ADMIRAL MICHAEL GILDAY, who heads US naval operations, recently raised eyebrows with comments at an Atlantic Council event suggesting that China’s timeline for an invasion of Taiwan could be shorter than the 2027 window previously suggested by now-retired Admiral Philip Davidson, who made comments suggesting that China might try to invade Taiwan in the next six years last year.

Gilday’s comments were that the US should expect China to act sooner on political promises than stated, as “What we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they have delivered on every promise they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it.” To this extent, Gilday suggested that China could even invade this year or next year, “When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window; I can’t rule it out.”

Gilday’s comments took place shortly after comments by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that suggested an accelerated timeline for a Chinese invasion. After Gilday’s statements, Taiwanese National Security Bureau head Chen Ming-tong stated that he expected China might use force by 2023 to try and push Taiwan into accepting terms set by the Chinese government but did not answer as to whether this would be a full-scale invasion or other forms of military action.

PHOTO CREDIT: US NAVY/PUBLIC DOMAIN

Gilday’s comments have provoked alarm in many quarters, though primarily outside of Taiwan. Domestic politics in Taiwan is still more focused on the election cycle at present.

Yet one also notes the imprecision of his statements. It would require weeks, if not months of troop movements to amass troops on the coasts of China for an invasion. A 2022 invasion of Taiwan, then, is logistically and physically impossible, seeing as with just a little more than two months left in the year, one would expect to see troops massing on the coasts of China by now.

To this extent, Gilday’s comments were about military readiness in preparing for hypotheticals–however unlikely–rather than suggesting that China in fact would be invading within the next two years. But, more generally, one notes that comments from military officials warning of a Taiwan contingency are often intended to try and create alarm, so as to push for greater efforts to strengthen military readiness. High-ranking military officials such as Gilday also have an imperative to justify increased budgets, further allocated resources, or even justify the raison d’etre of the military.

Comments by US and Chinese military officials should be taken with a grain of salt. Comments by US military officials have a domestic US audience, in hoping to encourage US politicians to take stronger action regarding Taiwan, as well as a Taiwanese audience. With the latter, the US is trying to push Taiwan into increasing military spending, lengthening the draft, as well as toward an emphasis on an asymmetric warfare posture.

By contrast, statements by Chinese military officials or politicians suggesting an imminent invasion of Taiwan can be viewed as a form of psychological warfare, aiming to intimidate Taiwan, diminish efforts to resist Chinese influence, and discourage possible resistance in the event of an invasion. Of course, China would prefer to be able to take Taiwan without fighting, given not only the immediate loss of life that would result from a costly and bloody invasion, but because of the shockwaves that would result from the fallout of the invasion.

Comments by Taiwanese military officials are most worth taking seriously, then, seeing as it is Taiwan that is actually in the line of fire and which would lose the most. But Taiwanese military officials, too, may be hoping to sound the alarm, so as to boost efforts to strengthen the military–whether in terms of lengthening the draft, say, or increasing military spending. One also notes that officials such as Chen Ming-tong are not likely in any position to outright deny comments by US military officials such as Gilday, seeing as the US is Taiwan’s security guarantor.

TAIWANESE PRESIDENT TSAI ING-WEN. PHOTO CREDIT: TSAI ING-WEN/FACEBOOK

To this extent, it is important to note that not all assessments suggest that China has moved up its timeline for an invasion. A recent Pentagon assessment did not predict that China would be imminently conducting an invasion of China. Likewise, much of the perception of China having moved up its timeline for invading Taiwan seems to be based on a misinterpretation of recent comments by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 20^th People’s National Congress as having made new statements regarding China being willing to use force to achieve unification. Yet, in reality, Xi’s statements were largely boilerplate and did not offer anything new.

And, moreover, statements about a 2027 window for an invasion are based on an assessment of when China would have the capabilities to launch an invasion, such as sufficient lift capacity to transport troops to Taiwan to mount a long-term occupation. On the other hand, this is very different than if China would, in fact, invade, given obstacles such as the catastrophic loss of life or economic impact–neither of which China could shrug off easily.

Brian Hioe