Could you describe the situation for workers today in Russia, three years after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?

It is important to note that a significant differentiation in wage levels has occurred. Salaries have mostly increased at military enterprises, given the need to attract workers to those jobs. Non-military enterprises facing greater competition for labour have also tried raising wages to attract workers, though not all have succeeded. But wages for a significant portion of workers are stagnating and falling behind price rises. Also, the gap between the average and the median wage — the one that divides earners into two equal halves — is widening.

I recently learned about one metallurgical plant in the Chelyabinsk region, where workers are very dissatisfied with their wage of 50-60 thousand rubles [US$580-600 a month]. While such wages might not seem terrible for the region, it far from matches the reported average wage growth.

In the public sector, wages are falling significantly behind. Funding for public-owned industries has either stagnated or declined in nominal and real terms. The so-called May Decrees of 2012, which sought to align wages in education, science, healthcare and culture with regional averages, are no longer being implemented.

Pensioners face a similar situation. Official indexation does not reflect nor compensate for the actual rise in consumer prices for pensioners’ basic needs. The prices of many essential food products, medicines and utilities — three primary expenses for retirees — are rising faster than overall inflation.

Is the war driving these price rises? Do workers see the connection between the two?

Inflation is being driven by rising prices in the military sector and industries closely tied to the military-industrial complex. However, most people do not associate inflation, which concerns them deeply, with the war. Even official public opinion surveys show that inflation is now the top concern for citizens. But for now, people tend to see it as a separate issue rather than a consequence of the war.

Does this mean that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal of keeping the population relatively indifferent to the war has been successful?

Currently, people either try not to think about the war or, to some extent, repeat official propaganda. Some believe that while the war may have been a mistake, now that it has started it must continue.

However, there is a growing sentiment — though difficult to measure precisely — among people that the war needs to end as soon as possible. These people do not necessarily care how it ends: whether through Ukraine’s capitulation or an abrupt declaration by the Russian leadership that all objectives have been achieved. They would likely greet any resolution with relief.

What has the war meant in terms of workers’ rights?

The war has been used to restrict labour rights at enterprises involved in the war effort. Most notably, restrictions on overtime work have been lifted. Legally, this is absurd, as the government decree contradicts the Labour Code, which sets specific limits on overtime. But this is something that happens in Russia: formally, the law takes precedence; but if needed, government decrees override laws.

Entrepreneurs, particularly those from the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, are taking advantage of this. They are lobbying to raise the permissible amount of overtime work, citing labour shortages. Indeed, there is a labour shortage, though it is uneven across different economic sectors. But just because there is a labour shortage does not mean that any person can easily find a job — there is often a mismatch between people’s qualifications and what enterprises need.

That said, from a worker’s perspective, the current situation is somewhat favourable. Unemployment, as measured by ILO [International Labour Organization] methodology (which is more accurate than the official unemployment rate), is at a historic low. It is approaching what economic theory defines as “full employment,” which is when unemployment falls below 2–3%.

There was a wave of dismissals of workers for their anti-war views, especially in education and theatre. More than 100 people lost their jobs. Did trade unions help workers in these cases?

We tried to provide legal support. We had several court cases challenging dismissals on the basis of procedural violations, specifically breaches of Articles 81 and 82 of the Labour Code, which require employers to offer alternative positions before dismissal. But one common issue we encountered was that individuals were declared “foreign agents” and added to the official registry.

Federal Law 255 imposes severe restrictions on those listed as foreign agents, including bans on teaching in state and municipal educational institutions. So, universities such as Moscow State University, HSE [Higher School of Economics], and RANEPA [The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration] argued that they could not offer alternative positions because the law prohibits financial support for foreign agents. This interpretation is legally absurd as wages are not financial support; they are compensation for labour. But Russian courts ruled against us.

Also, many members of University Solidarity left the country in two waves: first after February 2022, then after September 2022. This weakened us significantly. However, these former members are actively working on self-organisation efforts for exiled academics.

What other challenges do workers face in organising under wartime conditions?

There are very severe restrictions on the opportunities for collective action. Even an “Italian” strike [a commonly used term in Russia for a work-to-rule strike], which is a classic way to bypass legal restrictions on strikes, is practically impossible under Russian legislation. If we carefully examine the Labour Code, we can see that legally holding a strike is nearly impossible. Italian-style strikes by healthcare workers and some industrial enterprises have been relatively successful in the past. Now, however, they face resistance.

The opportunities for such actions have practically disappeared since 2020, when anti-COVID restrictions on street protests were introduced. Even solo pickets lead to detentions and administrative penalties, despite the law allowing for such actions. This significantly limits the possibilities for trade union activity. When a union cannot organise a strike or a rally, its options for action become very limited.

