tuareg independentists [4].

This trap undermines the narrative presenting Russian mercenaries, whether from Wagner or Africa Corps (often belonging successively to both entities), as formidable fighters who, on the military terrain, were supposed to make the difference. It also relativises the only success that Wagner can claim, namely the recapture of Kidal, stronghold of the Tuareg independence movements and presented by the Malian authorities as the reconquest of national sovereignty, which proves to be precarious at best.

The replacement of Wagner by Africa Corps will not fundamentally modify the relationship between the Malian authorities and the Russian auxiliaries. Most of Wagner’s fighters have been integrated into Africa Corps. What could evolve is greater control by Russian authorities over Malian politics, as the new entity depends on the Ministry of Defence, which was not the case for Wagner. Other changes could appear, particularly on the economic front. The Malian government was paying 10 million dollars (€9.2 million) monthly to the mercenary firm.

With Africa Corps, we see more of a formalisation of Russian intervention considered more as a state-to-state relationship, possibly opening the way to an exemption from this payment for the Malian government. Essentially, nothing should change, including on the military terrain, both in Mali and for the two other countries, Niger and Burkina Faso, which form the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) [5] also confronted with jihadist attacks.

The Deteriorating Humanitarian Situation

Since the seizure of power by the military juntas of the AES countries, the jihadists of JNIM [6], the acronym for Jamāʿat nuṣrat al-islām wal-muslimīn affiliated to Al-Qaeda, and the troops of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) [7] continue to advance. Of the 135 administrative entities that these three Sahelian countries comprise, most experts consider that two-thirds are under the more or less loose control of Islamist groups.

This progression is accompanied by a significant increase in deaths, nearly 11,200 recorded by the end of June 2024. This represents a tripling compared to 2021. And this evolution must be appreciated with caution, as the juntas’ control over information, with repression against journalists, suggests that this evolution remains underestimated.

On the humanitarian front, the situation has also worsened, with nearly five and a half million displaced persons. In most areas where war rages between Islamist forces and armies, schools and health centres are closed, leaving populations without education and care. For example, in Burkina Faso [8], 20% of health facilities and approximately 5,300 school structures are abandoned. The result is that 40% of children do not have access to school.

Food insecurity is considered a major risk. In Mali, 12% of the population suffers from malnutrition, in Niger [9] half of the children suffer from moderate or severe nutritional deficiencies, and in Burkina Faso more than 2.3 million people suffer from hunger.

The Jihadist Advance

Islamist groups are gaining ground by taking advantage of the weakening of national armies linked to the incompetence and corruption of most senior officers. They divert salaries, use part of the substantial funding that countries devote to their defence to build villas or buy companies. Added to this is arms trafficking, sometimes sold to armed groups.

Experts from Conflict Armament Research [10] estimate that most of the weapons and ammunition of the assailants come from national armies, a large part of which is recovered following attacks on military convoys or barracks.

Moreover, jihadists have largely invested in technologies, particularly in communications thanks to Starlink networks [11] allowing information circulation between fighters, giving a decisive advantage during battles. This strengthening of operational capabilities is accompanied, with Musk’s satellite network, by a presence on major social networks where short videos highlight the successes of their military operations, contradicting official communications from authorities.

Furthermore, the advantage that the armed forces of Sahelian countries had in the air tends to fade with the use of drones by armed groups. They use them for intelligence gathering, for bombardments but also for conducting battles. The first use of a drone took place in Mali in April 2024 where fighters used a quadrotor, equipped with grenades and mortar shells to attack a Dozo militia [12] allied to the national army.

In Burkina Faso, the attack on the Diapaga military camp which caused the death of about fifty people and enabled the seizure of a significant arsenal, notably armoured vehicles, was directed with the help of drones. This allowed insurgent leaders to have a global vision of the battlefield. It is likely that the use of drones by armed groups will intensify, increasing their striking power.

