THE military regime in Egypt since 1952 has been analysed in remarkably
divergent terms. observers and specialists alike have tended to emphasize
two main aspects: nationalism and dictatorship. In spite of many
differences the European Left has come close to the general and mostly
adverse conclusions agreed upon by the leading political scientists of
the West. The main difference is that whereas the Right has felt, and
still feels, a deeply rooted hatred of “Nasserism,” the Left is still seeking
a way out of its confusion while at the same time deploring the political
repression against the Egyptian Left.

In Egypt itself, these past twelve years are looked upon as a revolutionary
and empirical transition from feudalism to socialism. Such
informed opinion as is able to find an outlet in the Press appears
divided between a wide range of descriptive categories: state capitalism,
the welfare state, Arab socialisn , scientific socialism, democratic and
co-operative socialism-to list only the main ones. Thus the analytical
problems involved are not only those of the hitherto West European
centred social sciences: the same difficulties and the same uncertainties
confront the Egyptian theoreticians.

This essay tries to sum up the main thesis of a recent work by the
present writer: which has provoked a wide ranging and vigorous
discussion, and it will also endeavour to take the analysis further. It
makes no claim to a final, dogmatic solution of the question, for such
an attitude would be fundamentally opposed to the author’s view of
scientific research in general.2

 I.

A first approach may be attempted at the infrastructural level, i.e.
the economic, political and sociological aspects of the rCgime. The
problems of periodization lie mostly outside the scope of this essay,
but on the basis of the work mentioned above, we can distinguish three
main stages since the coup d’e’tat of 23 July 1952.

Until then, Egypt, though enjoying a large degree of formal independence,
was in fact a semi-dependent state, ruled by the agrarian wing
of the Egyptian bourgeoisie in alliance with foreign capital, under the
aegis of the palace. Its colonial-type economy could be characterized
as an under-developed capitalistic one, with a predominantly agrarian
structure. The confusion between agrarian capitalism and feudalism
which existed in most political circles in Egypt led to the political
developments initiated by the “Free Officers” being described as antifeudal.
In fact, as all serious research has shown, the Egyptian economy
has been predominantly of the capitalistic type since the last quarter
of the nineteenth century-with large-scale production for the market,
especially of cotton, and a growing use of wage-earning labouralthough
there remained many, often deep rooted, features of (Oriental)
feudalism, especially in Upper E g p t .

From the 1919 Revolution to the coup d’e’tat of 1952, the Wafd was
allowed to rule for a bare seven years, though holding an undisputed
electoral majority. This gave more than twenty-five years to the minority
parties, representing the right-wing of the Egyptian bourgeoisie:
especially the Liberal-constitutional party, for the big landlords (since
1923); the Saadists, closely linked with the industrial and financial fastgrowing
sections of the Egyptian bourgeoisie (since 1937); the Independents,
who represented mostly the palace, foreign vested interests, and
sections of big capital. This arrangement was imposed on the Egyptian
people by military occupation, and the British gave support to whatever
forces opposed the militant national liberation movement. This policy
could work because of the inefficiency of the Wafdist leadership,
especially after 1945, as well as the repression of the Left since the
early ’thirties.

However, it was clear to all that the unsolved and growing problems
of Egypt were bound to provoke a more radical solution. This was
attempted in the violent nationalist upheaval of 1935, which brought
the Wafd back to power, and led to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936;
and also immediately after World War 11, when the re-emergent
Marxist Left, together with the trade unions and the Wafdist youth and
Liberal wing, created the Workers’ and Students’ National Committee
(1946) as a new centre of leadership for the liberation movement. It was
this alignment of forces which, after the repression of 1946 and then of
1948-50, brought back the Wafd to power in 1949, encouraged its
reluctant leadership to denounce the 1936 Treaty (in 1950), and
launched guerrilla action against the British base in the Canal Zone
(October 1950 to January 1951). The stage was thus prepared for a
“National Front” government, based on popular action and inspired
by the Left, and under the benevolent patronage of Mustapha al-Nahas,
the ageing leader of the Wafd.

On 26 January 1952, Cairo was stormed by squads of right-wing
extremists and large fires were started. The “National Front” leadership
was inept in its handling of the situation and its most active forces
were away in the Canal area; the people were apathetic, and the army
and the police forces were either benevolent towards the extremists or
indifferent. Within twenty-four hours, the country being under martial
law and curfew, the constitutiotl was suspended, the Wafd was dismissed,
and the guerrillas were arrested. Four palace-led Cabinets
failed in succession. Then, on 23 July, the “Free Officers” seized power.

1. The first stage of the military regime (1952-56) was aimed at
modifying the structure of power in order to create a modern national,
independent, industrialized society. This was achieved, at the top of
the socio-political structure, by the abolition of the monarchy and the
establishment of the Republic of Egypt, the dissolution of all existing
parties and organizations (except the Moslem Brotherhood, until 1954),
the elimination of the traditional political tlites, largely influenced by
the European, mainly French and British, liberal tradition (ah1
al-kafza: the capable men); and these were gradually replaced by a
new type of official-officers, economists, technocrats, engineers,
mostly with an American, German and British background (ah1
al-thiqd: the trusted men).4 At the bottom of the pyramid, this policy
was to be tackled by agrarian reform which sought to weaken the,
economic basis of the landowning capitalists, while greatly increasing
the number of small landowners as well as redirecting capital investment
to industry. It also aimed at the elimination of communist
influence in the countryside, which was already in ferment by 1951.
There was also formed the “Liberation Rally,” a para-military formation,
ideologically parallel to the Moslem Brotherhood. It was hoped
that local capital, mostly invested in land, would accept the official
enticement, backed by a mass of new legislation, to invest in industry
with the help of the newly established Industrial Bank and the Permanent
Council for the Development of National Production. In the
event, however, seventy per cent of new investment went into the
building industry.
In its endeavour to establish a social basis, the military rCgime
was unable to persuade the industrial and financial sections of the
Egyptian bourgeoisie to support it in the task of social transformation.

