Magdalena Biejat (Nowa Lewica) and Adrian Zandberg (Razem)

When this year’s presidential campaign began, left-wing voters could only hope it would end quickly and that the left wouldn’t suffer another embarrassment like Magdalena Ogórek’s results in 2015 (2.38%) [Ogórek was the Democratic Left Alliance’s controversial candidate who later shifted to right-wing politics] or Robert Biedroń’s in 2020 (2.22%) [Biedroń is the founder of Wiosna Spring party and a prominent LGBT+ activist]. It seemed that the small pool of left-wing votes, some of which would flow to Rafał Trzaskowski, Warsaw Mayor and the liberal KO [Civic Platform] presidential candidate in the first round contradict would be fought over by as many as five candidates: Magdalena Biejat [New Left senator and feminist activist], Joanna Senyszyn [veteran left-wing politician and former Democratic Left Alliance MP], Piotr Szumlewicz [trade union leader and former Razem member], Waldemar Witkowski [chairman of the Labour Union, a minor social-democratic party], and finally Adrian Zandberg [co-founder of the Razem party].

Today, hours before the end of the campaign, the mood on the left is completely different. Both parliamentary left wings – Bielat’s Nowa Lewica which supports the liberal government and the opposition Razem party – can be pleased with a good campaign. Polls give hope not only that both Magda Biejat and Adrian Zandberg will more than double the 2015 results of Biedroń and Ogórek, but also that their combined result might even exceed 10%. If we add another 1-2% for Joanna Senyszyn, the left might achieve its best result in presidential elections since Grzegorz Napieralski’s 2010 record 13.68% of votes. It would be a surprise similar to Die Linke’s unexpected success in the German Bundestag [parliamentary] elections in February this year.

“Atomic Populism”

If this surprise actually materialises, the left will owe it not only to their good campaign work, but also to two other factors: the weakness of the liberal fronrrunner Trzaskowski’s campaign, who, since becoming the Civic Platform candidate, hasn’t made a single gesture towards the more progressive electorate, whilst making plenty towards conservative and free-market voters; and disappointment with both the current coalition government and the quality of the right-wing opposition.

Zandberg and his campaign primarily benefit from the latter phenomenon. Unlike Biejat, Zandberg has this year focused on a message addressed to voters who want to show the current government at least a yellow, if not a red card, and are not inclined to extend their credit of trust.

Judging by the turnout at recent rallies of the Razem candidate, his polling peaks, and the atmosphere surrounding his campaign in social media – this strategy has found its niche. If on Sunday 17 May Zandberg actually delivers on his polling highs, it will mean that he has successfully reached voters who didn’t vote for the left in the 15 October parliamentary elections. Including many of those for whom this Presidential election is the first one in which they can vote. In an Opinion 24 poll for “Newsweek”, Zandberg has 20% support in the 18-29 age group, and all indications are that his support will concentrate there.

Certainly, Zandberg was helped in reaching this electorate by the weak performance of dome minor left candidates, as well as the campaign mistakes of the far right Konfederacija (Confederation) candidate Sławomir Mentzen. The key moment might have been the Confederation candidate’s interview on Kanał Zero where he declared that in his ideal world, Poles would pay for university education – which, in an election campaign where one is so dependent on young, often student voters, is the worst thing one can say.

Zandberg wouldn’t have capitalised on these opportunities without a good, inventive campaign capable of flooding the public sphere with memes about the “mighty Dane”. The song “I’m Voting for Adrian, na na na” is certainly the most memorable cultural artefact produced in this year’s election. The message of the Razem candidate was also interesting. Zandberg hasn’t changed his views on human rights or redistribution; when asked about progressive taxes or LGBT+ rights, he said what he always has. At the same time, the campaign didn’t focus on these issues. What one can mainly remember from it are the promise of a “Poland built on atom and silicon” and outrage at the “trough-feeding” [political self-serving and corruption] of mainstream politicians. These slogans appealed to two emotions that the left has had some problems with in the past: first, an anti-establishment sentiment, and second, an aspirational one. [...] Zandberg and his campaign tapped into a patriotic emotion, appealing not so much to an abstract vision of a good, socially just state, but to the desire for Poland here and now to become truly strong and just.

Interestingly, this was also accompanied by a clear – compared to several previous left-wing campaigns – “remasculinisation” of the message. It’s not just about reaching for postulates circulating in men’s rights communities, but about the entire image of Zandberg as a giant, a Viking, a “lumberjack president”. All of this was of course highly ironic, but this irony was also a way to convey emotions and longings that the left had previously avoided in their communication.

[Razem is known for its strong advocacy for reproductive rights and abortion access, opposition to the strict abortion laws implemented under the conservative PiS governments, support for LGBT+ rights, and gender equality. In 2017, they organized protests against Donald Trump’s visit to Poland where protesters dressed as handmaids from “The Handmaid’s Tale” to symbolize concerns about women’s rights. [AN]

If I were to characterise Zandberg’s message from this campaign in the briefest terms, I would describe it as “atomic populism”. The Razem candidate managed to be both populist – in the sense of basing his message on the dichotomy between “trough-feeders” and “Poles tired of them” – and substantive in his aspirational message. Against the backdrop of the programmatic barrenness and lack of vision of the main parties, the Razem vision of “Poland built on atom and silicon”, embedded in a broad diagnosis of contemporary geopolitics and civilisational changes, could sound very substantive.

