In a climate of polarisation, the pro-democracy movement led by Thai youth and students calls for political change, including the dissolution of the military-backed government and reforms of the monarchy. In response to series of peaceful demonstrations, disproportional violence and systematic uses of laws were deployed by the state to clamp down on freedom of expression.
Labour as a movement is largely invisible in the uprising, although working people have always formed the main body of the mobilisation. As Andrew Brown wittingly argues “even when labour is invisible, in the sense of not being a public, organized actor overtly engaged in formal political processes, the politics of the working class is nonetheless there and is significant.” [1]
Yet the formal Thai labour movement remains completely silent on both the repression of youth activists and the call for political change. The formally organised labour continues to provide the military-backed government with stamps of approval and publicly display relentless loyalty towards the monarchy.
Questions have been raised about where the Thai labour movement stands. In this article, I would like to take a look at the often-neglected internal dynamics within the organised labour movement—the relationship between established groups and the less visible independent ones.
In particular, despite the invisibility of workers as a public, organised political actor, it is important to explore the anti-authoritarian politics of labour within and without the labour movement. In particular, I intend to highlight the significance of unorganised labourers and freelancers in the most recent popular mobilisation. By recognising their centrality, I want to critique the irrelevance of the so-called Thai labour movement, as well as its inability to represent the interests of the working mass in the present state of the Thai political economy. [2]
I begin with a discussion on the stance of the labour movement with a focus on the national labour organisations. Then I will zoom in on the emerging labour groups that capture and represent demands of the working class almost completely ignored by the Thai state and left out of the purview of formally organised labour. I argue the emergence of two non-union labour groups could potentially challenge the relevance of traditional Thai trade unions.
A Critique of the Formally Organised Trade Union Movement
Since March 2020, youth and student activists in Thailand have upended the pro-democracy movement in such a way that prompted many commentators to call the recent series of events a “revolution”. The young activists have steadily pushed the boundary of activism and political imagination, putting a spotlight on the place that monarchy occupies in Thai society.
Not only has Thailand become one of the world’s most unequal countries, but post-pandemic Thailand has also seen one of the highest youth unemployment in decades. Unemployment rates for young men and women reached a worrying level of 6 and 8 percent, respectively. Unemployment along with inequality and sense of insecurity have become common motives for young people’s protests and revolt.
Coming together from all walks of life, the working mass have taken to the street and joined forces with the discontent youth. They are a multitude of the distraught and discontented tied together by a shared structure of feelings, among which economic hardship and social indignation lie at the heart of their motivations. Students as young as middle schoolers risk and expose themselves to state violence and forms of harassment. A legitimate question will be, “where is the labour movement”? [3]
It is no secret that the formally organised labour such as a majority of national labour councils (According to Thai laws, labour congress is an organisation of at least 15 trade union members) and their trade union members have become strategic allies of the Thai state. Influential examples of such organisations are, for instance, the Confederation of Thai Labour (CTL) and the National Congress of Thai Labour (NCTL).
Not only do these labour organisations provide the officials with a rubber stamp when needed, but they also failed to represent workers’ voices in national politics by operating in an almost entirely apolitical manner.
On the one hand, they focus mainly on narrow industrial-relations issues and engage with the government agencies only within the confines of the industrial relations framework. [4] On the other, leadership of the formally organised labour is deeply involved in royalist conservatism, blending conservative politics into creating their version of political parties catered to working class.
The CTL’s current president, Manas Kosol, is an advisor to the current Minister of Labour, Suchart Chomklin. Once appointed a member of National Legislative Council by the coup regime following the ousting of Thaksin administration in 2006, Manas’s political orientation is unequivocal. Similarly, the NCTL’s president, Panas Thailuan, has played a prominent role in the Thai industrial relations system–a role exemplified by his delegation as the spokesperson of Thai labour at the ILO convention in Geneva in early June 2022.