2. The second stage (1956-61) started with the Suez crisis. Having
succeeded in obtaining Britain’s agreement to the gradual but complete
evacuation of the Canal base (19 October 1954), the military government
launched its offensive against the Bagdad Pact (1954-55), and
then switched to the economic problems facing Egypt; in the first
instance, to the High Dam project. This conjunction of politicalmilitary-
economic issues brought about John Foster Dulles’ refusal of
financial aid for the High Dam scheme. This was followed by the
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the three Powers’
aggression against Egypt.
The result, to the outside world, was unexpected. Fifty-five French
and British-owned firms were either “Egyptianized” or nationalized,
under the aegis of the “Economic Institution,” which came to represent
State-owned firms as well as the initial State participation in firms. Thus
the Suez aggression inaugurated the public sector of the Egyptian
economy and provided a further incentive to economic planning. The
State was thus endowed, by imperialism, with the necessary resources
for it to become a senior partner with the most important groups among
the Egyptian bourgeoisie.
The second stage of the military rtgime thus appears as a coalition
between the military apparatus and the financial and industrial sections
of the bourgeoisie (and especially the Misr group). But this coalition,
according to the officers’ view, was to work mainly in the eccnomic
field: political control, the “power of decision,” should continue to rest
entirely in their hands.
During the early years (1956-58)-the Bandoeng period-the rtgime
appeared ready to grant a certain amount of “National Front” concessions
and measures, especially after the release of communists and
Left personalities in the middle of 1956. The publication of the leftwing
daily Al-Missri’ the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, the
elections to the “Council of the Nation,” and the establishment of the
“National Union” as the only permitted political formation, in which
the nominees of the military apparatus and their bourgeois allies found
their place, are the main new political facts of this period. In foreign
affairs, the doctrine of positive neutralism proved an inspiration to
many countries who were similarly opposed to military pacts.
By the end of 1958, the situation was changing rapidly. There was
communist opposition to organic unity with Syria and a preference for
federalism; the Communist movement itself, after a generation of
factional strife and struggle, had established the (second) Communist
Party of Egypt (28 February 1958). The emergence of a National Front
rtgime under General Qassem after the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958
was looked upon as an ’alternative’ in Egypt. There was repression
against the communists and the Left (January-March 1959); and there
was also penetration in depth of the Syrian administration and
economy by the military group and by leading sections of the Egyptian
bourgeoisie.

On the home front, however, the military group continued to wield a
monopoly of political power; and the Egyptian bourgeoisie again
displayed a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm for the economic policy of
the rtgime. In particular it showed a marked reluctance to invest in the
industrial sector. Something had to be done to restore some degree of
harmony to the alliance.

3. The third stage, still under way, started with the laws of nationalization
of July 1961. The military rCgime had earlier shown its hand by
nationalizing the National Bank of Egypt and the Misr Bank (11
February 1960). By the beginning of 1962, all banks, all heavy industry,
insurance, and the key economic enterprises were State-owned; all
middle-scale economic units had to accept a fifty-one per cent State
participation in their capital ownership and therefore in their administration.
There was further an extensive medium and light sector of
economic activity in which the State’s participation was enforced and
the whole network was made to fit into the newly created "Public
Organisms" of which, at the beginning, there were thirty-eight. This
constituted the public sector as against the private one. Economic
planning had begun with the first Five Year Plan (1960-70) whose aim
was the doubling of the gross national product in all fields of the
economy.

The “third revolution” of 12 August 1963 brought a new wave of
legislation which nationalized 228 companies in industry, transport and
mines. Former shareholders were to receive compensation, in the shape
of State bonds bearing four per cent interest, payable in fifteen years.
Another 177 companies (including all internal transport and three arms
factories) followed on 11 November 1963; then came the turn of six
land companies (1 8 November 1963).

This profound modification of the key sectors of the Egyptian
economy had to find reflection in the socio-political field; and it was
the task of the National Congress of Popular Forces (made up of
national capitalists, peasants, workers, the liberal professions, civil
servants, university teaching staffs, students, women-the armed
services were added later as one of these “forces”) to discuss the draft
of the Charter of National Action, presented to its members by President
GamEil Abdel-Nasser on 21 May 1963. This important document proclaimed,
inter alia, that “socialism is the way to social freedom” and
that “scientific socialism” is the suitable style for finding the right
method leading to pr gress." T he Charter was adopted despite
fanatical opposition inspired by the Moslem Brotherhood. A new
organization, the Arab Socialist Union, was to be established as the
central organ of political activity and it was intended to represent all
popular forces, the workers and peasants being entitled to fifty per cent
of the seats in all the committees of the Arab Socialist Union as well as
in the future Council of the Nation.

 II.

It is not difficult to understand why these developments have led to
intellectual and political confusion and why there has been a marked
tendency to oversimplify the definition of the new society that is
emerging in Egypt. It has been variously estimated as socialism at one
end of the scale and, at the other, as leading to the establishment of a
new bourgeoisie which will become the tool of neo-imperialism.0
1. In the field of economics, the following facts can be established:

(i) The controlling position of imperialism has been uprooted and both
the economic resources of the country as well as the power of political
decision are now entirely in Egyptian hands.

(ii) Until 1963, private ownership was still the dominant mode of production
in the Egyptian economy as a whole and especially in the
sectors of landowning and the building industry. The estimates of the
1962-63 Budget put the private sector’s contribution to national income
at 65.8 per cent of the total, thus leaving only 34-2 per cent to the public
sector. The proportion of private and public, measured by national
income contribution, naturally varied widely between different parts
of the economy, private being represented by 93.8 per cent in agriculture,
87.5 per cent in building, 79.1 per cent in commerce, and 56.4 per
cent in industry." However, the new wave of nationalization measures
of August 1963 brought eighty per cent of industry into the public
sector; and the November decrees aimed at making the public sector a
majority influence in commerce, transport and armaments factories.
But agriculture remained relatively untouched, as did building.
It is now clear that the strategic sectors of the national economy have
been taken away from the Egyptian bourgeoisie and brought under the
ownership and control of the State.

