In GE15 [Malaysia’s 15^th General Election held in November 2022], the surge of Malay youth support for Perikatan Nasional [opposition coalition led by the Islamic party PAS] sparked narratives about a rising “green” or “theocratic wave” and urgent questions about the shifting political attitudes of younger Malays. Many were quick to blame the election outcome on the recent lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 and even went as far as calling the constitutional amendment a mistake. [1] But these narratives are simplistic and divisive and do not get to the heart of the problem.

Orang Kita: Politics of Acknowledgement and Resentment is a brilliant new paper by IMAN Research that dives into the minds of Malay youths, especially in the Malay heartland [rural areas with predominantly Malay populations].

In this episode of Beyond the Ballot Box on BFM 89.9, host Dashran Yohan speaks to Aziff Azuddin, the author of the report, about the insecurities, sentiments and political desires of Malay youth. They also discuss how Malaysia can truly build a political project based on multiculturalism and democracy in a polarised country.

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 The “Green Wave” Myth

Dashran Yohan: Let’s start with GE15, because I think that is what inspired you to write this paper in the first place. Perikatan Nasional [PN] is anchored by PAS [Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, Malaysia’s main Islamic party]. The narrative coming out of the election was that there was a green wave, a theocratic wave, that came all the way from the north right down to the halfway point of Selangor [Malaysia’s most developed state]. So was there a theocratic wave?

Aziff Azuddin: I think when people came out to call it a green wave, and then link it to rising Islamism, it felt like a knee-jerk reaction. One of the first few parties that rode on that was from groups from Pakatan Harapan [the reformist coalition], because there was an easy way to make people fear the wave.

But I think over time - it’s been almost three years since GE15 - we’ve started to see more measured analysis. These votes that youths gave to Perikatan Nasional were not necessarily because they believed in Islamism or wanted a theocratic state. There’s a question of them reacting to what they see as deficiencies in governance, deficiencies in cost of living - things which really hurt them on a material level. They could only express it through the ballot box.

In Malaysia, our parties are designated by race and one party with religious identity. So the shorthand thinking becomes: “Why did youths vote for PN? It must be because they believe in Islam.” Not necessarily. PN was a container for a lot of the frustrations and resentment that youth had leading up to that point.

 A Protest Vote

Dashran: You brought up in your paper that this was also a protest vote. What were they protesting against?

Aziff: GE15 was held in late 2022, right after the lifting of the pandemic. Since 2020, many of these youths had their education disrupted, their means of earning disrupted. There was a massive adjustment from going to the office or physically being able to earn your keep, to having to move everything online. Everyone was navigating a new world.

Coming out from that turbulent period - and I don’t think many of us have processed that trauma yet - suddenly we come up to the elections. A lot of frustration emerged as a protest vote.

If you’re talking about Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional [the former ruling coalition], they were contesting separately at that time. Barisan already had the reputation of being corrupt - UMNO-BN was rejected on those fronts. Pakatan Harapan unfortunately had the baggage of decades of being told that DAP [Democratic Action Party] is the Malay boogeyman, and PKR [People’s Justice Party] is seen as more of a political animal, not too committed to states outside the Klang Valley [Malaysia’s most developed urban area around Kuala Lumpur].

So it was definitely a protest vote. It was less about identifying with Islamic ideas and more about seeing who could best send a message.

 Class Divide and Bumi Privileges

Dashran: Your report tells the story of youths disillusioned by widening class divide. Talk to me about this class divide and how it’s shaping the politics of Malay youth.

Aziff: When I spoke to Malay youths, they identify with the fact - we asked questions about Bumiputra privileges [affirmative action policies for indigenous Malays] that are given by policy, some by constitution. And they would say: “Yeah, there are Bumi rights, but we’re not beneficiaries of it.”

Consider MARA [government agency providing loans to Malays]. Young Malays have to go through so many paperwork, and most cases they don’t end up qualifying. Or they want aid from government - I talked to several individuals who run small businesses, and they’re saying the money they got was from borrowing from friends. They couldn’t even get enough capital or meet basic requirements to take a bank loan.

So where is this Malay beneficiary system we’re talking about? They see themselves as being excluded from the system.

The only level of privilege they experience is access to education - public universities. This is something non-Malays aren’t able to access as easily. But once they leave university, they’re saddled with loans, they go back to their hometowns, they can’t get jobs because it’s either civil service or the local economy isn’t robust enough.

