I was invited to speak about ecosocialism, at Marxism 2025 in Dublin. There was a lot I wanted to say, so I decided to write down some key points I wanted to share. Here’s the presentation.

1. Ecosocialism is the policy and theory for tomorrow, but it is haunted by some problems from yesterday.

The current polarization withing ecosocialism between eco-modernism and degrowth is a problem. To put it bluntly: For eco-modernists, modern industrialization is primarily progressive, and they tend to have a relatively positive view of “growth,” whereas the degrowth movement fundamentally critiques such ideas. These are two heterodox traditions, but they also represent distinct poles in the debate, reflecting very different starting points for thinking and doing politics.

Eco-modernism has always been the dominant position within Marxism. This was perhaps less obvious as long as eco-Marxism existed as a subdiscipline within Marxism, primarily pursued by those with a personal interest in ecology. With climate change—especially over the last ten years—this has changed. Now, everyone who wants to be taken seriously must have a position on the climate. When main tendencies within Marxism engage with ecology, we get socialist eco-modernism.

2.The stark binaries between socialist eco-modernism and degrowth obscure necessary complexity.

Comrade Matt Huber poses some interesting questions in his book Climate Change as Class War. Do we want a “politics of less” or a “politics of more”? Do we focus on production or consumption? Is the political subject that will stop global warming the “working class” or the “professional managerial class” (PMC)? These are interesting questions, but the framing is problematic.

We obviously need more of some things, and less of others. I would agree that production is more important—in many ways—than consumption, but this does not mean that consumption is not also extremely important, both analytically and politically.

The core dichotomy we are expected to take sides on is growth. This is both problematic and confusing. People continue to refer to very different things when they talk about growth—and, by extension, degrowth. Does “growth” refer to biophysical or material throughput, energy use, human potential, capital accumulation, or the Human Development Index? Most often it is assumed we think about an increase in GDP, but how do we measure that?

3. “Growth”—understood, for example, as always increased GDP or biophysical throughput—is indeed a problem, but we cannot begin by confronting growth itself.

Investments in new infrastructure will directly lead to increased economic activity (increased GDP) in the short term. This is of course not a valid argument against such policies. Instead, we need critical discussions on which sectors, places, and industries should see more economic activity—and which should be phased out or shut down. These are complex questions. An ecosocialist movement seeking to mobilize beyond niche intellectual circles must provide concrete, place-specific answers.

On one hand: contra eco-modernism, we cannot have infinite increase in economic activity on a limited planet. And certainly not more decades or centuries of increase in biophysical throughput.

On the other hand: contra degrowth, we cannot mobilize the lower parts of the working class or any broad movement by making “less growth” the focal point of our project. Slogans matter, and I think it will be impossible to unite the broad working class on this slogan.

4. This discussion is not only about “growth”—it goes deeper.

The disputes between eco-modernists and degrowth is tied to broader questions about whether modernization, industrialization, or capitalism itself, is inherently progressive or reactionary.

I think it is fair to argue that large-scale industry, new technologies, increased productivity, and urbanization have created possibilities for socialism that did not exist in pre-capitalist societies. From this perspective, we see how the development of the productive forces, and capitalism itself, has produced the working class, aka “its own gravediggers.”

But how far can we take this argument?

If we look at the world today: does anyone see capitalism leading us toward socialism? Those arguing for capitalism’s progressive character have certainly read Marxist literature; this is not a conclusion one draw from observing reality—but from reading.

Capitalism is not advancing toward socialism; it is only taking us into a new geological epoch, and climate disasters, and genocides, wars, and always new crises. And so on.

Ecosocialist thinkers in the 21^st century should develop a better critique of productivism or uncritical celebration of growth than simply saying that it is bad. We need a more nuanced critique. We need to move past the binary of seeing modernism, capitalism, “development,” or “growth” as inherently progressive or reactionary.

5. Karl Marx.

One striking aspect of the debate between eco-modernists and degrowthers is how actively both camps invoke Karl Marx to support their case. Eco-modernists have a sea of quotes to draw from, while degrowthers have less material, but then make more of what they have. Building on new Marxological evidence, Kohei Saito famously argues that the “mature” Marx was degrowth communist.

We should continue to read Karl Marx for many reasons. His work remains the best starting point for understanding the roots of climate change. We cannot grasp global warming without understanding the dynamics of the profit motive, capital accumulation, metabolic rifts, class struggle and class fractions.

But as Marxists, we must remind ourselves that just because Marx said something this does not automatically make it true. We should be cautious of rhetorical exercise of first claiming that Marx “really” meant this or that, and then simply assume that so should we.

6. Ecosocialism and class

The biggest problem with the polarization between degrowth and eco-modernism is that it hinders fruitful discussions about class struggle. Some eco-modernists argue that there is an antagonistic relationship between the professional-managerial class (“PMC”) and the “working class,” where the former has occupied environmental movements, while only the latter can truly change the world.

This antagonism between a progressive working class and a reactionary “professional class” is mirrored, or rather inverted, by degrowthers. Tadzio Müller, an excellent German activist, has argued that industrial workers in the Global North will not only be our enemies, but “our most effective enemies.” Here, conversation about class starts and ends by pointing out that workers in the global north have an ‘imperial’ mode of living.