In this context, national armies are unable to hold territories, barracks become targets and each attack increases the number of soldiers killed or taken prisoner, causing demoralisation among troops. The example of the Boulikessi camp, considered highly strategic for its control of routes in central Mali, is quite revealing. Attacked twice in a month, the Malian army had no other solution than to abandon this position under the euphemism of a strategic withdrawal.

The Juntas in Power

Both at social and security levels, the situation is most worrying and continues to deteriorate. Yet it was to end the security deficit that the military in the three countries had decided to overthrow the civilian regime, as if the army had no responsibility in this state of affairs. The seizure of power by the military took place in a context of strong popular combativeness, although differentiated in the three countries.

In Mali, significant mobilisations notably led by the June 5 Movement - Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) [13] took place against the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta [14], who not only accumulated economic and military failures but was also tainted by various corruption scandals. Particularly in the crosshairs were the “bling bling” antics of the president’s son, Karim. On social networks, he can be seen taking selfies on a luxury yacht cruise where champagne flows freely whilst dancing with young women.

The military perverted the popular mobilisation by usurping power with the complicity of a minority of the M5-RFP led by Choguel Maïga [15] who would become Prime Minister without having real power.

In Burkina Faso in 2014, a revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Blaise Compaoré [16] which would lead to elections where the two main candidates were liberals close to France. The record of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré’s [17] government, like their civilian Malian counterpart, was unable to set things right in any way. The attack on the Inata gendarmerie barracks would trigger public indignation because despite several calls, these gendarmes would remain isolated, reduced to hunting to feed themselves. During the attack led by jihadists, about sixty soldiers perished.

If responsibility for this event is largely shared between the Kaboré government and the army, this would not prevent the military from seizing power through a first coup led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba [18] followed by a second. The Burkinabé army had completely free rein, unlike in Mali, with the absence of any political opposition. The Balai Citoyen [19] movement’s willingness, well-established among the youth, to confine itself solely to a watchdog role in the political scene, removed the possibility of appearing as an alternative to politicians whose allegiance to France was obvious.

Another path could have been taken following the example of the Resistance Committees in Sudan [20]. They initially appeared as a civil aid and solidarity movement, then as a mobilisation tool, to finally, just before the generals’ war, be capable of proposing a “revolutionary charter of people’s power” presented as an alternative to the military but also to political parties integrated into the system.

Niger presents a notable difference. President Mohamed Bazoum [21] was elected through a generally satisfactory electoral process. He had begun to follow an interesting path to try to end the war waged by jihadists by attempting both a military response and an opening policy for peace talks. However, he appeared as the French man by agreeing to host French troops in his country that had previously been expelled from Mali then Burkina. Moreover, before running for the presidency, Bazoum was Minister of the Interior and Security and had left very bad memories among the country’s activists.

An incident that is relatively overlooked but which reflects the tensions and mobilisations against French imperialism is the demonstration in Téra [22] in the Tillabéri region [23] against the Barkhane operation [24] convoy, whose repression killed two people, certainly caused by shots from French soldiers.

As can be seen, more or less, the military’s accession to power in the AES countries remains a consequence of popular mobilisations against corrupt civilian governments. It also fed on the populations’ incomprehension about the tangible absence of results against jihadists by the French army, which boasted of knowing the terrain but was incapable of stemming enemy attacks.

For many young people, this incomprehension transformed into doubt, then into conviction - that of French complicity with armed groups. An opinion that was popular on social networks. It also owes its success to the French army’s policy of weaving an alliance, though informal but real, with Tuareg independentists, grouped at the time in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) [25]. The joint work between the MNLA and the French army against jihadists was seen as an attack on national sovereignty because it implied sanctuarisation of the Kidal region for Tuareg independentists.

Economically, the Malian junta has engaged in an arm-wrestling match with Western mining companies for a more equitable sharing of profits. If this objective has led to coercive measures for the leaders of multinational subsidiaries, it is not in itself a break with the economic order. Many African governments have revised their mining rights, amended them to obtain better distribution of wealth. In the past, perfectly reactionary governments totally aligned with Western governments have sometimes taken much more radical measures, as is the case for example with the Zaïrianisation [26] policy in Congo, including an economic component launched by Mobutu [27].