Addressing the impacts of Covid-19 on the Thai workforce, his representation can be questionable considering the fact that the unionisation rate in Thailand is less than 2 percent of the total workforce, and the informal economy is actually much larger than the formal sectors. Without addressing structural issues of inequality, like other labour organisations, the two labour congresses have chosen to ignore the growing discontent.
It is also worth pointing out that a dozen of independent trade unionists who criticised the current administration for its inadequate Covid-19 measures have been prosecuted for speaking out. Alliance with organised labour does lend government agencies a semblance of mandated authority, particularly in industrial-relations affairs.
For example, after being criticised for non-inclusive and impractical Covid-19 relief measures, the Minister of Labour responded that his plans were consulted with and approved by the labour representatives such as the CTL. At the same time, the Ministry of Labour was found distributing survival kits to workers impacted by Covid-19 through the CTL.
The pictures of Manas handing out the survival kits with a banner showing photos of himself and Minister Suchart photoshopped next to him, bringing to mind political-campaign posters, speak loud and clear about reciprocity and the cronyism he is engaged in. Since November 2021, Mr. Manas has become the head of the newly-registered Nation-Building Labour Party, hoping to seize the votes of the working-class constituency in the upcoming, anticipated election.
Over a decade ago, Sakdina Chatrakul Na Ayudhya argued that, due to the weakness and lack of unity of the labour movement, “the Thai government is able to make decisions on labour policies freely without having to take into account the demands of these congresses, or else the government can choose to listen to only those congresses whose voice is in accord with its policies.” [5] Such analysis still stands today. Focusing on strength and unity allows us to evaluate the movement’s scorecards of associational power and other axis of power (i.e. structural, institutional, and societal), nonetheless, such an emphasis leaves self-censorship and hyper-conservatism of the organised labour unexamined.
But I want to shift the focus from the strength/weakness and division/unity of the movement to the internal structure and dynamics within which domination of labour elites and personality cults play out. Moreover, labour networks or coalitions themselves are crucial sites of political contestation. The complex composition of Thai organised labour highlights the conflict and contestation associated with organising workers—organised labour is a site of conflict between contending social forces and interests—within which there are significant political divisions that need to be recognised and explained.
Coming together from all walks of life, the working mass have taken to the street and joined forces with the discontent youth. They are a multitude of the distraught and discontented tied together by a shared structure of feelings, among which economic hardship and social indignation lie at the heart of their motivations. Students as young as middle schoolers risk and expose themselves to state violence and forms of harassment. A legitimate question will be, “where is the labour movement”?
Labour Aristocrats and Pro-Authoritarian Tendency
The labour movement’s various organisational forms and the different arenas of its activism underscore its diversity and the tensions within it. In a strictly legal sense, the labour movement comprises not only organisations formally recognised by law, such as labour unions, labour federations, and labour congresses, but also a number of civil society-based organisations that have emerged as a result of broader political struggles.
The latter includes informal associations, labour NGOs, and other labour groups such as area-based labour collectives. Unlike the trade unions, these relatively independent labour groups occupy no formally legal space within the industrial relations system but have nonetheless managed to carve out political spaces to advance a labour-centered agenda.
Since the early 1990s, two dominant organisational bodies, the Thai Labour Solidarity Center (TLSC), and State Enterprise Relations Committee (SERC), have been the leading force in the Thai labour movement. The SERC is undoubtedly one of the most powerful organisations within the Thai labour movement since it is an umbrella organisation of state enterprise workers which represents over 180,000 workers.
By contrast, the TLSC was established in 2001 by a number of trade unions as well as a ‘complex and dense network of alternative organising vehicles’. [6] Although the TLSC has no formal legal status as either a trade union or NGO, affiliates hoped to be able to use it as an independent vehicle through which they could voice their concerns about industrial as well as broader social and political matters. Historically, the TLSC has operated with the mandate of serving as a coordinating body instrumental in mobilising unions and non-unions and connecting organised labour in the private and public sectors.
