The fighting that broke out on August 27 between the Burmese regime’s army and the Kokang militia clearly signals the fragility of the ceasefire agreements that have been in place in Burma’s border regions for the past two decades. It also raises concerns of a return to a full-scale civil war unless the regime seriously works together with the ethnic armies, compromising its position as necessary in order to achieve an inclusive political process.
There is an undercurrent of tension flowing between the ceasefire organizations and the regime due to the flawed writing and approval process of the 2008 constitution. The regime’s desire to transform the ceasefire armies into border security guards, thus bringing them directly under the control of the national army, will almost certainly further these tensions and lead to more fighting.
The return to armed conflict also brings into question the credibility of the regime’s 2010 elections. It proves once again that the unilateral implementation of the 2010 elections as part of the regime’s seven-step roadmap cannot be regarded as a viable political solution paving the way to peace and stability.
In fact, the junta’s insistence on holding elections based upon a military-backed and military-supporting constitution is inviting armed conflict and unrest on a large scale in the near future. The international community, including Asian neighbors, should not support the election, but must rather stand firm in calling for an inclusive political process that involves reconciliation with Aung San Suu Kyi and ethnic leaders.
The Kokang, Wa, Mon, Kachin, Shan and other ceasefire ethnic groups have positively cooperated with the regime’s seven-step roadmap. They participated in a national convention to lay down the basic principles to draft a national constitution. The ethnic leaders proposed the necessary principles for the protection of ethnic rights and for a federal constitution. They compromised, they modestly made recommendations, and they worked within the limited space provided by the regime’s national convention.
In May 2004, some major ceasefire groups submitted a letter to the chairman of the National Convention Commission suggesting that the basic principles of the constitution should be reviewed and revised and that inappropriate decrees such as 5/96, which outlaws discussions on constitutional affairs, be abolished. When the regime reconvened the National Convention in 2005 and 2006, major ceasefire organizations tried their best to correct the basic principles to make them more democratic and based on a federal system within a legal framework. However, they all had to face refusals from the regime time and time again.
This refusal to listen had serious consequences. The first was that the New Mon State Party (NMSP) downgraded the status of its delegation to the National Convention. The second was the decision of several major ceasefire organizations not to participate in the 2010 elections. Although some ethnic groups have not yet decided what their position will be, even those that are inclined to participate are constrained by the absence of election rules.
It is under these circumstances that the regime is trying to finalize its roadmap in order to strengthen its claims to legitimacy through the 2008 constitution and 2010 elections. As preparation, in April 2009 the regime started its integration plan, which involves the transformation of ceasefire armies into border security guards. This plan has increased tensions and heightened ceasefire groups’ worries about their future status. As expected, major ceasefire groups have declined the regime’s proposal of integration.
Since the rights that they have been struggling for are not guaranteed by the 2008 constitution, the ceasefire groups don’t dare give up their armies. They know that the limited autonomy that they have enjoyed since entering into ceasefire agreements with the junta have been due solely to the fact that they have maintained their armies. Some groups with smaller armies have already been forced to surrender. Protecting their organizations and their armed groups is their last line of defense. The Kokang were just the first to fight to retain their army and territory; others may follow.
Ignoring such political realities and the root cause of Burma’s ethnic conflicts, some advocates, including the International Crisis Group, a respected think tank, are recommending that the international community should press all stakeholders to participate in the forthcoming elections.
It is true that the 2008 constitution establishes a federal form of government with a bicameral legislature as well as 14 regional governments and assemblies, ostensibly operating under civilian rule. However, in my opinion, all those spaces and changes will be extremely fragile, with far too much depending on the military. Indeed, I think that offering only limited spaces with too many restrictions is actually creating fertile ground for armed conflict and unrest. To avoid that outcome, the regime must seek political solutions together with all stakeholders before the elections.
The conflict may arise first from within. Transforming ceasefire armies into border security guards under the national army was just one major step in preparation for the elections. The army also has to fill its legislative and administrative quotas. The commander in chief needs to appoint at least 1,000 middle- and high-ranking officers to seats reserved for the military in the state, divisional and national assemblies. He must also select thousands of other officials to fill positions at various levels of the administrative mechanism as well. Who will go to the legislature? Who will remain in the armed forces? Moreover, in a country which will be run by the commander in chief according to its constitution, who from the army will want to serve the nation as president? Who will try to remain in the army as commander in chief? Conflicts may emerge even within the army itself.
We are aware that these flaws may present opportunities for the opposition to exploit, but we are also concerned about the potentially explosive nature of these flaws and the likelihood that they may lead to dangerous and bloody conflict situations.
Under such fragile circumstances, the extralegal armed groups of ceasefire ethnic nationalities will continue to exist even after unilateral elections in 2010. The recent fighting between the regime and the Kokang is evidence that the political problems which need to be solved with ethnic nationalities are not being addressed satisfactorily by the political arrangement of the regime. The political problems between the regime and pro-democracy forces will also remain even after the elections. The election results, already written, will also not serve to address and solve the social and economic situation created by the regime.
Sadly, the country is marching towards an even more chaotic situation and to even more suffering for the people. The regime must be pressured to seek a political solution among all stakeholders and to desist from the path of its unilateral roadmap. To avoid further years of strife and conflict born of an unjust and one-sided election and constitution, the international community must be steadfast in insisting that the regime reconciles with Aung San Suu Kyi and all other stakeholders.
Encouraging the current non-democratic election of 2010 is inviting further unrest, uprising and the return of armed conflict in Burma.