This led to currency change, nationalisation of land and commercial goods belonging to foreigners. This campaign was conducted with a stated desire to break with everything that could represent the West in the country, thus first names, names of cities and streets were changed, including that of the country. Congo would become the Republic of Zaïre. This violent, bureaucratic policy imposed from above was a means of strengthening clientelist politics for the perpetuation of power. This is what is happening with the AES juntas who largely profit from the security rent with the explosion of defence budgets.

The methods of corruption remain classic: opaque contracts without tender calls, public contract awards to family members or close associates of the junta and repression against journalists and NGOs to prevent information about these embezzlements from circulating. However, it is difficult to hide the luxurious villas recently built by junta members.

Concerning the sovereigntist narratives abundantly used by putschists, they hardly create illusion. Let us recall that the bigwigs of Françafrique [28] do not hesitate either to use anti-colonialist vocabulary or “pan-African” organisations to vilify NGOs that point to the corruption of these satraps. Thus the “NGO” African Dignity and Conscience organised a press conference to “face attacks by Western NGOs against African leaders” with the question: “How can we accept that heads of state of independent countries are the object of such intrusions into the internal affairs of their respective countries?”

Malian leaders have well understood that the question of Kidal’s reconquest could strengthen their popularity and give some credit to their sovereigntist declarations even if in the medium term this policy has proved catastrophic as we shall see a little later. Certainly declarations against France’s policy are always received with enthusiasm, whether that of Prime Minister Choguel Maïga at the United Nations tribune declaring that France had abandoned Mali mid-flight or that of Burkinabé leader Ibrahim Traoré [29] criticising the neo-colonialist policies of the West, under the benevolent eye of his host Putin, thus replaying a pale freakish copy of Thomas Sankara [30].

Especially since the behaviour of French authorities only feeds this rhetoric. With Barkhane, French military hierarchy directs operations and frees itself from the advice of concerned Sahelian countries. French soldiers have worked in collaboration with militias guilty of war crimes like GATIA [31] (the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies). Tricolour forces have been responsible for bombing civilians, notably in Bounti [32] killing 19 people whilst systematically refusing the creation of an independent commission of inquiry. French authorities wanted to intervene militarily to restore Bazoum following the coup. Not to mention obviously the continuous arrogance of President Macron which irritates Africans as much as the French.

The Juntas Against the Population

The central question for the three juntas could be summarised as how to remain in power with a record far from the promises made to justify their coup. For long months, speeches about sovereignty and the second independence of AES countries met with approval.

It now tends to crumble in view of the almost daily attacks by armed groups with their toll of deaths, prisoners, testimonies of attacked soldiers receiving no help despite their desperate calls, villages surrounded and abandoned to their sad fate by authorities. The policies adopted by juntas remain primarily to limit information in favour of propaganda based, as Trump would say, on alternative truth. Thus, independent radio and television channels are closed, newspapers threatened and journalists gagged.

Dissenting voices must also be stifled; even first-hour supporters of coups who show themselves critical are imprisoned in Mali or sent to the front in Burkina Faso. In Niger, anti-imperialist activists like Moussa Tchangari [33] are imprisoned on orders of President Abdourahamane Tiani [34], former head of the presidential guard. He now wants to be the herald of the country’s sovereignty, yet during his long career he did not particularly distinguish himself in the struggle against French neocolonialism.

In Burkina Faso, trade unionists like Moussa Diallo [35], Secretary General of the CGT-B, are forced to go underground. In Mali, parties are now banned and activists like Oumar Mariko [36], leader of the radical left party African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI), are forced into exile. At the same time, ad hoc structures created and subjected to juntas endorse presidents, thus Assimi Goïta [37] who went directly from colonel to five-star general will be able to remain in Mali’s presidency as long as the country faces terrorist risks.