Before the most recent coup in 2014, it was widely known that the SERC and TLSC, as led by Somsak Kosaisuk, Sawit Kaewvarn, Chalee Loysoong, and Wilai Saetia, had joined the hyper-royalist and anti-democracy movement – known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People’s (Absolute) Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), respectively. PAD and PDRC were largely responsible for the military coups in 2006 and 2014 and the ensuing military rulings. [7]
While the TLSC has relied on mobilising mass workers to pressure the state, its leadership’s deep tie with the conservative movements had made many rank-and-file members uncomfortable. For instance, in 2013, even with opposition from within, the TLSC under Chalee’s leadership invited all workers to join the PDRC movement. [8] It is worth pointing out that over the current administration the SERC and TLC leaderships appear to be disillusioned with the military. As a mandate to correct the course, the TLSC in particular continues to take an apolitical approach – the organisation and members remain apolitical and focused primarily on industrial relations issues.
Since Sawit and Chalee have been leading the trade union movement for a long time, it is almost impossible to separate their private lives from their public roles. For example, in October 2020, as the head of the State Railway Union of Thailand, along with 12 union officials, Sawit was sentenced by the National Anti-Corruption Commission to three years in prison.
As the State Railway Union is one of the most powerful labour organisations in Thailand, this case has become a high-profile case and a significant campaign point for organisations such as the ILO and Solidarity Center, which have advocated for freedom of associations and collective bargaining in Thailand. International organisations have since pressured the Thai government to drop the case, with a threat of the EU or US suspending trade preferences for Thailand. Through such a campaign, Sawit and the SERC have inevitably become the face of the rights and freedom of the Thai organised labour.
Most recently, Sawit, Chalee, and other key figures from the SERC and TLSC have played a central part in the Thai Social Democratic Party (TSDP)—known previously as the New Politics Party (Pak Kanmuang Mai), a party founded by the hardcore leaders of the Yellow Shirts movement. Since last November, Sawit and Chalee have become the new head and deputy of the TSDP, respectively.
As the TLSC leadership such as Sawit and Chalee have constantly asked its members to keep the politics outside the organisation, it is rather hypocritical that the leaders, as individuals, continue to play a more active role in electoral politics, particularly as they frame their TSDP as a political party for all workers and replicate the demands of the labour movement as the party’s platform.
In the past few years, the two liberal-leaning but conservative labour organisations are rather selective in supporting the causes of the popular anti-authoritarian movement. The TLSC has criticised the government’s handling of the economy and high costs of living fueled by inflation, representing the ideal economic unionism characterised by labour scholars. [9]
Since the youth-led movement revived street politics in late 2019, activists who are mostly but not limited to youth and students have been subjected to state violence, indiscriminate prosecution, and daily surveillance. At the end of 2021, at least 1,224 persons have been targeted with prosecution of violating the Emergency Decree. 127 persons have been prosecuted with the Section 112 of the Criminal Code, while 55 persons with the section 116. At least 233 lawsuits were filed.
Not only are both labour organisations completely silent about the regime’s violence and intimidation, but the TLSC issued a statement condemning protesters for inappropriately disrespecting the monarchy. It is rather ironic that around the same time that youth activists were violently suppressed, the SERC members were seen taking knees to express solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement in front of the US Embassy in Bangkok.
But the TLSC statement proposed a set of solutions on the political deadlock. One of them is the demand that new constitution drafting committee must represent people of all occupations and that workers be able to vote where they are employed. This set of demands clearly shows that, although the TLSC pays lip service to the interests of all workers, its politics of late has undoubtedly become synonymous with electoral politics – a horizon on which the eyes of its leaders are. As it seems, labour politics of the Thai labour movement is largely incarcerated in the prison of electoral politics.
Let’s be clear, I do not equate leadership with the movement as a whole. However, the Thai labour congresses, the TLSC and SERC as they are defined by Thai law and embedded in the webs of the Thai and international political economy, are very hierarchical and not well equipped to organise the struggle of workers in a broader sense.