In some cases, unions manage to participate in collective bargaining and secure improvements in their collective agreements. The problem is that most independent unions are minority unions, meaning they have limited influence in collective bargaining. However, medical unions, Novoprof [New Trade Unions, which unites workers from the service and food sector], and University Solidarity have had some success in making small improvements to working conditions through collective agreements.

But in general, given rising police repression that authorities justify as due to the war, trade union activity is extremely restricted. Large-scale actions that could change this trend are not something most workers are ready for at the moment.

We also know of many cases of trade unionists being jailed. Anton Orlov, a regional coordinator in Bashkortostan of the medical workers union, Action, was jailed for nine years after the Ishimbay strike by medics. Kirill Ukraintsov, a trade union activist from the Courier Union, was also arrested and jailed for several months before being released. Is there a growing sense that solidarity itself is now seen as dangerous?

Yes, absolutely. Collective actions — even when they are purely economic in nature — are perceived as highly disloyal to the authorities. However, there are still occasional surges of activity. 

There are some legal loopholes, for example, that allow protests related to wage arrears or in specific sectors such as delivery work, where people are not employed under formal labour contracts. Paradoxically, this frees them from Labour Code restrictions. A recent example of this phenomenon is the protest of delivery workers in Cheboksary.

We know that this also applies to taxi drivers, who are also not officially employed under labour contracts. Yet, even among them, attempts at self-organisation face pushback. For example, there was an attempt to organise a taxi drivers’ car rally in one city. After the rally, participants were visited at their home by police who conducted checks on their involvement in so-called illegal activities. The police and courts interpret these matters as broadly as possible.

But returning to our questions: What about the situation of workers in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine?

Unfortunately, these territories remain a kind of terra incognita for labour rights and economic conditions. It is unclear how employment functions there. It is not even clear who is currently working there or in what conditions, as much of the infrastructure is in ruins.

Moreover, a large part of the male population has been conscripted, even before the full-scale invasion started. In the parts of Donetsk and Luhansk that were under Russian control before 2022, there was a general mobilisation which removed many men from the workforce. The latest data suggests that combat losses among these conscripts are above average.

The two main Russian trade union federations, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) and the Confederation of Labour of Russia (KTR), reacted differently to the war. How do their responses compare?

FNPR, true to form, displayed full loyalty to the government and actively supported the war. Their 2022 May Day celebrations were disgracefully held under the “Z” symbol [which is used in government war propaganda], thereby turning a day of workers’ solidarity into a symbol of war and aggression. Many FNPR-affiliated unions actively participate in war-related fundraising and military events.

KTR, on the other hand, issued a statement immediately after the full-scale invasion. The statement was cautious in its wording, mainly expressing concern that the war would worsen workers’ conditions and damage traditional ties between Russians and Ukrainians. For May 1, 2022, KTR adopted the slogan “Solidarity is stronger than hatred”, which represented a subtle but clearly oppositional stance to the war. But after its initial statement, KTR has mostly remained silent, avoiding public comments on the war.

Among grassroots unions, the [Interregional Trade Union] Workers Association (MPRA), which represents industrial workers, has a membership that is largely neutral or only mildly pro-war. The teachers’ union did not issue an official statement because some local branches threatened to leave if it did, but individual council members initiated a petition signed by several thousand educators in the first days of the war.

University Solidarity, which represents higher education workers, twice issued explicitly anti-war statements. The second statement, after the announcement of partial mobilisation in September 2022, openly called on people not to participate in the war. The union, along with legal experts, held webinars on how to legally avoid mobilisation. This was important work.

Most other unions, however, have remained silent — though silence itself requires courage in Russia, as it is understood as dissent.

Have anti-war trade unions had any success establishing connections with unions in Ukraine? We know that Ukrainian trade unions are pushing to expel FNPR from international union organisations due to its pro-war stance. What is your opinion?

FNPR voluntarily left the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) under the threat of expulsion, though FNPR-affiliated unions remain members of some global trade union federations. As of now, Russian authorities have declared two global unions (ITF and IndustriAll) as “undesirable organisations”. This presupposes that collaboration with such organisations entails criminal persecution. So, FNPR and the KTR member unions have had to leave these organisations.

The problem, unfortunately, is that our Ukrainian colleagues are demanding the exclusion not only of the FNPR but of all Russian trade unions. According to accounts from participants in international forums, Ukrainian representatives deliberately ignore Russian independent unions and push to totally exclude Russian labour organisations. This is not a reasonable stance. It is understandable why Ukrainian unions take this position — it is psychologically justified. But politically, it is not a very wise strategy. It is in the best interest of Ukrainian workers to maintain contact with independent Russian unions that do not support the war.

As for connections with Ukrainian colleagues, these remain but on a personal level. I have an old friend from Kryvyi Rih, and we have remained in contact without conflict. There are other Ukrainian comrades as well that we talk with. However, these are personal rather than institutional connections.