Their management of the war has truly made the situation worse. In Mali, the junta unilaterally denounced the Algiers Accords [38] signed by a series of armed groups, mostly independentist. Then it considered them as terrorists and launched the operation to reconquer Kidal. Not only did the Malian junta turn Algeria against itself, the main regional power accusing it of destabilising Mali, but it opened a new internal front with the risk that tends to materialise of an alliance between JNIM and FLA.

In Burkina Faso, headlong flight is the rule with the establishment of Volunteers for the Defence of the Fatherland (VDP) [39]. These civilians who are recruited receive one or two weeks of the most summary military training. They are supposed to be assistance in intelligence for the army. Scattered in villages, they quickly become targets for jihadists. Most VDP come from the Koglweogo [40] who in the countryside played the role of both police and judge. They have often been criticised by human rights organisations for acts of torture against people suspected of being bandits. Currently VDP are accused of massacres against the Fulani community [41] suspected of supporting JNIM. Nigerien armed forces to a lesser extent also rely on community militias, notably the Zankaï [42] from the Zarma community [43] which target Fulani accused of supporting the Islamic State particularly in the Tillabéri region.

The AES armies accompanied by their Russian or community mercenaries have killed more civilians than jihadists. The latest revelations by the newspaper “Le Monde” and the weekly “Jeune Afrique” about Wagner mercenaries’ acts of torture, all accompanied by racist insults, are a chilling illustration of what the populations of these three countries can suffer. Isolation and large-scale human rights violations only strengthen the positions of Islamist or independentist armed groups.

The irony is that the strategy of militarist headlong flight adopted by national armed forces is the same as that followed by French military with the same result as key, a resounding failure explained by the nature of the crisis in the Sahel.

The Jihadists’ Strategy

In the Sahel, the reasons for engagement in jihadist combat are multiple. They are often linked to concern for protecting oneself, one’s family or one’s community. It can also be revenge against the abuses of authorities or militias claiming another community. The economic question, that is the possibility of having a lucrative activity, is also mentioned by jihadist prisoners or repentants questioned by academics. One finding emerges: very few put religion forward.

Certainly, there are debates about the importance that religion takes in this radicalisation. It seems illusory to completely dismiss this data. Especially since most leaders have a different and more religious approach that they transmit daily to fighters. This makes it possible to give a framework to action but also a justification for the war waged with its procession of suffering and death.

The strength of jihadist groups is to insert themselves into communities in different ways, and to be stakeholders in very local conflicts. In other words, political and sometimes armed struggles are most often well before the appearance of jihadist groups. If we take the case of Tuareg rebellions, they date from the beginning of Mali’s independence. Niger has also experienced armed revolts by these communities. In this regard, the journey of Iyad Ag Ghali [44], the leader of JNIM, is quite edifying and characteristic of the history of Tuareg struggle in Mali’s regions. At the end of the 1980s, he founded the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) which had nothing religious and defended Tuareg claims. It was only in the early 2000s that the religious question would become central.

In central Mali, the Macina katiba [45] of preacher Amadou Koufa [46] was built by defending the poorest populations; he denounces abuses, the obligation to pay money to access pastures, criticises large herd owners, corrupt religious figures. We find this same rhetoric in Burkina Faso’s Ansarul Islam group that integrated JNIM; its leader Ibrahim Malam Dicko [47] defends equality between social classes, defends people of servile origin and criticises traditional chieftaincies. These speeches have great resonance among the many young people who are declassed and without future.

Jihadists at least provide the population with justice that appears fair and swift. This dimension is often underestimated but important, even vital when it comes to settling land issues or those related to livestock. This armed struggle is driven by profound social inequalities, violence by armed forces and the absence of justice and is not over-determined by religious questions even if globally populations have a strong attachment to Islam. Winning this war implies profound social reforms.

As surprising as it may seem, the French army had integrated this dimension and tried to respond to it by launching the “Alliance Sahel” project then “Coalition for the Sahel” by soliciting the participation of the European Union and international financial institutions. This action remained vain because it contradicted the stated trajectory of the intervention, namely the eradication of terrorists and not the establishment of a development policy and governance improvement. Such a policy would have clashed with the elites in place and ultimately would have given credit to Islamist fighters criticising corruption and the inefficiency of authorities.