And yes, there are indeed tensions between many trade unions and the environmental movements. But it is wrong to describe these as antagonisms. If that were the case, would there be class struggles between the “working class” and the “class” that has occupied the environmental movement? This is not the case.

It is intellectually dishonest to ignore tensions between workers and climate politics, as well as issues of racism and imperialism. But it is also politically hopeless to assume these tensions are so great that the working class—however defined—cannot or should not be a subject of struggle against global warming.

It remains an absolute prerequisite for ecosocialists that organized labour (sometimes alienated by degrowth movements) and environmental movements (sometimes alienated by eco-modernists) are not only radicalized and strengthened but also brought together.

7. Climate activism is class struggle.

The climate movement we see in our streets, occupying coal mines, or organizing school strikes, is—I assume—99.9% composed of people who do not own any means of production.

Yes, many may come from homes with pianos and bookshelves. But let’s not allow Pierre Bourdieu to distract us from a clear class analysis. Class is not determined by aesthetics, taste, culture, or education. Taste, aesthetics, and culture certainly matter— for better or worse when we try to change the world—but they do not define class in society.

We start from a classical Marxist position: people who do not accumulate capital are part of the broad and heterogeneous working class. This will get way more complex when get further into it, and there will be exceptions. But this is where we start from. And where we start from matters.

People in labour unions and those in the environmental movement belong to the same broad and heterogeneous working class. And more than that, the main enemy named by the climate movement is the fossil fuel industry — a fraction of the capitalist class. This is class struggle.

(We think of climate change as an indirect class struggle. This is not the direct confrontation of a worker standing against her boss, but rather an indirect struggle. More similar to how we view struggles over privatizations as class struggles.)

That class consciousness is low—sometimes extremely low—within parts of the environmental movement is indeed a problem. This problem is compounded by eco-modernists and degrowthers who discursively reproduce and celebrate the conflict. As ecosocialists, we have work to do.

Whether the struggle to stop global warming unleashes its potential and is articulated and understood as class struggle, depends on the political struggles within the movements.

Bringing together the broad working class, it not an easy task. This should not surprise us: that has been the case for two centuries. It is tempting to romanticise history and see the history of the working class as more homogenous that it actually was. Questions of gender, racism, sexual orientation, nationalism, etc., were always—and still are—questions used by reactionary forces to divide the working class. Unite the working class is a difficult task—but is our task.

There are good examples to draw from, such as an initiative by the Norwegian think tank Manifest called “couples therapy.” This project has brought together progressive environmental organizations and labour unions organising in the oil industry, to sit down and discuss what a future industrial policy in Norway could look like.

However, when it comes to uniting the labour and climate movements, it remains the case that most of our attempts have failed. We have failed so many times over the past decades that it can be tempting to give up. But we won’t — because this is the very heart of ecosocialism.

8. Capitalism will not stop climate change, and climate change will not stop capitalism.

It is often assumed that global warming will bring about the end of capitalism. I think the opposite is more likely: this is precisely the kind of creative destruction capitalism needs to reproduce itself.

Some argue that ecological change has historically posed great challenges to existing systems, and therefore, climate change must do the same to capitalism. This view overlooks a key fact: unlike previous modes of production, capitalism is fundamentally based on change.

Then there is the assumption that climate change will create such severe problems—food shortages, infrastructure collapse, mass death—that capitalism simply can’t cope. But capitalism has always been adept at placing death in some corners of the world, so that life—and profits—can continue elsewhere. Mass death has never been a fundamental problem for capitalism; the system itself was built on colonialism, wars, and genocides.

Another argument is that since so much fixed capital is invested in fossil infrastructure, a rapid shift to renewables will trigger a massive devaluation, leading to an economic crisis that could spell capitalism’s end. First, this might be true, but massive devaluations do not automatically lead to economic crisis. And second, if such a crisis would occur, we should remember that capitalism is historically reproduced through crises. Capitalism exists because of economic crises, not in spite of them.

Never underestimate the flexibility of capitalism. Today, we see fossil capital and “green capital” operating together, seamlessly. Capital is, at the same time, both destroying the planet and attempting to save it. This is not a contradiction in terms — because the issue is not the planet, but profit. The problem is, if you destroy the planet while trying to save it, you destroy it.

9. Climate change can fuel the rise of fascism.

Crisis was a defining feature of twentieth-century fascism. In discussions about the crises that led to its rise, thinkers like Nicos Poulantzas pointed to economic, ideological, and political upheavals. Could global warming become another crisis with the potential to fuel fascism? There are three ways to answer “yes.”

First, as a defence against progressive movements. What would happen if popular pressure becomes strong enough that political leaders were forced to do what it takes to limit warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees—shutting down oil rigs and coal mines, halting the airline industry, stopping deforestation? This would almost certainly push fossil fuel interests into alliances with the far right, further developing what we can already identify as fossil fascism.