We may understand their shortcomings by referring to the social and political locations of trade unions in history. As Selma James made the case for the US trade unions, “[trade unions’] functions are to mediate the struggle in industry and keep it separate from struggles elsewhere. Because the most concentrated potential power of the class is at the point of direct production, the unions have convinced the wageless that only at that point can a struggle be waged at all.” [10]
Addressing strategies of the Western women’s movement in engaging with the trade union movement in the 1970s, James made the case for autonomous organising of women, particularly women of colour and working women. As a historical product of class compromise, trade union as an organising vehicle is not meant to hold inclusive space for the working class and women’s struggles.
In Thailand, scholars attribute increasing economic trade unionism to the Thai labour laws, which separate public and private unions and limit the scope of labour activism beyond the workplace level. Historically, such laws are the direct product of authoritarianism. [11]
At the organisational level, my ethnographic studies of labour organising at the workplace and local levels illustrated the limitations of the legal framework, and regardless of its benefits workplace activism and labour unionism in Thailand are embedded in a masculinised culture of leadership and devoid of an anti-oppression framework. This tendency toward authoritarianism has its roots in both the narrow framework of industrial relations and masculinised and hierarchical culture.
Therefore, the Thai trade union movement is inherently prone to authoritarianism within and without. It is not well equipped to understand intersecting forms of exploitation (i.e. capitalism, patriarchy, sexism, racism, nationalism, etc) in society.
Let’s be clear, I do not equate leadership with the movement as a whole. However, the Thai labour congresses, the TLSC and SERC as they are defined by Thai law and embedded in the webs of the Thai and international political economy, are very hierarchical and not well equipped to organise the struggle of workers in a broader sense.
Autonomous Labour against Authoritarianism
What is the alternative? Amid the wake of anti-authoritarian sentiment in late 2020, two labour groups emerged to fill the gap left wide open by the absence of organised labour. They have recently played a pivotal role in forging solidarity with the youth-led anti-authoritarian movement.
The first group is the Labour Network for People’s Rights (LNPR) consisting of trade unionists from at least seven industrial areas. These trade unionists are those in the existing trade unions and those who were dismissed or laid off by employers due to their union activities, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. Compared with the formally organised labour groups, these activists are actively involved in the larger network of the Thai civil society, using political space in general to mobilise. The second group is the Workers’ Union (WU), a new organisation that aspires to unite all of the working class under the banner of “we are the 99%.”
LNPR as Embodiment of Solidary
Following the formation of the Free People Movement by the Free Youth group in early August 2020, pro-democracy labour activists came together to found the Labour Network for People’s Rights (LNPR) in mid-August 2020. From the outset, the LNPR has a simple goal of being voices of the Thai workers that express solidarity for the youth and student movement by echoing all of their demands.
On August 16th, the LNPR organised the official launch of the group with a panel titled “why labour movement needs to unshackle itself”. To unshackle here has double meanings, as in Thai it also means to join hands with the Free People movement. The launching of the LNPR was supposed to be an invitation for workers in general to embrace the movement ignited by the youth.
As most core members are experienced women activists, the formation of the LNPR really symbolises a long-standing tradition of autonomous women-led labour groups’ organising alongside the male-dominated labour movement.
While the TLSC leadership continues to maintain a close relationship with the Prayut administration, the LNPR regards the current military-backed government as authoritarian and oppressive. Not only does its founding statement emphasise inequality between ruling elites and working-class people, but it also questions the type of economic development built on the back of the Thai working class.
A part of the statement says, “For so long, we have had to bear with an underdeveloped and oppressive education system. As a result, when our children are grown up, they are trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty, endlessly passing on the inheritance of poverty to their own children. In short, the inequality gap widened by the authoritarian government makes it almost impossible for us to pull ourselves up the social ladder.”
Unlike the formally recognised counterparts, the LNPR criticises the current authoritarian regime as at the core of workers’ suffering. Most importantly, the LNPR also points directly to the role of the capitalist state in perpetuating endless vicious cycles of class reproduction in Thailand. This analysis echoes, albeit incidentally, the radical critique of the social factory laid out by the Italian Operaismo (“workerism”) movement in the 1960s and early 1970s.
