Five days after Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran, this volatile new war shows no signs of winding down. What began with a series of Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites, military leaders, and scientists has escalated into a tit-for-tat exchange, with civilians in Israel and Iran bearing the brunt of the damage.

While Israel has claimed initial tactical victories — establishing aerial dominance and carrying out coordinated operations inside Iranian territory — it now faces mounting retaliation. Iran’s nightly missile attacks have repeatedly overwhelmed Israel’s air defenses, including in major urban centers, killing at least 24 people. In Iran, health officials say Israel’s attacks have killed well over 200 people and wounded more than 1,000 others.

Despite the initial show of force, Israel’s strategy remains murky — besides seeking to pressure the United States to join the war. And with its economy teetering, over 100,000 citizens stranded abroad, and public fear growing under intense bombardment, the long-term viability of this new war effort is not yet clear. All the while, Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza continues unabated.

To help make sense of Israel’s motivations in opening up a new front and assess what the coming days and weeks might bring, +972 spoke with Ori Goldberg, a leading Israeli academic and political commentator who has spent years studying the Iranian regime.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Why do you think Israel decided to launch a full-scale war against Iran right now, considering it’s already in a multi-front, multi-year war with an overstretched reserve army?

Ori Goldberg. (Courtesy)

Netanyahu’s claim that the attack was about preventing an immediate threat to Israeli national security is not just facetious, it’s fictitious. I think it was really an attempt to realign the world behind Israel.

The reason Netanyahu felt he had to do that, even at the cost of starting a full-fledged war, was that Israel had exhausted pretty much all of its options in Gaza after a nearly two-year long genocidal campaign. From military action that has failed to return the hostages, to the new Gaza Humanitarian Foundation “aid centers” [that have so far failed to facilitate widespread ethnic cleansing] — nothing Israel was doing in Gaza seemed to catch on. So Netanyahu did what he has done throughout the past two years: open up another front.

Iran was much easier for him [than other fronts] because the idea that the Islamic Republic must be dealt with using military means is perhaps the broadest, most solid consensus in Israeli politics. I think Netanyahu wanted to make political gains and ensure his personal status and future — above all, postponing his trial — as well as try to drag the world into this conflict by forcing, at the very least, the United States to side with Israel.

By the way, an attack this elaborate, with so many people outside Iran and people operating inside Iran to deploy drones — this could not have been in response to an imminent threat; it has obviously been planned for years. So it was a question of timing, and timing is always political.

Having launched the attack, do you think Netanyahu is now aiming to force a new nuclear agreement on better terms, to bring about regime change, or something else?

It’s everything and nothing. I think the truth is Israel isn’t committed to any one of those goals. And it’s good to have multiple goals, because if you don’t succeed in one, you can always point at another and say, “This is what I was actually trying to do.”

Strategically, Israel’s only real MO — as always — appears to be targeted assassinations of senior IRGC leaders. The drone attacks and bombings haven’t neutralized Iran’s entire array of air defenses. Israel has now issued evacuation orders for neighborhoods in Tehran; it seems to think Tehran is Beirut or Gaza.

According to the national security strategy that Netanyahu seems to be promoting, success looks like Israel being able to do whatever it wants, whenever it wants, without paying a price. Iran posed the biggest challenge in that respect, so Netanyahu basically said to the rest of the world, “I’ll see you and raise you — I’ll start a war with Iran.” That’s why I think all of this is happening.

Meanwhile, Iran is making its own calculations. I think it understands that it’s better in the medium- and long-term to absorb Israel’s aggression, demonstrating that it has the resolve to withstand such pressure, than to go all out and enter a suicidal war that it can’t win.

Still, Iran is firing missiles that are getting through Israel’s air defenses and killing Israelis on a nightly basis. They are making the entire country sleepless. I haven’t slept in four nights, and I’m as afraid as I’ve been in a while.

People take shelter in an underground train station in Tel Aviv during ongoing missile attacks from Iran, June 17, 2025. (Chaim Goldberg/Flash90)

How significant were the initial Israeli strikes on Iran targeting senior military leaders and scientists? And how significant have the subsequent attacks been now that Iran has its defenses up?

