Mahinda Rajapakse has had a good few months. First, he resoundingly defeated the LTTE, ending a war that had raged for almost three decades. Then, just as calls for an international investigation into his government’s excesses during the final days of fighting were gaining strength, the United Nations essentially gave him a clean sheet. On 27 May, during a special session called to discuss Sri Lanka, the UN’s Human Rights Council (HRC) passed a resolution praising Colombo’s war policy, and without demanding anything of it in the current post-war context. The HRC went as far as to say that it “Welcomes the continued commitment of Sri Lanka to the promotion and protection of all human rights and encourages it to continue to uphold its human rights obligations and the norms of international human rights law.”
That such a biased and uncritical assessment emerged from what can be seen as the highest human-rights body in the world is extremely disappointing. But a deeper look into the workings of the HRC reveals that the decision should not have been unexpected. Established in 2006, the body is an intergovernmental committee made up of 47 members, elected for three-year terms. The positions taken by the HRC are those backed by a majority of the governments as put to a vote – not that of senior UN staff. The Lanka resolution, for instance, was passed despite the urging of Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, that an independent probe was necessary into the abuses committed by both sides of the conflict.
In this sense, Sri Lanka’s victory in the HRC was not a reflection of global admiration for its war. Rather, it was an indicator of the manner in which alliances are being reconfigured, both regionally and globally. A split between the Global North and South, which has been a part of most HRC sessions, was pronounced this time around as well. To begin with, the request for a special session on Sri Lanka was led by the Western countries, including Britain, France, Germany and Canada. Meanwhile, a group of Asian members, including India, Pakistan and China, maintained that the whole undertaking was unnecessary – eventually even walking out of a pre-session meeting.
When the HRC finally convened, the 47 members were split. On one side was a resolution, put forward by Switzerland and backed by the European countries, that made two primary demands: that international aid agencies be given unfettered access to the camps for displaced individuals, and that an inquiry (by the Sri Lankan government) be launched into alleged war crimes committed during the conflict. The other position was the one that finally passed, supported by the countries of the Global South. After much haggling, 29 countries (all non-Western, including Russia) voted for this position while 12 opposed (all European). Six others (Argentina, Gabon, Japan, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine) chose to remain ‘neutral’.
Power play
Flush from the victory, Sri Lanka is now spewing aggressive rhetoric on the motivations of the countries opposing the resolution. Dayan Jayatileka, the head of the Sri Lankan mission in Geneva, accused the West of seeking to impose “humanitarian imperialism” on the countries of the South. Similarly, countries voting for the resolution said they did so based on the argument that the war was a “domestic” matter for Colombo to handle as it saw fit. This is undoubtedly a strategic step for these states, including Saudi Arabia, Cuba and Malaysia, who wish to remain free of international scrutiny themselves.
While accusations of ‘imperialism’ are excessive, it is also important to note that the hypocrisy of the West is as damaging to the effectiveness of the HRC as the sovereignty arguments of the Southern governments. For instance, Sri Lanka was, justifiably, criticised for the high number of casualties and people forced from their home during the war. But these voices have been silent about the fighting in the Swat Valley, which has now displaced more than 800,000 people. The NATO countries also seem to lose their powers of speech when it comes to speaking out against American drone attacks on civilians in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan. That the West has much at stake in both countries is the only explanation for this barefaced double standard. None of this, of course, excuses Colombo’s conduct. And it does not bode well for the region that all three Southasian members of the HRC – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh – voted for the resolution. The first two went still further, co-sponsoring the original draft presented to the body by Sri Lanka as well as working to prevent the adoption of a more-critical document put before the Council.
On the island itself, the HRC resolution is an unmitigated victory for President Rajapakse, especially in terms of the publicity value it affords. But it does not change the reality on the ground. No laudatory resolutions can alter the high number of civilians killed during the final months of the war. While the official figures from the UN and Colombo stand at about 8000, independent groups put the final death toll for the last two months of the war at 20,000 civilians. There are also reports that the Sri Lankan Army shelled heavily populated areas, even when it knew the Tamil Tigers were using civilians as human shields. (The doctor who reported the shelling to the world is currently detained by the Colombo authorities.) In the post-war context, the resolution also allows Colombo to avoid scrutiny of its treatment of the estimated 300,000 Tamils currently languishing in camps, many of which might be more aptly described as prisons. Humanitarian and aid organisations still do not have full access to these camps, and this is unlikely to change soon; all the HRC resolution has to say on the matter is that access should be granted “as may be appropriate”.
Independent reports from inside the country prove that the presence of humanitarian agencies is much needed, and long overdue. So dire is the situation in the camps that Sri Lanka’s then-Chief Justice Sarath N Silva himself has said that the displaced communities have no hope of justice in their own country. Similarly, a recent report by the respected group University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) warns that the camps “have become lucrative business for some government ministers, their hangers on who undersupply food parcels and charge for the whole amount and make a tidy pile of money by selling timber, and for those put to guard the inmates making money by releasing those who could afford.”
Already oblivious to criticism, however, the international stamp of approval has only emboldened the bombastic Sri Lankan government. Just two weeks after the Council’s laudatory resolution, Colombo called off a two-year-old investigation – by a commission appointed by the president himself – into previous claims of 16 specific instances of alleged abuses by both sides. Only seven of the cases had been investigated when the commission’s mandate expired, and was not renewed.
All in all, today it seems almost blithe to say that the end of the war has not resulted in much improvement in the human-rights situation of Sri Lanka. In the north, Tamil refugees continue to live in dismal conditions, virtual prisoners of the government, just as they had been under the Tigers. In the south, the harassment of journalists and others critical of the regime continues unabated. It is a damning indictment of the Rajapakse government that after the ‘collateral damage’ of thousands dead – be they civilians, soldiers or rebels – hundreds of thousands displaced and billions of dollars spent, Sri Lanka is not a safer home for its long-suffering people. As for the HRC resolution – while remaining critical of Western double standards – the coming together of Southasia’s antagonistic governments for an unethical purpose is shameful.