(iii) The State controls the objectives, the tempo and the methods of
growth of the national economy as a whole through the organs of
planning, and within the framework of the Ten Year Plan. As the State
also provides about ninety per cent of new capital formation, it can
clearly impose its own priorities in economic development, such being
large-scale industrialization, the High Dam, prospecting for new
sources of energy, and desert land recovery. Economic planning, however,
is still based on the individual enterprise and it is regulated, in a
broad way, by the market. This is well shown by the much publicized
data relating to the profits of the nationalized firms.

(iv) Thus the considerable industrial build-up, although it lays considerable
emphasis upon the heavy and strategically important industries,
still encourages the consumption pattern of a welfare state type of
economy; and through the “demonstration effect” it permits a pattern
of imports with a bias towards durable consumer goods, such as T.V.
sets and household equipment. Voices are being raised in Egypt itself
against the dangers of this situations and at the same time it is recognized
that Egypt’s rate of economic growth during the decade 1952-62 has
been somewhat inferior to that of other countrie C. le arly the creation
of new industries, even though accelerated, will not, on this pattern,
lead to a rate of economic growth which will transform Egypt into a
predominantly industrial society within a reasonable period of time.1°

(v) Although there are considerable diffjculties in assessing, with a
high degree of accuracy, the extent to which different leading social
groups are reaping the benefits of the new economic course, two groups
stand out clearly: the middle and big landowners (but not the old
landed aristocracy) and the new power Clite, described in a later section.
This new power Clite or managerial class, it must be noted here, is
not compar blew ith the entrepreneurial class which came to the fore
during the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century in Europe and
North America; and it has nothing in common with the leading strata
of the socialist countries. This, in itself, does not constitute a weakness;
it only does so when control by a mass political organization is lacking.
(vi) The repression against the Marxist Left has given considerable
encouragement to economic co-operation with, and reliance upon,
Western Germany and the United States. By mid-1963 half the wheat
supplies were coming from the U.S.A. while Western Germany received
a record number of Egyptian students, especially technologists, and at
the same time a growing, and very expensive, network of loans and joint
enterprises was being built up. The year 1963 brought some unexpected
developments, among them being the attempt to curtail Egypt’s
commitments in the Yemen by a thinly disguised wheat blackmail
threat by the United States; growing complaints about the stringent
conditions of West European (mainly German) fifiancial and economic
assistance;ll and, above all, by the opposition to Egyptian influence in
Middle Eastern politics as a whole.

(vii) To sum up: the Egyptian economy appears as a mixed economy.
It is still in many ways capitalistic: the land remains nearly untouched
by nationalization; the public sector, though under the direction of
manage (technocrats) is still ruled by the market and (public) profit
incentive; and planning, and foreign aid particularly, tend to strengthen
this pattern, at least in the short run. It is a relatively fast-growing
economy with a central state-capitalistic sector (the public sector) of
unusual proportions;12 but every new wave of nationalization, while it
weakens the power of private capital, only provides more solidly
entrenched positions and power to the technocrats.

The transition to socialism can be said to be taking place when the
delegates of the “popular forces” direct the political and economic life
of the country. At present Egypt is ruled by a powerful State apparatus
and an economic technocracy. Socialism further requires that economic
development and planning shall develop the capital goods sector
and not, as is at present happening, be concerned with the building of a
welfare society (which is now the main support of the military-technocratic
power Clite). These are the two main economic prerequisites to
socialism, and for the rest we must turn to a consideration of the sociopolitical
situation.

 III.

In the socio-political field, the following appear to be the main
features :

(i) The dismantling of the (traditional) Egyptian bourgeoisie has been
accomplished, as already noted, in two stages.

(ii) The bourgeoisie has been replaced by an Establishment, controlling
the strategic, dynamic sectors of the economy and of society as a whole:
that is, the public sector of the economy, the State apparatus (the
armed forces and security services), and the political and ideological
organizations and institutions (civil service, foreign affairs, publishing,
the arts and the mass media).
These new leading cadres have been recruited mainly from the petty
and middle bourgeois strata, but they include some from the old ruling
groups: senior officers, technical experts (economists, engineers, university
professors), administrators and organizers.13

(iii) The officers’ corps is now organically integrated with the leading
economic, administrative and political groups. All those who had to
leave the armed forces, or who have elected to do so, have been
appointed to the upper ranks of the non-military establishment. About
1,500 officers have come within this category between 1952 and 1964.

(iv) The new power tlite can be defined more as a technocracy, largely
under German and American influence in their attitudes and approach,
rather than a mere bureaucracy. This technocratic Clite is superimposed
on the huge traditional Egyptian bureaucracy, which is still growing
fast but which today wields less power than it did under the inefficient
ministers of the former regimes. The Press is continuously engaged in
campaigns to improve the efficiency of this passive bureaucracy and to
try to force it to adapt itself to the needs and tempo of the technocratic
tlite.14

The dangers of the situation whereby this highly concentrated technocratic
Establishment sits astride the bureaucratic pyramid become more
apparent when we analyse the structure of manpower and the labour
force in Egypt. In 1960 seventy-seven per cent of the population could
be reckoned within the manpower category although only 32.6 per cent
were in the labour force. This labour force, moreover, apart from those
in agriculture was heavily concentrated within the tertiary sector. The
broad divisions are: 21.7 per cent in the infrastructure and services:
10.6 per cent in commerce: 54-3 per cent in agriculture: 10.6 per cent
in manufacturing and 2-8 per cent in building and construction.15
These figures show clearly the extent to which the dynamic sectormanufacturing-
is limited in the Egyptian economy today. Under such
conditions, the over-concentration of economic, political and ideological
power in the hands of the technocratic-bureaucratic Establishment
may well prove harmful to Egypt’s future development.