Israel’s strategy of targeted assassinations has never worked apart from in the very short term. My sense is that the Islamic Republic’s leadership is back on track. This is not Hezbollah, where if you kill Hassan Nasrallah then you’ve really decapitated the organization.

So while the attack was very elaborate and sophisticated with multiple fronts and multiple targets, which took Iran by surprise, Israel nevertheless overreached — exactly as it did in Gaza. And with every day that passes, Israel gets further bogged down.

While it’s true that Israel has established aerial dominance, Iran has yet to deploy the heaviest missiles in its arsenal. And it has shown that it is not averse to firing with intent to kill civilians, despite mostly aiming at military targets.

Given the unprecedented level of destruction, human casualties, and fear inside Israel right now, how sustainable do you gauge this situation to be? Especially given that much of the Israeli economy isn’t really functioning, and the airport remains closed.

So far, most of the casualties have been old people, refugees from Ukraine, and Palestinians — people who are very much at the periphery of Israeli society. So the real sense of impending death is still far away. But the images [of the destruction] really are unprecedented.

Fire rises from the Bazan power plant in the northern Israeli city of Haifa after an Iranian attack, June 15, 2025. (Mordekay Baliti/Flash90)

I don’t see Israeli public opinion shifting significantly. The entire country is thirsty for a win after failing so abysmally in Gaza. But I also see Israelis generally drifting away from politics, and moving into personal survival mode: they will line up and buy supplies, they will not go to work, they will care for their kids, and generally do what has to be done. But I don’t see them rushing to enlist for a ground war against Iran.

Do you see a ground war as realistic?

Israel is now at a stage where its strategy is based on constant escalation. It always has to turn the volume up. And the only way to turn the volume up now is to insert special operations troops into Iran, or perform a [full-scale] ground invasion.

I understand that Israel’s elite 98^th division was taken out of Gaza and told to prepare for the expansion of war with Iran. But while that’s all great rhetoric, I don’t see it happening. I think a ground war is the most unrealistic option of all. Basically, Israel overreached, and it is now stuck.

How do you see the war with Iran affecting the ongoing war in Gaza and negotiations with Hamas?

There are reports that Iran has approached both Israel and the United States through third parties to initiate talks to end the war. If the Iranians are smart, they will demand that Trump force Israel to sign an agreement that will end the war in Gaza too. I think the end of the war in Gaza and the end of the war with Iran are intimately connected — not because the Iranians are great patrons of the Palestinians, but because of Israel.

The real test for the international community is reigning Israel in. Israel has gone completely rogue: it feels like it has absolutely nothing to lose, that it’s setting its own rules and does whatever it wants. So this is about the international community stepping in and saying, “If you keep doing this, you’re going to be the new South Africa, at the very least.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu poses for a picture with French President Emmanuel Macron at the Prime Minister’s Residence in Jerusalem, January 22, 2020. (Marc Israel Sellem/POOL)

However, I don’t know if the world is up to the task. [Western leaders] are still saying that Israel has the right to defend itself. [French President] Emmanuel Macron said it, [UK Prime Minister] Keir Starmer said it, and of course [Germany’s Chancellor] Friedrich Merz said it. But I think in this case, it’s less about rhetoric and more about action.

At this point Netanyahu both doesn’t care anymore, and is firmly convinced that Israeli security is dependent on this complete freedom of action to do whatever it wants without paying a price.

How do you see the war evolving over the coming days or weeks? What are the best- and worst-case scenarios?

I’m not sure what the English equivalent is to the Hebrew expression להשתין מהמקפצה [“pissing from the diving board,” meaning acting brazenly], but Israel really is doing just that. It’s doing whatever the hell it wants, with absolutely no regard for anybody else’s interests. And that includes the United States.

I don’t think this war will be over in days, but I think it’s sensible to assume that as we head into next week there will already be talks about ending it. I don’t think Israel will be allowed to enjoy total impunity for much longer. There are going to be calls to answer for at least some of what it has been doing.

Nobody’s bought the whole “preventive strike” narrative. So I think, at least to some extent, Israel is going to have to suffer the consequences of its actions.

That’s surprisingly optimistic.

I am an incurable optimist. Of course, I also live here, so if Israel suffers the consequences of its actions my life is not necessarily going to get better. So, you know, I’m optimistic and masochistic at the same time.

Amos Brison

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