They end up having to go to Kuala Lumpur, Klang Valley, or Penang island to earn their living. Then they feel: “I end up not contributing to my community, and I have to contribute to economies of states which don’t give back to me.”

There’s identification with capitalist elite forces. They see that elite Malays don’t care about them. Elite Malays get benefits - their children go to university, they get money from government for contracts. “Why are we not getting anything?”

When we talk about Bumi privileges, they talk about how maybe we can have more income-based policy where everyone who needs it gets it, instead of this distorted policy which benefits Bumi elites more.

 Racial Perceptions and Class Solidarity

Dashran: Is there a sense of class solidarity, or does it wrap around racial and religious lines? Is there a perception that the Chinese are the rich people?

Aziff: There’s actually a lot of solidarity with the Indian community in understanding that they are underprivileged. The youths I spoke to in the Malay heartlands - Kelantan and Terengganu [east coast states] - tend to have a lot of Indian friends, very little Chinese friends.

There is some degree of perception that the Chinese community is more well off in terms of earning money, running big businesses. Most of the big companies they see or work for are owned by Chinese capitalists. I think it’s also years of narrative being set - “the Chinese control most of the economic pie.”

When I talk to youth on the mainland of Penang state, they talk about how the island of Penang is primarily Chinese, primarily earning better, in better work industries than they are. They would reference Penang island, reference Klang Valley, and bring up the same narratives.

Is there class solidarity? I think we have a ways to go, but certainly there is an anti-elite sentiment which boils down to anti-capitalist and anti-politician sentiment.

 The Oil Royalty Issue

Dashran: Another issue highlighted in your report is the long-standing oil royalty issue between Kelantan and Terengganu with the federal government. How did that shape politics and perceptions?

Aziff: Kelantan has seen PAS ruling for almost 30 years now. There’s a reason - it’s anti-federal, rooted in anti-federalism, anti-UMNO [United Malays National Organisation]. Under the Mahathir government back then, they withheld oil royalties, restricted development in the state. The state was left to fend for itself.

Mahathir intentionally punished the electorate in Kelantan because they did not vote for Barisan Nasional. What it produced over many years is this perception that UMNO and Barisan are prejudiced against those who support PAS. It becomes a sort of religious resistance - “We are suffering under Barisan rule, this is why we vote for PAS, because we are resisting.”

They were the original rebels. You cannot see it from the perspective of voting for effective government - you have to see it as voting to resist against the big brother.

Now, how is it translated today? When Pakatan Harapan took over, there were negotiations about giving oil royalties back to Kelantan and Terengganu. But the federal government today still has not given allocations to opposition politicians. Is that not another form of oppression?

This idea that federal will always not care about us, will always punish those against it - because federal government is now PH plus BN, people in PN see the historical trend continuing similarly.

 The Najib Phenomenon

Dashran: There’s a section of Malay youth with positive perceptions of Najib Razak [former Prime Minister imprisoned for corruption], which continues despite the 1MDB scandal [massive corruption case involving billions of dollars]. Talk to me about this Najib phenomenon.

Aziff: When I spoke to Malay youths, the positive perception of Najib comes with qualifications. They acknowledge that Najib was involved with 1MDB, corruption cases - they understand him being corrupt, abuse of power.

But in context of governance for the past three years, they can’t help but feel that policies during the Barisan era, while they were growing up, they experienced in terms of BR1M [cash handouts], book vouchers, laptops for education. Those in the East Coast got UTC [Urban Transformation Centres] - they could access agencies much easier than having to go to the state capital.

You’re also talking about ECRL [East Coast Rail Link], HSR [High Speed Rail] proposals - these were Najib-era projects.

For many youths, the nostalgia for Najib is in comparison to the government now - this feeling that we had a Prime Minister who really cared about everyone, who had policies targeting people excluded or not paid attention to.

When you translate it to politics now - rise in cost of living, property prices rising, can’t rent in the city, economic policies targeted towards elites, can’t get jobs - there’s frustration with this government compared to how the Najib era was.

Najib was brilliant in his PR rebranding himself from the elite silver-spoon son of a PM to “Boscu” [boss/uncle], the cool online presence who brings down politicians, riding his motorbike, being the man of the people.

The love for Najib has less to do with supporting corruption and more with wanting a government that sees and addresses our needs.

 Education System Failures

Dashran: Education was repeatedly pointed out as a core problem. What are Malay youths frustrated about regarding the education system?