(v) The new power tlite gathered strength in the struggle against the
Egyptian Marxist Left (the Communist Party and the large fringe of
progressives and militants). The anti-communist repression has continued,
with different degrees of severity, since August 1952, and it
reached a high point, first, between 1954 and 1956, and then again from
January 1959. While there is a general State law prohibiting all political
parties, there is a specific anti-communist law, dating from the late
1920s, and which has been strengthened by the military rCgime. No
other such law applies to any other organized ideology. Yet the general
line of Egyptian Marxism, despite its persecution, has been one of
critical, but not conditional, support of the rtgime, and its objectives
have been the promotion of a popular-democratic national state.
It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that the leading cadres of
the rkgime are recruited from two ideological groups: the German-
American and the Moslem Brotherhood. At the end of 1963 the Arab
Socialist Union was under the direction of Major Hussein al-Shafei
(from the Moslem Brotherhood wing of the Free Officers); Dr. Abdel-
Qbder Hatem, Minister of Culture and National Orientation (typical of
the American cadre); and Kamal Rifaat (an enlightened technocrat,
with Titoist sympathies).16 The Union had absorbed those who
belonged to the Moslem Brotherhood1’ but only a few Left personalities,
and these in their individual capacity.18 The overall economic direction
of the economy is in the hands of Vice-President Abdel-Latif al-
Boghdbdi (a former manager of Misr Airways, and known to represent
the alliance between the officers’ corps and big business) and Dr.
Abdel-Moneirn al-Kayssofini (a capable economist of the Liberal
school).lg The president of the Executive Council, Ali Sabri, a highly
efficient administrator, had, up till 1952, a conspicuous pro-American
past. These are only a few names, but they show an unmistakeable
trend. So much so, that Ahmad Bah% Eddine, the editor of the daily
Ai-Akhbdr, could write that "what we discover first, inside the U.A.R.,
is that the revolution has concentrated its efforts on building the
’material characteristics’ of socialist society without concentrating on
its ’human characteristics,’ i.e. the socialists! There can be no socialism
without socialists! . ."20 This is now sought, inside the framework of
the Arab Socialist Union, through the creation of an inner core of
educated political cadres. It is said that they will comprise a larger
proportion of the Left.21

(vi) Over-centralization and anti-Marxism-in a State whose official
philosophy and policy are described as “scientific socialism”-impart
a highly autocratic flavour and style to present-day Egyptian society.
Every step forward comes as a decision of the State machine from above,
never as an initiative from the people. While no other political parties
have been allowed, the rkgime has proved itself unable to inspire and
organize its own party. The result has been a growing and widespread
political apathy, in a country that hitherto was notably ebullient. If
the State insists on doing everything by itself, and by order, then why
not watch from afar?22

It must be emphasized that this political apathy is a new phenomenon.
It did not exist before 1959. Even the crisis of the spring of 1954 did
not stop political activity, contact and discussion; and this was followed
by the period of the opposition to the Bagdad Pact, the Suez crisis and
the “Bandoeng” period. Between 1939 and 1959 Egyptian Marxism
had succeeded in attracting the best of Egyptian youth to its philosophic
ideas and to its vision of an Egyptian renaissance; and it had become
the intellectual dynamic for both the intelligentsia and the working class
in the main cities. Because of the lack of contacts with the international
Communist movement in general, and the Soviet Union in particular,
Egyptian Marxism was compelled to find a way forward by developing
its own theoretical position within a distinctly national framework (and
this long before the theory of “polycentrism” was form lated)I.t s i de as
and theories met with the respect of the non-Marxist sections of the
intelligentsia and informed patriotic opinion. The severe repression of
1959 therefore deeply affected not only the Marxists but progressive
groupings in general. The attempt to destroy this body of thought and
action was to bring about a general crisis in all fields of intellectual and
political life. The intellectuals were singled out, but they were only the
symbols of a far wider crisis of Egyptian society and one which involved
the gravest dangers for the whole course of Egypt’s future.

 IV.

Much can be gained, at this point, by turning our attention to the
problem of the superstructute of Egyptian society.

(i) Throughout the ages Egyptian history illustrates certain special
characteristics which have involved over-centralization in its administrative
structures from its earliest days. The struggle of the Egyptian
people to live and work amid deserts has meant that there must always
be a central authority responsible for artificial irrigation, the regulation
of the Nile level, drainage and the allocation of water. Since this could
not be supervised by some regional authority, the land of the Pharaohs
came to be the seat of the oldest centralized and unified State in history,
and the most compact of the “hydraulic” societies. In later times the
regulator of water supply was to be the main controller, or owner, of
economic resources and activity. This has happened twice in modern
history: the first time under Muhammad-Ali and then today, with the
military rCgime led by Ganl2l Abdel-Nasser. Private ownership is but
a recent development in Egyptian economic history and was only
introduced late in the nineteenth century.

This centralized control and management, and sometimes ownership,
in the economic field under a single State authority was bound to
enhance the role and importance of the State apparatus to an unusual
degree. Further, if we take into account the geo-political vulnerability
of Egypt, the need to build a strong army was a logical consequence.
It is, therefore, no coincidence that army leaders should wield economic
power during many periods of Egyptian history: after the eviction of
the Hyksos; during the Mamluk era; under Muhammad-Ali; and
today, in the form of the present military rkgime, with its control over
the public sector.

These developments in the economic sphere were inevitably reffected
in matters of ideology; and from the Pharaohs to Gamil Abdel-Nasser
the master of temporal power has also been the centre of a unified
spiritual power. Here is the source of the long tradition of theocracy in
Egypt; and we should remember that even before Coptic (i.e. Egyptian)
monotheism came to the fore, the Pharaonic pantheon showed a clear
tendency towards unity; and this trend was also powerful behind the
Sunnite Islam of Egypt.