Second, through the crises themselves—a next-level shock doctrine. Crises create opportunities for racism, and climate disasters will generate many. More heatwaves killing people and destroying crops, food shortages, and millions forced to flee—these conditions might fuel reactionary politics. What if a socialist government proposed that the burdens be shared equally? Political scientist Cara Daggett, in her great work on petro-masculinity, asks whether the climate crisis could catalyze fascist desires for Lebensraum.

Third, through variants of so-called eco-fascism. What if the far right makes a 180-degree turn and fully acknowledges that global warming is human-made? Where would they place the blame? Certainly not on business leaders in the Global North. Instead, they would scapegoat “immigrants”—Muslims, Jews, or Chinese, or any other group that can be used to mobilize hatred and racism.

But this doesn’t have to happen—because we are here.

10. Ecosocialism will smash fascism—and they’re going to pay for it.

Human geographer Laura Pulido and her colleagues identified an interesting difference in Donald Trump’s first presidency, between his explicit and spectacular racism, and the silence that followed his environmental deregulations. They argue that the former—intentionally or not—helped obscure the latter. This is interesting. Climate denialism might have some currency, and conspiracy theories and fake news are always key tools in right-wing campaigns. But in general, the climate issue also remains a challenge for them. This is not something they want to discuss.

So how do we respond? We intensify the struggle against global warming.

As Samira Ali so effectively pointed out at this conference on Friday, the antifascist struggle must be both defensive and offensive. We must defend what is worth defending while escalating and intensifying our own struggles—especially those the far right does not want to face. The fight for ecosocialism is exactly that.

Uniting the broad working class must always remain at the core of any socialist strategy. But let’s be honest—so often when we sit down to talk, our disagreements deepen rather than dissolve. Sometimes, external pressure forces unity more effectively than good intentions.

Perhaps this is where fascism inadvertently helps us. The far right—whether in government or on the streets—will continue to attack progressive institutions, labor unions, feminist and anti-racist movements, and, of course, the environmental movement. There is no room for naïve optimism here. But these attacks might also make it easier to see what unites the broad working class. If so, that is an opportunity we must seize.

So, let’s unite labor unions and environmental movements. Or rather—let’s allow the fascists to unite us. Then we will be strong. And then, we will fucking win. Thank you.

Ståle Holgersen

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Discussion

Brian M. Napoletano

March 27, 2025 at 1:16 am

I am not as familiar as I probably should be with Ståle Holgersen’s work, but his lecture notes here suggest that he is wrestling with an issue confronting most ecosocialists: how to build a mass movement capable of making necessary advances against capital, and on a timeline compressed by the severity of the Anthropocene crisis. Inasmuch as this is a problematic close to my own heart, I have tried to read his comments sympathetically. However, I am a bit concerned about his characterization of both the current polarization of ecosocialism and its historical precedents.

At no point was eco-modernism a—much less the—dominant position within Marxism. Indeed, if anything, eco-modernism is perhaps better understood as primarily an attempt to protect capitalist visions of modernization against both the social and ecological indictments of classical Marxism by contending that the tendencies to social-ecological devastation that no serious observer of modernity could plausibly deny are temporary rather than permanent features of capitalist development, rather than structural tendencies of the system. The power of Marxism is that it precludes such dissimulation by tracing the destructive tendencies of capital to their roots in capital accumulation. As the work of John Bellamy Foster, Paul Burkett, Brett Clark, and numerous other ecological Marxists has repeatedly demonstrated, Karl Marx’s thought itself was profoundly “ecological” in the sense of taking the metabolic relationship between society and nature, and the implications of its alienation, quite seriously. Subsequent work by Foster in particular has demonstrated that, while some Eurocentric variants of Western Marxism did indeed move in the direction of productivism, the dialectical and historical materialism championed by Marx and Frederick Engels played a central role in the development of contemporary ecological thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, the rather torturous way that Kohei Saito attempts to anachronistically present Marx as an advocate of degrowth communism by breaking him apart into three different stages tends to bolster rather than challenge the productivist interpretation of Marx and classical Marxism. Nonetheless, precisely because Marx continues to serve as an important starting point for a deeper account of the Anthropocene crisis, an accurate comprehension of the actual content of his work remains essential.

The related characterization of contemporary ecosocialism as polarized between eco-modernism and degrowth is similarly superficial, as it more closely reflects the surface turbulence generated by Saito’s problematical representation of Marx and the polemical response reaction by Mathew Huber and Leigh Phillips than any sort of deep fault line in ecosocialism. As is common in attempts to employ Marx’s ideas without engaging with the content of his work, both Saito’s attempts to argue that Marx ultimately reject the idea of capital establishing a basis for socialism and Huber and Phillips’s attempts to argue that Marx considered any and all technological developments under capital necessary steps towards socialism misses the dialectical nature of his critique. Marx, as Burkett and Foster in particular have elucidated, identified in capital both progressive and regressive elements, precluding any sort of categorical condemnation or validation of capital. Indeed, I would contend that the substitution of such categorical assertions for careful analysis of concrete technological and social developments is a distortion of the dialectical method constituting the backbone of the Marxist tradition and the strength of ecosocialism. Much more could be said on this and other points raised here, but that would require another essay at the least.

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