While we were discussing the agreement that would give rise to the “Geringonça”, the [governing right wing] PSD and CDS were offering the national airline TAP to David Neelman and preparing to sell the national train company CP and Lisbon and Porto’s mass transport systems, after having already privatised almost everything that remained. Even before the elections, they had created new legal obstacles to accessing abortion. Limitations to the right to strike were on the agenda.

During the ’troika’ [EU imposed conditional financial support to Portugal], unemployment soared, wages retreated twenty years and GDP fifteen. The right wing pointed to pensioners and civil servants as problems and did everything to cut labour income [1]. The European Union refused any change of course and in political debate, the existence of an “arc of governance” that would coincide with European alignment was asserted. Those who refused this alignment would not count for anything [2].

Meanwhile, the “To hell with the troika” demonstrations brought together crowds, and broad sectors of the left met at Aula Magna, in trade union struggles and in new activism by pensioners or debt auditing groups. Against all predictions, in the 2015 elections, the left had almost 20% of votes [3]. Suddenly, hope became strength in votes and opened up a new possibility in the Portuguese landscape. The coalition right won the elections, but PS and the left have a majority and give substance to the popular demand for change. The right had to leave.

The Geringonça was a product of that time. Of the urgency that ran through the life of each person and also of trade unions, local authorities, small businesses, NGOs. When the possibility of change opened up, the whole country embraced it. It was like coming up for air and finally being able to breathe.

But the Geringonça was also the context of European Union and capital pressures, of impossibilities self-imposed by PS, of impasses. Whoever thought one day that it would have been good to have left-wing ministers in government, instead of just a parliamentary agreement, should know that such a government would have fallen in little more than a month, with the resolution of Banif [4].

The left conquered what had never been done before, but ended up in the thankless position of handing over government to PS. And we knew the risks.

Some remember the obstacles imposed by Cavaco Silva, who demanded a written agreement to recognise the new majority in parliament. In truth, it was an enormous help. Unlike Bloco, the PCP preferred to have nothing in writing. As quickly became clear, PS agreed with the right on everything that wasn’t explicitly agreed upon.

Between 2015 and 2019, there was a period of recovery of rights, of labour income and, no less importantly, of defeating austerity as a hegemonic idea. The annual update of the minimum wage and pensions, free textbooks or transport passes are now taken for granted. Almost a decade later, it might be difficult to think there was a time when all this was considered irresponsible and provoked Brussels’ wrath.

Simultaneously, PS postponed planned public investment and relied on the right for decisions about the financial system, energy or real estate market. Changes to labour legislation were postponed until the end of the mandate and ended up being voted on with PSD’s support.

By the 2019 elections, popular support for these 5 years’ achievements would give victory to PS. The costs of what was postponed would only become visible later. Bloco, unlike PCP, opted for public and permanent confrontation throughout the legislature [5]. In the elections, we withstood the pressure and maintained the same number of MPs. PCP lost almost a third of its parliamentary group. PS won without a majority and the new legislature requires negotiation.

After the elections, Bloco proposed a new written agreement. PS refused and had PCP’s comfort; everything would be seen measure by measure. This opened the field for PS to govern by blackmail [6]. In public debate, the left would always bear the burden of sectarianism when refusing what PS wanted to impose. Forces like PAN or Livre helped this narrative. Meanwhile, through the combination of the crystallisation of some traditional trade unionism and the ongoing reconfiguration on the right, a new agenda determined by the far-right emerges. All political debate became murkier.

Bloco considered it had no conditions to reject the legislature’s first budget, at a time when PS was still reaping the fruits of the geringonça. We were at the beginning of 2020. A pandemic would follow and an enormous sense of insecurity throughout society. António Costa bets on fear and wins. Unlike Bloco, PCP still approves the State Budget for 2021. The following budget doesn’t pass and, with the crisis provoked this provoked, in 2022, PS achieves the absolute majority it had been preparing since 2019. It would end up losing it again a little more than a year later, flinging open the doors to the right and far-right.

It’s certain that no one could predict the pandemic’s impact, but we must recognise that it only accelerated what was already happening and with errors that favoured the right. On the left, there was the dazzlement of some sectors (including in Bloco’s sphere) by institutional negotiation instead of public confrontation and social movement. In the PS, there was an absolute refusal to make changes to the economy’s structure.

Catarina Martins

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