(ii) This last point can serve as an introduction to the general analysis
of ideology.
Let us consider briefly the development of the modern intellectual
situation,* from the time of the cultural renaissance initiated by
Muhammad-Ali’s envoy to Europe, Rifat al-Tahtawi (1801-73).
Two main trends can be distinguished-Islamic fundamentalismz5 and
liberalism. The first, initiated by Gamal Eddine al-Afghani took shape
with his reluctant disciple, Cheikh Muhammad AbdoQ. Their aim was
to promote a new renaissance in the lands of Islam by criticizing
decadent tradition in the light of common sense and reason but still
within the framework of religion. Religion must continue to hold the
central position in social life and politics. All factors which lead to
disunity, such as political parties, should be proscribed, although discussion
could be allowed to take place within a unified and centralized
organization and the religious education of the people would gradually
prepare the way for representative government; but, AbdoQ proclaimed,
only a benevolent despot “could promote the renaissance of the East,”
and he added: “fifteen years would be enough.” This trend came to
have its right wing-the Salafiyya-with the Al-Mandr group of Rachid
Rida and, above all, the Moslem Brotherhood. Its radical wing, however,
continued its search for a reasonable degree of liberalism within
the framework of Islam; and this was the work of Ali Abd al-Raziq, his
brother Mustapha, and later, of Khaled Muhammad Khaled. The
second main trend, liberalism, was launched towards the end of last
century, by a group of Lebanese CmigrC thinkers and writers who had
found refuge in Egypt (the AI-Muqtataf group and above all Shibli
Shumayyil as well as Farah Antoan). About the same time a number of
prominent members of the new Egyptian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia
were also searching for the conditions which would lead to a national
renaissance. Among these were the Al-Garida group of Loutfi al-Sayyid,
Qassem Amin, Ahmad Fathi ZaghloQl, and Saad Zaghloiil, who was
to create the Wafd and lead the revolution of 1919. On the ],eft of this
group stood the socialists, Shumayyil and AntoQn and, particularly,
Sallma Moussa and Abdel Rahm5n Fahmi. It was this broad trend
which has been largely responsible for the development of modern
Egyptian culture and politics from 1919 to 1959. The central figures are
Taha Hussein and Tawfiq al-Hakim, and they were accompanied and
followed by large numbers of active intellectuals. On the left of this
main group were the Egyptian Marxists, who first appeared in 1922, but
whose influence has been more powerful since 1939. Finally, on the
right of this liberal trend another group was developing under Gerrnan-
American influence and it was closely linked with the Egyptian bourgeoisie
(the Akhbrir al- Ydm group, with Abbas al-Aqqid as its intellectual
leader).

The Free Officers who carried through the 1952 revolution mostly
came from the radical wing of Islamic fundamentalism. Some belonged
to the Moslem Brotherhood but only very few to the Marxist groups.26
The majority, under Gam2l Abdel Nasser, were at first naturally
inclined to Islamic fundamentalism. This was their intellectual tradition
and it provided a respectable justification for their professional emphasis
upon authority as well as for their contempt for discussion and factions.
Moreover, they believed that their traditional faith would help to unite
the nation behind them and that, as an ideology, it was not only more
efficient than the vague ideas of the Wafd but even more important,
that it would provide an effective counter to the ideas of Marxism,
potentially the only serious opposition. This was the position at any
rate until the 1954 crisis with the Moslem Brotherhood. It was, however,
in the process of grappling with the many difficult problems of the
take-off after independence that a change was forced upon the
Egyptian leadership. Their central problem was the creation of a modern
society in Egypt. This was first attempted during the second main stage
of the revolution-between the years 1956 and 1961-in alliance with
the big bourgeoisie, and with the landlord class excluded. Although
in the end the alliance was to end in failure, one important result
was that Islamic fundamentalism developed a virulent anti-Marxist
orientation.

This failure provoked a major crisis of ideas and policy. It was a
serious blow to the Establishment and even more to the right-wing
elements in the political leadership. Gam%l Abdel-Nasser himself had
been for years moving slowly to a pragmatic vision of the futurez7 and
he was gradually appreciating the need for a rethinking of fundamentals.
This was to be the business of the 1962 Congress: "The
socialist solution to the problem of social development in Egypt-with
a view to achieving progress in a revolutionary way-was never a
question of free choice. The socialist solution was an historical inevitability
imposed by reality, the broad aspirations of the masses and the
changing nature of the world in the second part of the twentieth
centuryu-so reads Section 6 of the Charter entitled "On the Inevitability
of the Socialist Solution.“And Section 9 on”Arab Unity,"2B
following as it did the famous speech of self-criticism of 16 October
1961, came very close to an abandonment of the policy of organic and
centralized unity, put forward in the years 1956 to 1961. It began,
moreover, to approach the policy advocated by the Egyptian Marxists.
This may be summed up as, first, the need for unity in the struggle
against imperialism; second, an emphasis upon the oneness of culture
and historical traditions of the Arab world; and third, the necessity for
international policies which would further the reunification of the Arab
world in ways that would respect the traditions and the needs of each
individual country. Paradoxically, it was just these ideas of the Marxist
Left which were made the pretext for the repression which began in
January 1959.29

 V.

What, exactly, are the fundamental contradictions in the present
situation of Nasserism? By answering this question we shall also be
able to assess the chances of socialism.

The United Arab Republic can be characterized as an advanced
independent, autocratic State with a predominantly State-capitalistic
planned economy. It has gone further than many comparable societies
in the way of control over its own resources and in the establishment of
its own inalienablesovereignty. The Cold War setting of the international
situation has provided Egypt’s leaders with the opportunity to develop a
new type of neutralism which, in a number of important respects, has
brought increased support to the economy. There are, however, some
critical points in the present situation whose problems are becoming
progressively more difficult:

(i) The regime is trying to accelerate the rate of economic growth, but
for this it needs an organized popular support which at present does
not exist. The State apparatus, which is still growing, is not only not
an alternative but it will increasingly act as a drag upon the forces of
change. Over-centralization, which has taken an anti-Marxist turn, has
destroyed or alienated or neutralized a considerable reserve of political
and intellectual cadres whose participation is now essential. There can
be no solution to Egypt’s economic problems, made much more acute
by the high birth rate and the lack of land,3O without the re-establishment
of political liberty. The argument being developed here is that
there can be no take-off into sustained economic growth without the
political mobilization of the mass of the people: "There can be no
socialism without socialists."

