North Korea has shocked and challenged the world
by punching a big hole through the global nuclear
order. The effects of its test will ricochet for
a long time, changing the Asian balance of power
and impacting Iran.

The explosion underscores some plain unvarnished
wisdom: the best way to deal with “problem cases”
like North Korea is to discard nuclear weapons as
a currency of power by pursuing the global
nuclear disarmament agenda. The alternative is to
risk a more unsafe world with yet more
nuclear-armed states.

North Korea shows that a small (pop 23 million),
poor, economically and politically isolated
country, which recently experienced famines, can
build nuclear weapons if it is determined to.
Splitting the atom requires neither high science
nor very advanced technology.

The science is more than 60 years old, and the
technology no more sophisticated than what a car
garage has—once you have fissile material or
reactors. The test sets a terrible example. Some
40 countries have significant civilian nuclear
programmes, which can be diverted to make weapons.

Why did North Korea test? It has a long history
of conflict with South Korea and the United
States. During the 1950-53 Korean War, General
Douglas MacArthur had plans to launch nuclear
strikes against the North. The Cold War has not
ended in the Korean peninsula.

More recently, President George W. Bush torpedoed
the reconciliation process between the Koreas. In
2002, he named North Korea an “exis of evil”
state and reneged on aid promises. This negated
the improvement in Washington-Pyongyang
relations, including the 1994 Agreed Framework,
under which North Korea suspended its nuclear
activities.

In 2003, Pyongyang quit the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Six-party Talks
with Pyongyang (involving the US, Russia, China,
Japan and South Korea) faltered largely because
of inept US diplomacy. Yet, in September 2005,
Pyongyang signed a preliminary denuclearisation
agreement in Beijing. Four days later, Washington
declared economic war on it.

After the US-led invasion of Iraq, North Korea
became desperate to prevent a regime change in
Pyongyang. More recently, it became uncomfortable
with the appointment of militarist Shinzo Abe as
Japan’s prime minister and the lead taken by
South Korea’s Ban Ki-Moon in the election of the
United Nations secretary general.

On October 3, Pyongyang foreign ministry said: "A
people without a reliable war deterrent are bound
to meet a tragic death and [loss of] sovereigntyŠ
This is a bitter lesson taught by the bloodshedŠ
in different parts of the world." The blast
followed six days later.

North Korea’s test exposes the folly of relying
on purely physical controls—like International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards under the NPT—to
prevent nuclear materials from being put to
military use. IAEA safeguards are leak-prone.

In some past years, IAEA inspections failed to
account for over 20 kg of plutonium in
reprocessing plants—enough for half-a-dozen
bombs. Besides, a country can quit the NPT at
three months’ notice. That’s what Pyongyang did,
and Iran might do if cornered.

More important than safeguards, and critical to a
country’s decision not to cross the
nuclear-weapons threshold is its political will.
Without this, safeguards, even sanctions, won’t
work. In many countries, this will has got
greatly weakened—because the nuclear-weapons
states (NWSs) have refused to undertake nuclear
arms reduction, leave alone disarmament.
Thousands of nukes remain on high alert.

The five NPT-recognised NWSs have flagrantly
violated its Article VI, which mandates complete
elimination of nuclear weapons—a legal
obligation under a 1996 World Court verdict.

India and Pakistan slavishly imitate them in
their hypocrisy. India’s nuclear deal with the US
is widely seen as involving double standards:
indulgence for America’s friends (India, Israel,
Pakistan), and punishment for Iran or N. Korea.
But double standards are not Washington’s
monopoly. All NWSs practise them.

The world has condemned the North Korean test.
But it has few options to deal with Pyongyang.
Military force isn’t one. President Bush has
ruled it out—not out of magnanimity, but
compulsion. The US is bogged down in Iraq.

Over 37,000 US troops are stationed in South
Korea. North Korea’s 1.2 million-strong army,
with 11,000 artillery pieces, and an arsenal of
missiles, can make devastating conventional
strikes against South Korea and even Japan, where
another 40,000 US troops are stationed. There’s
the risk of a nuclear attack.

India and Pakistan have strongly condemned North
Korea. This is another gross instance of
hypocrisy. Pyongyang has cited the same reasons
for going nuclear that they did. It doesn’t lie
in India’s mouth to condemn Pyongyang. Nor is it
remotely credible for Pakistan to do so after Dr
A Q Khan allegedly traded uranium centrifuges
with North Korea’s missiles. Today, India and
Pakistan both practise the same hypocrisy and
double standards for which they (rightly)
criticised the N-5.

India has strongly warned against "the dangers of
clandestine proliferation". The reference is to
Pakistan. Some Indian commentators cite President
Musharraf’s “In the Line of Fire”, which says:
"Dr Khan transferred nearly two dozen P-1 and
P-11 centrifuges to North Korea" along with
auxiliary equipment and instruments.

However, on all available evidence, the Korean
test used plutonium, not uranium. The plutonium
came from a reactor at Yongbyon, built by the
Soviet Union in 1965. North Korea removed 8,000
used-fuel rods from it and extracted 25-30 kg of
plutonium, enough to make 4-6 bombs. It probably
ran the reactor between February 2003 and April
2005 too, and removed some more rods. It would be
foolish for India to use the Korean test as a
stick to beat Pakistan with. The demand that Dr
Khan be subjected to interrogation for his Korean
operations won’t cut much ice anywhere.

North Korea’s test will strengthen the
non-proliferation lobby in the US and create more
difficulties for the India-US nuclear deal, which
already faces hurdles. Japan and South Korea
would be singularly ill-advised to go nuclear in
response to North Korea. That will trigger an
arms race involving China. The whole world will
be destabilised under the impact of such an arms
race. If the US develops a "theatre ballistic
missile defence“(”Star Wars") shield for
Northeast Asia, China will respond with utmost
hostility.

The time has come for a radically different
approach, which reforms the global nuclear order
by honestly implementing the two-way bargain on
which it was originally based. Under the bargain,
the non-nuclear weapons-states agreed not to make
or acquire nuclear weapons and subjected
themselves to IAEA inspections. In return, the
NWSs committed themselves to serious negotiations
to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide. However,
the NWSs have cheated on their part of the
bargain.

The remedy lies in negotiating a return to the
global disarmament agenda. What the world needs
is de-alerting of all nuclear weapons, separating
nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and
phased destruction of nuclear armaments. Regional
initiatives are also necessary to dissuade North
Korea from a weapons programme by offering it
security assurances and generous agricultural and
industrial assistance and food and fuel aid. Such
arrangements can lead to the creation of a
Northeast Asian nuclear weapons-free zone which
addresses the security concerns of all the
regional states.

The world cannot afford any more breakouts before
it takes the nuclear bull by the horns.