The Flag Effect

It’s difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when Zandberg’s campaign took off. It started very well from the beginning and gained momentum with each passing week. Against this background, Biejat’s campaign looked weak for a long time. This was also because the New Left candidate had a much more difficult task in this campaign than Zandberg. It’s easier, especially in presidential elections, to run a campaign against everyone than to explain one’s achievements in a government that so far has been unable to fulfill many important promises to its voters. Especially when one is a junior partner, often having problems pushing through key demands.

The achievements of the left in government – the widow’s pension, making Christmas Eve a public holiday, increased funeral allowance – though important, have limited electoral reach. They either reach a fairly limited group of voters, or introduce changes too minor to build the kind of political capital that could be built on something like the Family 500+ programme [a €120 child benefit programme introduced by PiS in 2016]. While Zandberg outlined a vision of far-reaching change – not having to worry that in the near future he would actually face the question of how to implement it – Biejat tried to defend a more evolutionary approach, a policy based on difficult, often frustrating negotiation of small changes.

[Magdalena Biejat and several other MPs left Razem in October 2024. This was a significant split in the Polish left. The split occurred because Razem voted to leave the “Lewica” (Left) parliamentary caucus and position itself as an opposition force, criticizing the ruling coalition from the left and holding the government accountable. Biejat’s faction believed they could accomplish more by remaining within the Lewica caucus and working within the governing coalition to push for progressive policies. After leaving Razem, Biejat joined the Nowa Lewica party and later became their candidate for this 2025 Polish presidential election. She currently serves as Deputy Marshal (Speaker) of the Senate. [AN]]

The breakthrough moment for Biejat’s campaign was the second televised candidates’ debate in Końskie. [During the debate, the PiS-backed candidate Karol Nawrocki attempted to create a symbolic moment by placing two flags on the debate podiums - a Polish national flag (white and red) on his own podium, and an LGBT+ rainbow flag on Rafał Trzaskowski’s podium (the Civic Platform candidate). This was meant as a political provocation, implying that Trzaskowski prioritized LGBT+ issues over national identity. Trzaskowski promptly removed the rainbow flag from his podium and set it aside, seemingly wanting to avoid the divisive symbolism.

At this point, Magdalena Biejat saw an opportunity and stated: “I saw that you hid the rainbow flag. I’m not ashamed of it, I’d gladly take it from you.” She then walked over to Trzaskowski, took the flag, and placed it prominently on her own podium, declaring she was proud of Poland and proud that Poland’s rainbow citizens choose to live in the country. [AN]]

From that moment on, Biejat’s campaign really took off, which in the end also began to translate into good polls. If the New Left candidate is not overestimated in these polls, the team can be satisfied, even if – with support at around 5% – she wins slightly lower support than Zandberg.

Between Biejat and Zandberg, there are essentially no noticeable programmatic differences except for one, today the most important for the left: whether it’s worth remaining in Tusk’s government, or whether one must move into decisive opposition. This difference translated into a different communication style for both campaigns. The New Left candidate’s campaign was free from populist emotion, appealing to pragmatism, the necessity of recognising political realities, politics as the art of making good, small changes. Zandberg, echoing Jarosław Kaczyński, told his voters: “enough with left-wing impossibilism” or, following Mickiewicz, “measure strength by intentions, not intentions by strength”. Biejat responded to this with “let’s finally start behaving like adults”. As one might expect, just as Zandberg will have his peak support in the under-30 electorate, Biejat will have hers in a slightly older group, for whom the political maximalism of Zandberg’s campaign may be less convincing, and may even sound naive.

Biejat managed to present herself in this campaign as a competent, pragmatic politician, clearly standing for certain values. She may thus become an alternative for progressive voters of the 15 October coalition who weren’t convinced by Trzaskowski’s campaign, but who don’t yet want to write off the current government.

What Next?

It’s hard to say that either left wing candidate introduced any new ideas into the public debate this year. However, they managed to fight for space for a left-wing message, moving left wing ideas on issues such as housing policy closer to what constitutes social common sense.

Both left wing candidates clearly marked their differences, but apart from the ’exchange of courtesies’ between activists of both parties on social media, barely visible to the average voter, their disagreements didn’t take a form that could deter voters from both candidates. It may turn out that the division has done the left good. At least in these elections. What next?

If Biejat and Zandberg deliver good results, the left will have two leaders from the generation of 40-year-olds – young by Polish political standards – who are more “built up” than any left-wing politician has been for a long time. And if Trzaskowski wins, this political capital could be multiplied in early elections to replace him as Major of Warsaw.

The key decision will be whether the left should run on a single list in the next parliamentary elections. Zandberg’s result above 5%, especially if he clearly beats Biejat, increases the chances of this scenario. However, Razem may find that it’s difficult to maintain a young, generally anti-system electorate in the long run. The division that worked in the presidential election doesn’t necessarily have to work in the parliamentary one – but let’s wait until the end of the current campaign before discussing scenarios for those elections.

To all this, we must add a few sentences about Joanna Senyszyn’s campaign. [An old guard figure of the former Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) - the post-communist party that was once dominant on the Polish left but has since declined in influence] her goal was to undermine Biejat’s campaign and strike at [the Nowa Lewica leadership]. However, it doesn’t appear that Senyszyn particularly harmed Biejat; rather, she emerged in this campaign as a sympathetically eccentric third-tier candidate. As another left-wing voice in the debates, Senyszyn tilted the field to the left, which generally helped rather than hindered the left.

Jakub Majmurek