(ii) By relying to a large extent on foreign aid, and by listening to
bourgeois counsels during the 1956-61 period, the rtgime is now faced
with an even more dangerous situation. The idea of Arab unity paved
the way for the Baath, whose strategic role is first to wrest the initiative
from Nasserism in the Arab world, and then to assist in its destruction,
after having liquidated the communist^.^^ At the same time there is on
the part of Nasserism a determination to stand by Arab revolutionary
movements. This has led to the all-out support which was given to the
Algerian Democratic Republic, as well as to the Yemeni expedition,
and it is this sort of role in international affairs, unthinkable a few years
ago, which gives to Nasserism in this present period a marked antiimperialist
stance. It follows that conflict with the United States in
particular is likely to be in the context of a domestic situation
in which the Egyptian leadership can rely on its own State power, and
the general sympathies of the Arab masses, but in which it still lacks
the ability to mobilize and develop mass initiative. And such mass
support is required, not only to sustain and encourageits anti-imperialist
stand in international affairs, but to curb and combat the many opposition
groups within its own society.

That the army came to play such an important part in the moulding
of contemporary Egypt might appear to some as unfortunate, but it is,
in fact, the way all nations have achieved Statehood-by the sword.
It is this in part, at any rate, which accounts for the considerable
impact of Nasserism on quite wide sections of radical opinion in the
under-developed countries of the world. In general, it must be said that
Gam2l Abdel-Nasser has gone further than his forerunner, Mustapha
Kemal Ataturk and further than most Latin-American nationalistreformist
politicians, such as Peron.

Nasserism? The word itself-an Egyptian prototype of national
development-was unknown until recently. It has come to mean that
mixture of radical independence, the reconquest of national identity,
and emphasis on social progress, which is usually described as nationalism
but which it may be more accurate to characterize as the "nationalitarian
stage" of development, to indicate the period during which
the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are freeing themselves
from imperialism and neo-imperialism, recovering and building up
their own national identities in the world context of the Cold War.33
The fact that the national state in Egypt has taken an autocratic
form and that such a prominent position is occupied by the army34 must
not be allowed to confuse one’s analysis, nor should these facts be taken
as an “unmistakable” sign of the reactionary character of the rkgime.
For there is no such thing as an irreversible fatality in historical development35
and full weight must be given to both the positive as well as the
negative features in the situation.

The outcome of the present position will depend on the inner evolution
of the two main radical currents of thought and action: Nasserism
on the one hand, and Egyptian Marxism on the other. The first has
changed in many ways since 1952, for it has learnt the dangers of
political apathy and the absence of mass organization; it has begun to
understand and expose its own reactionary brethren, and it has arrived
at the point where the Charter of 1962 could be formulated as a middle
of the road programme, acceptable to wide sections of the national
movement. It is true that the lower ranks and many leading personalities
still refuse to speak of scientific socialism and continue to adhere
to the ideas and the concept of Arab socialism, as a weapon against
Marxism. But 1963 has witnessed the cautious release of several dozens
of political prisoners; and it is now possible to make a distinction
between the radical wing of the rkgime, headed by Gamal Abdel-Nasser,
which is still taking the initiative, and the powerfully entrenched
reactionary vested interests. In one important respect, the dangers and
the lessons of right-wing nationalism-that is, the Baathist offensive,
with strong Western, mainly American, support-have been understood;
but only, so it appears, inasmuch as they constitute a menace
to the frontiers of Egyptian influence.36

On the other side, Egyptian Marxism, even under the conditions of
widespread repression, has shown a resilience that has enabled its
cadres to maintain their political appeal to the Egyptian people; and
the influence of their ideas has continued to grow. Their political
approach since 1952, emphasized since Suez and the foundation of the
second Communist Party of Egypt, has been to encourage a populardemocratic
content to the national movement and thus to launch the
socialist stage in the Egyptian renaissance. The Marxists see their
historical role, therefore, not in developing an alternative array of
forces in opposition to Nasserism but in putting Nasserism on the road
to socialism. In Algeria, the socialist revolution, under the leadership of
Ahmed Ben Bella, within a general framework of reference that is both
national and Islamic, is showing the way to national reconciliation, as
well as emphasizing the central importance of the peasant revolution.
Speculation about the future in Egypt may be summarized thus: the
choice is either a coalition of the two main radical trends in the national
movement, which will allow Egypt to make full use of its potentialities,
at home, in the Arab world, in the world struggle against imperialism,
and to begin to move towards socialism; or the elimination of
these possibilities by the combined action of pro-imperialist forces
in the Arab world together with reactionary forces within the Egyptian
Establishment.

Twelve years have elapsed since the main radical trends in the
Egyptian national movement began their passionate debate and their
fratricidal “war in darkness.” The time has now come, and the situation
is now more clearly defined, to proceed to a more frank, straightforward
and confident dialogue. There is no other path forward.

Cairo-Paris (C.N.R.S.)

Notes:

1. Egypte, socie’tt militaire (Paris, 1962), referred to hereafter as Egypte.

2. This refers to articles and essays published in Cairo (1956-59), and, particularly,
to the Introduction to the series Maktabat al-afkcir, published, under this title,
as a preface to the Arabic translation (by Adly B. Abdel-Malek) of V. Gordon
Childe, History (Cairo, 1959), pp. 5-14; this Arabic theoretical platform for
open Marxism was brought to the attention of the European reader by J.Berque:
Les Arabes d’hier a demain (Paris, 1960), p. 102, n. 24.

3. Credit for this analynis should be given, above all, to Ibrahim Amer’s Al-ard
wa’l-fallri’, al-mas’ala a/-zirri’iyya ji Misr (Cairo, 1958). He made a highly
significant use of Marx’s ideas on “Oriental despotism” (and the whole concept
of the “hydraulic society,” developed by K. Wittfogel), and I acknowledge my
intellectual debt to him.