The political radicalism of the LNPR, intended to be a platform for independent workers, puts them at odds with the TLSC. On Decent Work Day in late October 2020, the LNPR and the TLSC organised rallies in front of the Social Security head office in order to submit demands on behalf of their constituents. While the TLSC legally requested a permit from the authority to hold a rally, the LNPR instead took a civil disobedience approach and organised their rally without a permit. As the LNPR arrived at the scene earlier, its occupation of the space was interpreted to be rather defiant and disrespectful to the TLSC. Subsequently, one of the LNPR leaders was pressured to leave her position as the vice-chair of the TLSC executive committee.
As most core members are experienced women activists, the formation of the LNPR really symbolises a long-standing tradition of autonomous women-led labour groups’ organising alongside the male-dominated labour movement.
The Workers’ Union as the Socialist Movement for All
The Workers’ Union (WU)’s generic name is intended to serve a specific purpose. It is meant to be an inclusive labour organisation for all, especially the wageless and the precarious–those who are excluded by the trade union movement. The WU was founded by individuals from a large network of labour activists, scholars, NGO workers, and leftist activists around early 2021. Yet, activities of the WU on a day-to-day basis are run rather by youngsters who do not have prior experience with labour activism.
The WU has gained much traction from ‘woke’ youth whose anti-authoritarian awareness was fomented by the movement. Apart from the core founders, who are veteran activists, the WU’s active members are generally those who are inclined toward leftist politics but have not had a chance to experience former coup d’etat and political upheaval.
They are mostly young professionals such as graphic designers and translators, and freelancers and creative workers such as artists, film directors, and musicians. The members of the WU have relied on digital organising tools such as social media in its mobilising and educational activities. Some of the WU founding members are also very active in the Creative Workers Union (CUT)–a precursory “trade union” of precarious illustrators, actors, and behind-the-camera workers, who struggled with non-standard working conditions worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic.
Although the WU and CUT use the term “trade union”, they are not legally recognised as such by Thai law. Its usage is intended both to expand the scope of what trade unions can actually do and to increase awareness of the young generation on the power of (general) trade unions. CUT and WU have effectively raised the questions of workplace democracy and power dynamics within the workplace. Surprisingly, this is an issue that has never been publicly discussed by any trade union in Thailand before.
The WU has six objectives, but the most important ones include “creating a common sense of class consciousness that “we are all workers”; building collective power to negotiate with the state and capital; promoting the creation of a working-class political party and make the welfare state for all a reality.” It also states that in the short term, this organisation is “standing side by side with the pro-democracy movement of youth and the people’s to rid of the authoritarian.”
In late February 2022, the WU officially launched its organisation by organising a “Workers’ Fest”, which highlights issues from a wide range of labour organizations and social movements. The event itself organised as a people’s forum, in the guise of a festival, invited participation from a broad network of civil society organisations. The Workers’ Fest showcased a wide range of movements from feminism, LGBTQ, and students fighting oppressive school rules, to the sex workers and solidarity for Ukraine.
One of the key differences between the WU and organised labour is that the politics of the WU is in tune with the changing political awareness sparkled by the youth. In other words, the WU incorporates not only critiques of the authoritarian state and the place of the monarchy but the oppression within all social institutions including family, workplace, and school.
The WU has gained much traction from ‘woke’ youth whose anti-authoritarian awareness was fomented by the movement. Apart from the core founders, who are veteran activists, the WU’s active members are generally those who are inclined toward leftist politics but have not had a chance to experience former coup d’etat and political upheaval.
Making Sense of the Three Streams of Organised Labour
During the upsurge of public demonstrations, independent labour groups have held a number of protests and rallies, although they have gone almost unnoticed by the mainstream media. According to an internal report conducted by the Just Economy and Labour Institute (JELI), between December 2020 and December 2021, there were at least 19 rallies and protests, at least 10 of which were organised either solely by the LNPR or by LNPR jointly with the youth movement. These events were high-profile protests in which labour activists aimed to draw public support in order to mobilise popular pressure on the government.
