August 9 was the 62^nd anniversary of the atomic
devastation of Nagasaki. It is an appropriate, if
sad, occasion to look at the military as well as
energy implications of the India-US nuclear
agreement.

The nuclear deal is as much about weapons as
civilian power. Not only does it recognise India
as a “responsible” state "with advanced nuclear
technology"; it specifically distinguishes
between India’s civilian and military nuclear
facilities while placing the former under
international inspections (safeguards). Its
Article 2.4 affirms that its purpose is "not to
affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of
either party“or to”hinder or otherwise
interfere“with any other activities involving”material and technology“acquired or developed”independent of this agreement for their own
purposes".

Put simply, India can produce and stockpile as
much weapons-grade material as it likes in its
unsafeguarded and military-nuclear facilities,
including dedicated weapons-grade plutonium
producers like Dhruva, the uranium enrichment
plant near Mysore, the Prototype Fast-Breeder
Reactor (PFBR) under construction, and the eight
power reactors (of a total of 22 operating or
planned ones) exempted from the agreed separation
plan.

According to an International Panel on Fissile
Materials report, the eight reactors alone will
yield 1,250 kg of weapons-grade plutonium a year,
enough to build 250 Nagasaki-type bombs. In
addition, the PFBR and Dhruva will respectively
produce 130 and 20-25 kg of plutonium annually.
India can use imported uranium for its
safeguarded reactors and dedicate scarce domestic
uranium exclusively to military uses, generating
up to 200 kg of plutonium after reprocessing.

This will each year allow India to more than
triple its existing estimated plutonium inventory
of 500 kg, itself enough for 100 warheads. The
deal leaves India free to build even more
weapons-dedicated facilities. Surely, this puts
India’s potential nuclear arsenal way beyond the
realm of a “minimum deterrent”. This should put
paid to the argument that the deal will cap
India’s nuclear-military capability. If anything,
the deal panders to India’s vaulting nuclear
ambitions.

Washington made unique exceptions in the global
non-proliferation order for India primarily to
recruit it as a close, if subordinate, strategic
ally for reasons elaborated since 2000 by
Condoleezza Rice, Ashley Tellis and Philip
Zelikow, among others. A strong rationale was to
create a counterfoil to China, and an anchor
within a US-dominated Asian security
architecture, on a par with Japan and Israel.

There’s a price to pay for this. This isn’t
merely acquiescence in US strategic-political
plans, or accommodation to Washington’s pressures
in respect of Iran. It also, critically, lies in
potentially triggering a regional nuclear-arms
race and abandoning the fight for global nuclear
disarmament. It is sordid that India, long an
apostle of nuclear disarmament, should end up
apologising for mass-annihilation weapons.

Will the deal help India achieve energy security?
Nuclear power is a hazardous and accident-prone
energy source.
Its radiation is an invisible but deadly poison;
it leaves extremely toxic wastes which remain
active for thousands of years. No solution to the
waste-storage, leave alone disposal, problem is
on the horizon.

Nuclear power is costly. A Massachusetts
Institute of Technology study estimates US unit
costs of 6.7 cents for nuclear, 4.2 cents for
coal, and 3.8-5.6 cents for gas. In India, power
from nuclear plants under construction will cost
Rs 3-plus. But the winning bid for the coal-based
Sasan project is only Rs 1.20.

Nuclear power has a bleak future worldwide -
despite global warming, which the nuclear
industry claims it can mitigate. Nuclear power
can only make an insignificant contribution to
greenhouse gas reduction. A just-published Oxford
Research Group study says that for nuclear
industry’s contribution to be significant, the
global industry would have to construct about one
reactor a week for 60 years - an absurdity.

Nuclear power in India is less than 3 per cent of
its total electricity capacity. Even if its
utopian mid-century targets materialise, nuclear
power will only contribute 6-7 per cent to power
generation. What price are we paying for it?