4. These are Muhammad Hassanein Haykal’s labels, in Azmat al-mouthaqqafin
(Cairo, 1961).

5. Mithdq al-’amal a[-watanf, English text, The Charter (Cairo, 1962), pp. 57-8.

6. American sources have no hesitation as regards the socialist nature of the rkgime;
see M. H. Kerr: “The emergence of a socialist ideology in Egypt,” Middle East
Journal (xvi, 1962, no. 2), pp. 127-44; Ch. Issawi: Egypt in revolrrrion (Oxford,
1963); both have little to say about Egyptian Marxism, Communism and pre-
Nasserite socialism. The second formulation can be found in Hassan Riad’s:
“En Egypte: sociktb militaire et capitalisme d’Etat,” Revolution (no. 1, septembre
1963), pp. 68-74, (no. 2, octobre 1963), pp. 42-52; also in Avraham Ben-Tzur:
“Le socialisme de Nasser,” Nouvelles Perspectives (juin-juillet 1963), p. 80-96.

7. “The U.A.R. Budget estimates 1962-63,” National Bank of Egypt Economic
Bulletin, (xv, 1962, nos. 2 and 3), pp. 108-25; Al-Ahram, 30 June 1962.

8. A detailed survey of public spending-"I15 mat5 youmkin an yastamirr istih-
IPkouna fi’l-ziylda 50 milydn gounayh koull sans?’-undertaken by AI-Ahram
(1, 2, 3 and 4 August 1963), revealed that public spending on commodities was
rising by some 50 million Egyptian pounds per year: from 876 millions in 1959
to 1,050 millions in 1962. This had to be brought under control, this influential
newspaper implied, if economic development was to bear fruit. And Ihsan
Abdel-QoddoOs: “There are people who think about socialism thus:”why not
sell the factory and buy a T.V. set and refrigerator for each worker, with its
price? These people are dangerous and destructive!" (Rose-el- Youssef (quoted
from here on as R.Y.) no. 1843, 7 October 1963.)

9. Ch. Issawi: "The period 1952-62 has been one of rapid economic and social
advance all over the world-not only in the developed regions, but in most parts
of the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and large parts of Latin America. . . . It
should be noted that the per capita (Egyptian) rate of growth since 1952 has been
slightly below the world average," op cit., p. 47, n. 3. However, Dr. Abdel-
Moneim al-Kayssocni, Minister of the Treasury and Planning, declared, in his
Press conference of 17 October 1963, that the U.A.R. rate of economic development
during the year 1962-63 was nearly double that of most other countries:
8.5 per cent, as against an averageof three to four per cent (Al-Ahram, 18 October
1963). Dr. Abdel-RPziq Hassan, head of the Research Dept. at the Industrial
Bank, complained about the contradictions of official data, as provided by
Dr. KayssoOni and Dr. Aziz Sidky, Minister of Industry ("Kayfa naqiss
al-kif5ya al-intPgiyya?’Al-Ahram, 5 November 1963).

10. By 1969-70, manufacturing is expected to represent 11-7 per cent only of the
labour-force (as against 10-6 per cent in 1959-60), while agriculture will have
gone down slightly: 49.9 per cent, as against 54.3 per cent (cf. the undermentioned
“Population and manpower”). By then, the working class will be
even more differentiated from the fellahs than today; both more specialized
and more bureaucratic, as long as genuine political activity remains blocked,
and their militant leaders banned.

11. This is what the Research Department of the National Bank of Egypt has to
say: "Experience has shown that loans from the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have
been obtained on favourable terms. . . . However, loans from Western Europe
do impose some burden on the balance of payments because of their short
term nature and comparatively high rates of interest,“in”Stabilisation of the
U.A.R. economy," N.B.E. Econ. Bull. (xvi, 1963, nos. 1 and 2). p. 2.

12. Even a professor of economics and a high-ranking official such as Dr. Hussein
KhallPf hesitates to speak of “socialism” (cf. AI-tagdid fi’l-iqtisscid al-Mirf
al-mourisser, Cairo, 1962, pp. 455-64).

13. Egypte . . . , pp. 45-6, 104, 107, 174-7, 366. C. Issawi, having dismissed the
“inter-war period” intelligentsia, writes: "It was this combination of social
scientists, many of whom took cabinet or high administrative posts during the
early years of the Revolution, with entrepreneurs, managers and administrators,
which was to sustain the new rbgime during its first dbcade," op cit., p. 93-4.
On this latter element, cf. H. Harbison and I. Abdel-Kader Ibrahim: Human
resources for Egyptian enterprises (New York, 1958). The best informed description
is Hassan Riad’s: “Les trois iiges de la sociCtC Cgyptienne,” Partisans
(no. 7, 1962), pp. 22-50, (no. 8, 1963), pp. 42-58; and the above mentioned
articles in R volution.

14. Particular mention should be made of the “page of opinion” (safhat al-ra’y)
of AI-Ahram, and the round tables organized and publicized by the influential
weekly, Rose el- Youssef.

15. “Population and manpower,” N.B.E. Econ. Bull. (xvi, 1963, nos. 1 and 2),
p. 5-16.

16. Together, they constitute the “Committee of socialist propaganda and thought”
of the A.S.U. (Al-Ahram, 4 October 1963); as such, they are to supervise the
Higher Institute for Socialist Orientation (AI-Ahram, 16 April 1963). R.Y.
published the abridged text of Kamal Rifaat’s report on Yugoslav socialism
in nine instalments (nos. 1831 to 1839, from 15 July to 9 September 1963).

17. Le Monde (22-23 September 1963) spoke of the “rehabilitation” of members of
the Moslem Brotherhood who had been deprived of their political rights,
following a decision of the State Council.

18. Hussein al-Shafei “assimilated” ex-members of “Ikhwiin al-Hourriyya” (the
secret organization of pro-British Palace circles, before 1952). The communists.
Moslem Brothers (this was lifted by the above mentioned decision), usurers,
drug smugglers and other criminals were all to be deprived of A.S.U. membership
(Al-Ahram, 2 April 1963).

