𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐬 𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞: Lerche notes that close to half of all rural households in India own no agricultural land, and the majority of those who do possess less than 1 hectare. The bulk of them are thus either wage labourers or ‘farmer-labourers’, that is, households combining self-employment with wage labour. It is far from clear how representative Bansal’s Doaba village is, but here rich, surplus-producing farmers form no less than 40% of all cultivator households. Bansal distinguishes no fewer than four different capitalist groups (called ‘class categories’), of whom the most powerful by far are those he calls ‘big tenant-capitalist farmers’. His petty commodity producers (what one used to call ‘poor and middle peasants’) are all net sellers of labour-power.

𝐇𝐨𝐰 𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐬: Jodhka makes the obvious point that “𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑗𝑎𝑏 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑎𝑝 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒 Most of the agricultural land is owned and cultivated by the caste of Jatts…Punjab has the highest proportion of Scheduled Castes (SCs) or Dalits [anywhere in India], nearly 32%, but they own less than 5% of the total agricultural land”. And interestingly, “given the choice, Dalits would choose to not work as farm labourers.

𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞: This, by universal assent, was broad-based and remarkable. Jodhka argues that the leaders of the struggle acknowledge divisions of caste and class: “They have been speaking in the language of coalition building across the landowning farming classes/ castes and the landless 𝑚𝑎𝑧𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑘𝑎 (labouring classes) or 𝐷𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑏ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎 (Dalit fraternity). One of the core slogans of the movement has been: 𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛-𝑚𝑎𝑧𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑘𝑡𝑎 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑑 (long live farmer-worker unity). In order to reach out across classes and different segments of Punjabi society, they have been actively using the inclusive idioms of Sikh faith and celebrating anniversaries of Dalit icons” . In some contrast to this, Pattenden&Bansal focus on a very different sort of alliance which they argue has the 𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 to emerge — one between small farmers and landless labourers “that is tentatively nudging its way across caste and gender-based divisions”, an incredibly optimistic view!

𝐋𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐦𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭: This lies firmly with the (male) dominant caste farmers, in class terms the 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑑𝑎 𝑗𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑟 or substantial landowners. Arguing, correctly, against a sectarian left position that claims that capitalist farmers would be the main beneficiaries of the farm laws, Bansal asks, “if big capitalist farmers were supposed to gain from the laws, what was their logic behind lending their firm support to the protest movement?” In his fieldwork it was the more substantial farmers who were most vociferous about supporting the movement.

As for the major concerns —

𝐌𝐒𝐏 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐛𝐫𝐨𝐚𝐝 (𝐜𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐬-𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐬) 𝐬𝐮𝐩𝐩𝐨𝐫𝐭 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐢𝐭: Most of the papers foreground the issue of minimum support prices (MSP) as the absolute pivot of the struggle. This of course is tied into a whole regime of designated markets (𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠) and private commission agents (𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑎𝑠) where the mass of producers including the large ones depend on the advances extended by commercial capital. Here it is Bansal’s analysis of the different meanings those support prices have for different agrarian groups that strikes me as most interesting. “Many (capitalist producers) said they would be 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 if the state refuses to provide assured procurement and prices for wheat and paddy”. As for the smallest farmers, they too were opposed to the to the removal of 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠 and/or 𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑎𝑠 because, despite employment in the non-farm sector, they continue to depend on agriculture as a vital part of their income and “𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑀𝑆𝑃 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑦 𝑑𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑎𝑠 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠”. The caste dimension is especially interesting: as one bus driver cum part-time farmer told him, “if these laws are implemented, there will be no difference left between us and the 𝑐ℎ𝑢ℎ𝑟𝑒-𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑠”, this a derogatory term used by Jats and other dominant castes to refer to Dalits. In other words, the fear of proletarianisation has a strong casteist aspect as well.

𝐅𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐬 𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐟 𝐏𝐃𝐒: In their joint paper Pattenden&Bansal make the point that in undermining the system of public procurement the first of the farm laws would “also undermine the PDS, which provides poorer households with foodgrains at a fraction of open market prices. Landless households and farmer-labourers who depend on the PDS to make ends meet” would then face higher living costs and a downward pressure on real wages.

𝐅𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝: Jodhka states this most clearly. The open access to agriculture given to big corporates “𝑤𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠 … Once the 𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑎𝑠 [are] gone, the farmers would have no choice but to enter into contractual arrangements with the private buyers, taking advances from them and eventually getting trapped into cycles of debt. This would ultimately result in losing their lands to the corporates…This is the gist of what I have been hearing from ordinary farmers and their leaders over the past roughly one year”. Bansal reports the fears of his Jatt Sikh poor peasants that the removal of MSP would lead to the “𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐) 𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑠”.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐛𝐲 𝐚𝐠𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬: Bansal’s capitalist farmers told him they much prefer dealing with the 𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑎𝑠 than with corporates. Jodhka shows why, by highlighting the extent to which all groups of farmers work through the advances given to them by the commission agents through whom they sell to state agencies such as the FCI. He notes that over the years Punjab’s farmers became “among the most indebted in the country… 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑦𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚”.