Considering the fact that there were over 2,200 protests between February 2020 and December 2021, a majority of which took place in 2021, this number (19) seems insignificant. However, these events are unique for many reasons.
First, they were organised to highlight economic issues, from the vantage point of industrial workers, rather than individuals’ experiences. In most cases, these events highlighted structural and legal issues such as transparency and participation of workers in the governance of social security schemes.
Beyond that, as the case of the LNPR shows, although the labour activists started off by organising their own activities independently of the larger youth movement, the labour leaders were quickly welcomed to join the rank of its leadership. The workers’ outreach was well received by the youth activists who saw the need of having the voices of the industrial workers heard at their political rallies.
Akanit Horatanakun has recently proposed a valuable framework for understanding the typology and nature of collective actions during the upheaval. According to Akanit, we could observe there are two types of protest: connective and brokered actions.
Connective action is characterised by organic and decentralized protests organised and coordinated independently by activists by means of social media and creative tactics, without adhering to a specific set of demands proposed by the prominent political activists. By contrast, the other type of protests which are high profile and centralised, and often involved mass mobilisation is often brokered by what Akanit calls ‘youth political entrepreneurs’.
To borrow Akanit’s framework, I would argue that the example of the LNPR illustrates that the labour activists first organised their protests as connective actions. Nevertheless, some of the LNPR activists have eventually become a part of the core cadre of political entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, this does not come without personal costs. According to an internal report conducted by JELI, by the end of 2021, the active LNPR activists have been charged with at least three counts of law violations.
In late October 2021, the WU organised a rally in collaboration with the LNPR and the Construction Workers Union, to demand clarity from the Ministry of Labour on regulations regarding permission of undocumented migrant workers to temporarily stay in the country due to the Covid-19 lockdown. At the event, police arrested eight undocumented workers who were mobilised by the organisers before transferring them to the immigration office for deportation. It is important to point out that one of the officials escorting the migrant workers was wearing a shirt with the minister’s name, Suchart Chomklin, on it.
Following the incident, the TLSC and the SERC issued a statement, not to support the WU and the LNPR, but to denounce the use of migrant workers as ‘political pawn’. They argue that as labour organisations they represent all workers including migrant workers and criticise labour groups that bring vulnerable documented migrant workers into political protests without considering the consequences.
For those who understand political divisions among organised labour as well as orientations of all the labour organisations involved, this statement does not say much more than declaring the TLSC and SERC’s support for the Ministry of Labour’s action. The statement says nothing to demand justice for the undocumented worker. What this TLSC and SERC statement implies is that as the WU and LNPR activists are openly anti-government, the rally organised by them is thus ‘political’ and not recognised as a neutral labour issue.
What differentiates these self-organised and independent labour groups from the labour aristocrats is three-fold. First, the former supports the radical demands of youth-led movement directed toward the monarchy. Second, while criticising the legitimacy of the elected government and prime minister, its criticism focuses on authoritarianism in the society as a whole. Third and perhaps most importantly, it explicitly links political and economic struggles with an emphasis on power relations and everyday life struggles.
The emerging labour groups, the LNPR and the WU, show us what the culture of solidarity and critique of authoritarianism at the most fundamental level look like. They are offering us a glimpse of what a socialist workers’ movement is supposed to be. If they could withstand persistent state’s oppression, the growing movements would have potentials to set in motion disillusionment with unfounded claims and misrepresentation of the Thai labour aristocrats. What lies ahead for the autonomous labour is a hard row to hoe though. A long march toward building the political movement for equality and freedom starts with the first step of creating an equal and free movement from within.
What differentiates these self-organised and independent labour groups from the labour aristocrats is three-fold. First, the former supports the radical demands of youth-led movement directed toward the monarchy. Second, while criticising the legitimacy of the elected government and prime minister, its criticism focuses on authoritarianism in the society as a whole. Third and perhaps most importantly, it explicitly links political and economic struggles with an emphasis on power relations and everyday life struggles.
Kriangsak Teerakowitkajorn
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