19. Cf. his typescript Ph.D. Econ. thesis, Monetary policy in agricultural raw
material producing countries with special reference to Egypt (University of
London, 1942).

20. Al-thawra a/-ichtirikiyya, qa&ya wa moundqachdt (Cairo, 1962), p. 56. And
Ihdn Abdel-Qoddofis: "Those who don’t understand socialism are not entitled
to explain socialism on the pages of the newspapers" (R. Y., no. 1798,26 November
1962) ; Dr. Fuad Mohieddine: "We are witnessing ideological disintegration.
Among the high ideals presented by the Press, radio, T.V. and the theatre, some
are capitalistic, and some are socialist; ideology is nearly absent from the
information media“; Muhammad Auda:”We can only regret to see nonsocialist
and unpolitically conscious trade-union leaderships, some of which
were agents of capitalism" (R. Y., no. 1847,4 November 1963); etc.

21. Cf. The full text of draft statutes, and the final ones, of the A.S.U. (Al-Ahram,
17 November and 8 December 1962). There is not a single known socialist in
the “supreme executive committee” (ibid., 29 October 1963). Later, one single
Marxist member was included in the general committee. Elections to the 7,000
committees of the A.S.U. (ibid., 5 December 1962) comprising 4,310,851
members gave a 57 per cent majority of seats to peasants and workers; 7.66 per
cent abstained, and 7.11 per cent were invalid (A., 14 June 1963).

22. About political apathy, cf.: “IntaziroQ al-taalimat” (R. Y., no. 1840, 16 September
1963); “AI-nls wa’l-nifiq” (R. Y., no. 1841, 23 September 1963); "Allazin
ichtarokofi fi koull tanzim“(R.Y., no. 1814, 18 March 1963);”Al-wouzarP“wa’l-maqled al-khlliya” (R.Y., no. 1815, 25 March 1963); etc. Already, by
September 1963, there had been 90,000 formal appeals to the Executive Committee
against abuse, thus assimilating the A.S.U. to the State (R. Y., no. 1842,
20 September 1963).

23. M. Rodinson’s “L’Egypte nassbrienne au miroir marxiste,” Les Temps Modernes
(no. 203, avril 1963), pp. 1859-87, rightly insists on this aspect of my analysis,
but says nothing of historical national specificity.

24. Some recent works, in European languages, provide an introduction, namely:
M. Jamal Ahmad, The intelIectua1 origins of Egyptian nationalism (1960);
N. Safran, Egypt in search of political community (1961); A. Hourani, Arabic
thought in the liberal age 1798-1939 (1 962).

25. 1 have found it necessary to use this term-instead of the unspecified "Islamic
NASSERISM AND SOCIALISM 55
modernism "-for reasons explained in Egypte . . . , pp. 199-204, and in the
Introduction to my forthcoming study, Matkriauxpour l’itude de lapenske arabe
contemporaine.

26. C ’ P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian army inpolitics (Bloomington, 1961), pp. &68;
and Egypte . . . , pp. 204-18.

27. One can hardly fail to remember Atatiirk’s words: "But what can we do if we
don’t resemble democracy, we don’t resemble socialism, we don’t resemble
anything? Gentlemen, we should be proud of defying comparison! Because,
Gentlemen, we resemble ourselves." (Quoted by C. Issawi, op. cit., p. 46.)

28. The Charter, pp. 57-68, 105-10; italics are mine.

29. Cf. the full dossier published by the "League of the progressive Egyptians
abroad" : The great crime against the Egyptian people (mimeo., January 1962, no
indication as to place of publishing), pp. 112.

30. C ’ the above mentioned “Population and manpower,” and Dr. Ali al-Geretli,
"AI-soukkdn wa’l-mawdred abiqtissddiyya fi Misr (Cairo, 1962).

31. CJ the author’s “Le mouvement d’unitt arabe et la situation internationale,”
Croissance des Jeunes Nations (no. 23, 1963), pp. 19-20; and the round table
“L’Egypte et I’unitt arabe-recontre-dtbat avec Anouar Abdel-Malek,”
Dkmocratie Nouvelle (no. 6, juin 1963), pp. 72-81 ; (no. 7, juillet-aoiit 1963),
pp. 73-84.

32. G. Lenczowski rightly states: "As for relations between Cairo and Washington,
they can never be expected to attain a level of cordiality, largely on account of
American commitments to third parties who have unsettled political accounts
with Nasser’s rkgime." The Middle East in world affairs (3^rd ed., Ithaca, 1962),
p. 532.

33. M. H. Haykal dates back the use of the word “Nasserism” to the Egyptian
campaign against the Baghddd Pact (“Al-khatar al-N%sseri,” AI-Ahram,
25 January 1963.). C-f. my- “Q-u’est -ce que le Nasstrisme?” Croiss. Jnes. Nal.,
ibid., pp. %’-8.

34. The role of the army in the new, “socialist,” Egypt, has been formulated by
Gam5l Abdel-Nasser himself ("We want no oliticiansin side the army. Bur
the army, as a whole, is a force in the midst of national politics." (AI-Ahram,
27 July 1962), and Marshal Abdel-Hakim Amer, to the returning troops from
the Yemen ("You are the army of the revolution which moved forth on 23 July,
without any wish or desire but the interests of this people! ibid., 8 November
1963). Specialists would detect a somewhat more traditional approach in th s
latter speech. Cf. our “Le r61e des militaires dans les rkents coups d’Etat,”
Le Monde diplomatique (no. 108, avril 1963), p. 4.

35. Hassan Riad: "Comme hier son prkdtcesseur, la bourgeoisie aristocratique, un
jour, la bureaucratie nasstrienne se dtmasquera, passera dans le camp occidental.
deviendra un appendice de l’imptrialisme" (op. cit., Re’volution, no. 2, 1963,
p. 52).

36. This is exemplified by M. H. Haykal’s editorials, reflecting the President’s views,
about the Baath, and more so, by the U.A.R. government’s attitude to Iriq.