The only thing left is for dirt barricades to go up between neighborhoods, as in the past, and for our identity to be hijacked once again. Why not? This week, all types of “armed appearances” spread throughout our streets and cities with extraordinary ease, even reaching Lebanon. The younger generation, who has certainly never participated in the war rituals of the past, has nonetheless learned all of these old maneuvers. Even some of the old flashpoints have regained their prominence. The killed and wounded fell as a result of heavy gunfire and bombs, which were perhaps concussion grenades, but horrifying all the same.
The only thing we hope for now is that no one dares to belittle our labels, by granting the name of “martyr” to the dead who perished in this ugly practice. They are the victims of an insane confrontation that is not worthy of people dying. No matter what the purpose of either party is, and whoever they are affiliated with, it should not lead to the deaths of so many people, which is what will happen if the situation continues as it is. Perhaps the first thing that should be said before any more words or analysis is a declaration of absolute rejection of the logic of slipping into a civil war in Lebanon today.
For the record, it must be stated that all the possible ills that are bandied about regarding civil war are largely correct. However, there is something that could be said for it in defense of the Palestinian resistance, which once made its home in Lebanon. Perhaps, possibly, we can justify the willingness for sacrifice in Lebanon for a higher purpose that goes to the heart of all our core ideals. However, this must be left for another discussion. What is more important is to stress the different context existing today, given that the entire Arab region is dominated by the threat of disintegration: the disintegration of states and their regression into sectarian and tribal clans, and the risk of an honor system growing between unchecked entities, whereby civil disputes varying in scope, intensity and violence become a way of life.
This week’s events in Lebanon are the logical and expected results of the spread of the present vertical division, which is characterized by one dominating characteristic, the impossibility for this structure to develop, to produce anything other than itself or to move out of the domain in which it was born. It is a stagnant and barren division, which could more easily be defined as the “majority” camp and the “minority” camp, even if this or that naming could really express the reality. There are two equal blocs and each has a substantial amount of power. There may be surprises or alterations in structural components here or there, but these are irrelevant because vertical divisions are stagnant and barren. When it continues, it surpasses itself and turns into a crisis with no solution, which ends in extreme tension and explosion.
The truth is, this trend expresses the mutual failure of the two camps, as neither is proposing a national solution that could generate a dynamic capable of polarizing the masses. By polarization, this does not mean reaching a consensus, but moving the debate and the conflict to a level that expresses wider social, political and economic issues, which address the interests of each individual and each group, and which facilitates the creation of a public space for developing cultural and political affiliations.
It is not enough to say here, and rightly so, that such choices are obscured by the present divisions. Mr. Fouad Siniora represents the force biased to a project aimed at administrating the region according to the American vision. This is the vision that Europe caters too as well, either by conviction or inability to do otherwise, it doesn’t matter. It also appeals to a growing Arab reaction, in line with the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the overpowering sectarian fighting between the Shiites and Sunnis. The growing fear of Iran could also possibly constitute a key to the dominance of this vision over the region.
Meanwhile, opposition to this vision is represented in those forces which are confronting this project. It is not enough just to say this, however, because it is far removed from basic class-oriented analyses, according to which the poor areas in Tabana neighborhood of Tripoli are not justified in their stance supporting Siniora. This is a group, defined by sociological and scientific research, as the most despondent in Lebanon. Hence, this is one example, proving the efficacy of Siniora’s bribery of this sector, something which has become widespread in Lebanon. This might facilitate matters for his faction, but will not determine them.
It is worthy to note that the prevailing self-awareness in Lebanon today revolves, first and foremost, around the split between Shiites and Sunnis. In addition to this split, however, is another dimension, which has the potential to play a role in creating allies within this division, stemming from self-interest. This is particularly true in regard to the Christian representatives, who, through this affiliation, express their recently suffered marginalization within Lebanon, not on demographic or social grounds, which remains limited by nature, but in relation to the vertical split in the region.
Moreover, the importance of the regional factor and its penetration into the local balance of powers in each country, becomes a prominent, if not dominating, factor. This is an indicator of the continuing force of the link between the parts of this region, according to what is “provincial,” if we allow ourselves to use these pan-Arab terms. This is exactly what the Sunni bloc in Iraq is employing when it praises itself for reaching into the Arab depth by refusing to accept itself as a minority. The continuation of this link could be described as a hindrance to the durability of modern countries. Today, it is said that this is manifesting itself negatively, in that it facilitates the spread of crisis and destruction. This is all true, but it does not negate objective observation.
The opposition’s lack of efficiency is worrisome. It was dragged into an already doomed confrontation given this vertical, stagnant and barren division: it did not preempt any of the government’s steps and probably did not even predict them, starting with the cabinet meeting, held to take key decisions regardless of the ministers’ resignation, an ending with an escalation of civil disobedience, which ranged between reaching a stalemate and descent into bloodshed. The opposition seemed to be planning on its own without considering the strategic reactions of its opponent. Finally, it was not able to extract national legitimacy for its positions or prove its credibility. This is where the crisis lies. The mechanism for a general awareness of something is more important than the actual thing. General awareness is followed by the interpretation of any position or speech, which overrides any subsequent explanations to eliminate unnecessary “misunderstandings.” Hence, the opposition forces were not able to remove themselves from the accusation that they was working within dictates designed by Iranian-Syrian interests and therefore, this general awareness prevailed over its moves and the interpretation of its positions.
If Mr. Siniora really represents what he says he does, no one is waiting for him or his associates to develop the national settlement project in Lebanon—or a revolution for those who do not want a settlement. Rather, they will wait for those forces in opposition to American dominance to deliver this. The production of national consciousness or a new social pact for Lebanon has not begun yet, which is what would enable the vertical, stagnant and barren division to encompass all other components and to absorb everything that has been said and done as long as it stays haphazard. One example is that critique of the Paris 3 project, the meetings for which took place this week, have become just a tease, not heard or received. Rather, the general strike has been belittled and “sabotaged” the international meeting held the next day. Even the victims themselves became a commodity at Paris 3: one party saying the country is unqualified for investment as long as there is no political settlement while the challenges, with criminal disregard, that the country is doing fine, and that conflict is manufactured by certain forces. In both cases, Paris 3 turned into a tool in the local battle, stripped of any other dimension. Furthermore, it became material used to deepen the division and to push it towards more dangerous interactions. It seems as though it is just one pit stop for international intervention, foreshadowing a repetition of what took place in Iraq, even if by other methods.