The billions spent and which continue to be spent are wasted and could have been invested in programmes really improving the lot of populations.

What Future?

Independently of the specificities of each country composing the AES, certain common elements can be highlighted as likely to play a role in the future.

Firstly, there is above all a desire manifested for years by populations to open dialogue with jihadists and more generally armed groups to move towards peace. If we take Mali’s case, this demand has been reiterated several times. In 2017 during the National Understanding Conference, civil society launched calls for discussion. In 2019 again, during the inclusive national dialogue, of the 3,000 delegates a good number spoke for opening talks with Amadou Koufa and Iyad Ag Ghali to establish peace.

In Niger, negotiations were initiated as early as 2022 by the Bazoum government before it was overthrown. In Burkina Faso under Kaboré’s presidency then later during the first coup led by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, the desire for peace negotiation came up against the intransigence of French authorities who had drawn as a red line the refusal to discuss and a fortiori to negotiate with what they called terrorists. A rule systematically flouted when it came to negotiating the liberation of Western hostages.

This search for dialogue is found deep in the three countries. Villages or cities negotiate with jihadists the end of blockades or the end of attacks and often these are notables and religious figures who conduct these discussions. These agreements between villagers and armed groups are considered as support for jihadists and lead to massacres of many civilians by the military. The junta in Burkina Faso considers supporters of dialogue as traitors. Recently again Traoré declared: “The Burkinabé will not negotiate with his enemy. We are going to fight and we are going to win. We will not let go of anything, absolutely nothing.”

Secondly, the international situation has repercussions on armed groups or at least some. The evolution of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group [48] led by Ahmed al-Charaa [49] in Syria could be a path taken by JNIM. Namely a disaffiliation from Al-Qaeda, lesser religious requirements that would allow alliances with other groups like Azawad independentists.

Discussions already exist between these two forces with two points of divergence: the religious question and the question of independence. If each entity, one dare not say “waters down its wine”, then an alliance could form. If skirmishes between FLA and JNIM occurred at the time of the end of the peace agreement, quickly a modus vivendi was found opening the way to occasional military cooperation against Malian armed forces and Wagner mercenaries. This was the case in Tin-Zouatin [50] near the Algerian border where 82 Russians lost their lives.

Third factor: the growing isolation of juntas abroad. Niger refuses to cooperate with its neighbour Benin [51], facilitating increasingly numerous jihadist attacks in this country. Burkina Faso has execrable relations with Côte d’Ivoire [52], accusing it of wanting to destabilise the country without formal evidence being able to support this accusation. Mali has fallen out with Algeria [53] which played a decisive role in the peace agreements since denounced by the junta. These countries bordering those of the AES are increasingly worried about security deterioration that weakens their regime and which see violent incidents gradually occur on their soil. This is the case for example of the W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) [54] natural park located on the three borders of Benin, Burkina and Niger, a real rear base for armed Islamists.

Fourth point: the fragility of juntas. Indeed, movements within the army cannot be excluded. In Burkina Faso, Traoré denounces real or imaginary coup attempts that have been foiled. This shows that he cannot count on all the armed forces. Recently, Niger in the space of two days experienced two mutinies, one in Filingué [55] the other in Téra. Troops refused to go to the front, which says a lot about the state of Nigerien forces. In Mali, dissenting voices are heard within the army.

For the future, many options exist; three that have occurred in other countries can be mentioned. A Somali-style scenario where Islamist groups manage to control most territories surrounding capitals, remaining under junta domination, trying to impose a blockade and continuing their wars towards coastal countries. A second scenario that would resemble what happened in Syria. JNIM’s break with Al-Qaeda and relative deconfessionalisation allowing alliances with army fractions in one of the three AES countries around the expulsion of Russian troops, and governance without corruption. Finally, one cannot rule out a collapse, under jihadist hammering, of one of the three regimes that would have a domino effect on the other two countries. An episode that would recall that of Afghanistan with all the catastrophic consequences particularly for women.

Paul Martial