Aziff: The youths felt education has failed them - “I get a degree, I can’t even get a job.” Earning a degree has been the minimum standard for decades. We were told: get a degree, get a good job, get good pay, have it sorted. That promise is no longer true.

“I went to university, I have to repay PTPTN [student loan], but I can’t get a job. How do I repay the loan?” This is why you see the boom in gig workers - not just because of the pandemic, but because the job market doesn’t accommodate them. They go into the informal economy.

Second issue is political literacy. Following GE15, some youths - the slightly older, more politically mature ones - saw how youths voted based on emotion. They say we need political literacy in schools. Schools have been shy about talking about democracy, civil rights.

You had individuals like Fahmi Reza [political activist] teaching his online audience: “This is how government is structured, this is why you vote, these are issues to look at, these are roles of elected representatives.” Unless you go into Form Six [pre-university], you wouldn’t know government structure.

Third is media literacy. The elections were really distorted, especially on TikTok - misinformation, disinformation, perceptions being swayed by PN. Even though most youths supported PN, there’s recognition that PN was using racial rhetoric, religious rhetoric to influence younger voters.

 Vernacular Schools Debate

Dashran: Was there frustration about the lack of a common school system, like Singapore’s? [Malaysian parents can chose between Malay, Mandarin and Tamil medium schools]

Aziff: The Malays we spoke to loved the idea of multicultural Malaysia. They had friends from other races in public universities, which they cherish. But because they value multiculturalism, vernacular schools frustrate them - they see that at childhood stage, we’re already being split into different systems.

When they talk about vernacular schools, they focus on the Chinese population. They talk about how a segment of Malaysians go into different education, learning in a language that’s not the national language, taking UEC [Unified Examination Certificate], learning everything in Mandarin, even though they are citizens of Malaysia.

“No wonder there’s no concept of unity - you’re speaking different languages, inhabiting different childhoods, very different contexts growing up.” For Malays in heartlands, their first genuine interaction with non-Malays would be in public university, where they become friends because the space allows it.

They don’t talk about international schools or private schools - they feel vernacular schools exclusively create isolation. “A certain segment of Malaysians inhabit different language, grow up in a bubble, have their own economy, never interact with Malays.”

They want vernacular schools out of the picture - “Let everyone go to the same school. They can still learn Mandarin at home or take courses in school. But put everyone in same space, because we see it working in public universities.”

 Why Vote Perikatan Nasional?

Dashran: If the focus is on development, material conditions, education - why vote Perikatan Nasional, who don’t necessarily have coherent economic agenda?

Aziff: PAS fielded many white-collar candidates in GE15, something they hadn’t done before. Previously they’d put up the typical candidate - someone wearing skullcap, strong religious credentials, clean with no corruption involvement.

In GE15, they started fielding professionals - accountants, lawyers, people who worked in industry. PAS recognised they needed credibility - “We are not just religious folks, we are professionals who can govern.”

Remember, Bersatu was made of former UMNO members with governing experience. The credibility during elections was: “We have people who used to be in government, and individuals from corporate class.”

That sold the idea to youths - “Maybe PAS can govern, maybe they’re committed to being more technocratic.” It was partially protest vote, but Perikatan Nasional knew their strategy and surfaced what appeared to be a technocratic approach.

Dr Samsuri [PAS politician] has been pushed as an academic, somebody who understands governance - not your typical religious leader cut of cloth. Dr Samsuri was floated as PM candidate for PAS, which tells you PAS recognised the need to appeal beyond traditional base.

 Global Context and Right-Wing Populism

Dashran: What we’re seeing in Malaysia seems similar to movements in other countries - India under Modi, America, Germany, France - Ultra conservatism, shrinking democratic spaces, right-wing populism weaponising insecurities of majorities.

Aziff: If people feel their material conditions are threatened or destabilised, it’s easier to sell the solution that a certain group is the problem, or a certain structure is the problem.

In Malaysia, neoliberal policies promised economic growth, but consequences include influx of migrant workers for cheap labour, not hiring Malaysians, creating perception that blue-collar jobs are beneath Malaysians. Parents parrot this, education system focuses on white-collar degrees.

When the economy promises you something, you follow that route, only to realise it’s a sham. “I took loans, tried to work, tried to be the model rational economic citizen, and it’s all a lie.”

Then groups come saying: “We know it was a lie, we can offer something better.” The rhetoric becomes enticing.

I need to stress - youths react mostly to material conditions, but Islam is important because the current system has failed them. People like Najib weren’t caught earlier, corrupt individuals are let off, poor and underprivileged weren’t part of political calculus.