What has been the impact of the war on universities, academic freedom and the right to dissent?

In reality, the crackdown on academic freedom started before the full-scale invasion. Unfortunately, higher education institutions in Russia have always had issues with academic freedom. These issues became more pronounced around 2019, after relatively large-scale protests involving students and some faculty members. This led to increased pressure on educators with independent political and social views.

Universities, including those considered relatively liberal such as HSE, began introducing internal regulations restricting free speech. These restrictions started even earlier, with rules prohibiting faculty members from publicly stating their university affiliation if their opinions did not align with the administration’s stance. Faculty members were also banned from criticising their institutions. This trend is not limited to higher education. For example, a leader of the Moscow Metro workers was fired simply for giving a newspaper interview.

Repression has escalated with increasing political control over universities. Indoctrination courses such as “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” have been introduced, featuring textbooks filled with obscurantist ideas reminiscent of the most reactionary ideologies of the 19^th century. In some cases, students have reported professors for expressing dissenting views. A prominent case involved Maria Rakhmaninova, a professor at the St Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, who was denounced by her students and quickly dismissed, forcing her into exile.

Are there any strategies among university workers to resist this?

Unfortunately, university workers are highly fragmented. This is a broader issue: Russian workers in general are highly atomised. As a result, resistance strategies are mostly individual. Some faculty members choose to remain silent on sensitive topics, others seek to emigrate if they can secure academic positions abroad, even temporarily. Some try to navigate the restrictions while still promoting progressive ideas in subtle ways. However, there is no unified strategy, and solidarity among academic workers is very weak.

Some well-known left-wing university professors, such as Boris Kagarlitsky and Azat Miftakhov, are currently in prison for their political beliefs. In response, there are campaigns to support leftist political prisoners. Why are such initiatives important?

These efforts represent a last line of defence, so to speak. Even if political action is nearly impossible, showing solidarity with those who have taken action remains crucial.

There is a long-standing tradition of this, going back to pre-revolutionary times. Even during the harshest periods of political repression after the 1870s, there were always support networks for political prisoners, such as the Political Red Cross. Similar organisations existed in Soviet Russia until around 1937.

More recently, there are several initiatives to support leftist political prisoners. One important example is the Leftist Political Prisoners Support Fund. Russia has political prisoners from various ideological backgrounds: liberals, nationalists and leftists. The fund helps support leftist activists who are less publicly visible than their liberal counterparts.

Another interesting initiative is “Dialogues with Kagarlitsky”. Since Boris Kagarlitsky is one of the most prominent leftist political prisoners, this serves as both a platform for public discussion among leftists and an avenue for dialogue between the left and liberals. A wide range of organisations have participated, from anarchists to social democrats to the Committee of Solidarity Actions [which involves several left-wing organisations] and Rabkor [the online media outlet that Kagarlitsky edited until he was jailed]. These discussions have been held in Moscow, St Petersburg, Ufa and Yekaterinburg.

Such efforts help maintain horizontal connections among different leftist groups and remind people that they are not alone. Supporting political prisoners is not just about helping those behind bars — it is just as important for those who remain free.

You signed the statement “ The Left for Peace Without Annexations” that was distributed at a gathering of post-Soviet anti-war left émigrés in Cologne in November. What was the purpose of this statement?

There is a wide range of positions among anti-war leftists regarding questions such as what does the peace we stand for mean? And can this peace be bought at any cost? For example, there is a strong sentiment that the Ukrainian people resisting only increases the casualties, and that, therefore, this resistance should not be supported. Some Western leftists and part of the Russian émigré community support the idea that the Ukrainian people should not be supplied weapons.

But this essentially means handing Ukraine over to Russian aggression — to Kremlin aggression — even if people may not realise this. Meanwhile, no one is restricting arms supplies to Russia from Iran, North Korea, or the delivery of critical components for weapon production from China, and sometimes even from European countries.

The authors of the Left for Peace Without Annexation statement say that only the Ukrainian people can decide how long they are willing to resist and under what conditions they are ready to make peace. Only they can decide what they are willing to compromise on.

It is wrong for Russians, especially Russian leftists, to impose on Ukrainians how they should act or restrict what actions they can take. This could weaken Ukrainian society’s position and even force them into capitulation. We also believe that lasting peace must be based on rejecting annexations, and only one country is capable of carrying out annexations. The main goal was to emphasise these stances.

Some signatories of this letter may be considered revolutionary defeatists. Clearly, this position is a little bit idealistic under the current circumstances, as there are no visible prospects for a revolutionary resolution to the war. But at the very least, we needed to firmly state the possibility of such a position.

---

Pavel Kudyukin

Click here to subscribe to ESSF newsletters in English and or French.