If the system doesn’t work - democratic, Western-inspired, neoliberal free market - perhaps Islam is the answer. Islam as political system calls for justice, equity, addressing the needy. Even non-Muslims are part of this picture - they reference historical Islamic societies where Jews, Christians flourished with Muslims, Palestine before Israel.

This idea of Islam offering a good system becomes attractive. When detractors think it’s negative, they should ask Muslims: “What sort of political system did you have in mind?” If you ask, you see we want the same things - equitable country, harsh on corruption.

 Socialist Ideas Without the Label

Dashran: What do they think about concepts like socialism?

Aziff: Let’s look at PSM [Parti Sosialis Malaysia] and why they’re not doing well. The word “socialist” is linked to Russia, Stalin, China. In Malaysian context, you’re talking about Cold War communists and racial polarisation.

But if you ask Malay youths what good governance looks like, they use socialist language. They talk about wealth redistribution, taxes targeting the wealthy - that’s Marxist language. Everyone should have access to housing, good living, good work - that’s socialism language.

They see this as separate from Western concepts. The rejection is because they see it failing in the West. “The West sells liberalism - look at Israel, complete collapse of world order, hypocrisy.”

That’s why the turn to Islam as system is attractive. Not everyone says Islam should be the solution, but certainly something resembling ideas of justice, good governance.

 Youth Exclusion and Tokenism

Dashran: Is there anything else people should know from your research?

Aziff: What worried me is actual youth representation, actual youth involvement in democracy and institutions. Across the board, there’s feeling that political parties - PAS, UMNO, PKR - don’t care for youths or involve them in important democratic decisions.

During elections, youths who participated in campaigning felt their involvement was only as flag bearers, drivers for candidates, social media distributors. They’re not at the table telling parties: “These are things we should focus on” - not actual stakeholders in discussion.

If you see political representation - in last election, efforts to put youths as candidates - most were in areas they had to outperform to win. Either easy wins or expected losses. On paper, you can say “We fielded X percentage youth candidates,” but where did you put them? Did they get support?

Youths feel excluded from political process and expression in public spaces. In Kelantan, under PAS government, community spaces where they used to perform gigs or community events are heavily restricted - “You cannot hold events here.”

“If we cannot express politically, let’s express in arts, civic engagement. But government limits us from that too. Where else do we have left? Only online.” Then government says they’ll restrict using 3R laws [race, religion, royalty restrictions].

“You excluded us politically, from public spaces, now from digital spaces - the only space we have left.” Coming into next election, you’re going to get frustrated votes if nothing is done in the next two years.

 Building Multicultural Democracy

Dashran: For people who believe in building a political project centred around multiculturalism and democracy - actual democratisation of wealth and power, democratic spaces where people with differing beliefs can work together harmoniously - what should they keep in mind?

Aziff: You have to meet people where they are. What this study did was allow me to go to different parts of the country, speak to different Malays from different backgrounds. It’s understanding that people come from different backgrounds, different ideologies, but you have to meet them where they’re at.

If you’re serious about democratic involvement and inclusion, you have to accept that sometimes the other person may have completely different ideology, but that doesn’t mean you can’t agree to disagree. You need to build common ground.

Relationships - not just romantic, but all relationships - are about negotiation, communication. You constantly negotiate to find: What are your red lines? What matters to you? What is your idea of Malaysia? What is my idea? Can we gel that together?

A lot of nation-building, relationship-building aspects aren’t pronounced in how we do work, how government approaches different people, even personally. How often do we go out of comfort zones? How often do Klang Valley individuals choose to go to East Coast, meet people there, understand that you’re more than the political party you support?

I know many Klang Valley folks who’ve been to UK and Australia, but not the Malay heartland. I absolutely loved going to Kelantan - you support PAS, but in speaking to them, you realise maybe there are things we can connect with. You want multiculturalism, but what are the roads to it?

Building communities, connections, relationships, maintaining relationships is very hard work. If you can extend that thinking beyond personal spaces to the rest of the country - meet them where they’re at. The first step is empathy and feeling that we want to form connection because we want to build something good.

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This transcript was generated by otter.ai and edited for publication. The conversation was conducted in English with some Malay terms explained for international readers.

About the Research: Orang Kita: Politics of Acknowledgement and Resentment is available from IMAN Research. The study involved extensive interviews with Malay youth across Malaysia’s heartland states, particularly focusing on the East Coast and northern peninsula.